COLORADO-APPEALSBLOG.COM

April 30, 2007

The supreme court's announcements for today are here. The court issued four decisions and granted cert. in one case.

In an original proceeding, the supreme court held that C.R.S. § 40-6-113(6) does not generally require the Public Utilities Commission to include advisory memoranda in the records of PUC decisions and orders. But when the staff injects new factual information into the proceedings
through an advisory memorandum read at the open meeting deliberation of the Commissioners, and the factual information has not otherwise been made part of the record, the PUC must include such factual information in the agency record for purposes of judicial review under § 40-6-115. Justice Martinez, joined by Justice Bender, dissented, taking issue with the majority's statutory interpretation as too deferential to the PUC and noting that "all new information within the advisory memoranda is necessarily part of the record under section 40-6-113(6). In addition to new factual information, whether or not disclosed by staff during the open deliberation meetings, this would include the analysis and recommendations of the PUC advisory staff in the advisory memoranda, subject to any valid deliberative process privilege claim by the PUC of those portions of the analysis and recommendations that were not revealed during the public deliberative meetings."
In Re: Board of County Commissioners v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission

The mere existence of a trial court judge’s friendship with a member of a prosecution team, by
itself, does not create either actual bias or the appearance of impropriety. Rather, disqualification depends on the closeness of that friendship and the extent of the friend’s involvement in the underlying case. In this case, the trial court judge presiding over the defendant’s criminal trial had little present social involvement with a member of the prosecution team who made a single
appearance on behalf of the district attorney’s office. Under these circumstances, the trial court judge was not required to disqualify himself from the defendant’s criminal trial. The court therefore affirmed the court of appeals’ opinion reinstating the defendant’s conviction and sentence. Justice Eid delivered the majority opinion. Justice Bender, joined by Chief Justice Mullarkey and Justice Martinez, dissented, concluding that the court should have deferred to a statement by the successor judge in the trial court, who ordered the first judge's recusal to be retroactive (the trial judge had recused himself after the trial). Justice Bender concluded that successor judge's statement was a factual finding and therefore should have been deferred to.
Schupper v. People

In an original proceeding, the supreme court granted a rule to show cause to consider the trial court’s order allowing the defendants to interview non-party medical providers outside of the presence of the plaintiffs. The non-party medical providers were involved in the medical treatment that is the basis for the plaintiffs’ malpractice action. The supreme court discharged its rule to show cause, holding the physician-patient privilege does not bar the interviews, because the non-party medical providers are subject to the statutory exception to the privilege covering medical providers who act “in consultation with” other medical providers who are sued for malpractice. This exception to the physician-patient privilege covers information relevant to the malpractice suit that is acquired by any medical provider who participates in a unified course of treating the plaintiff-patient along with a sued provider. The court further held that Samms v. District Court, 908 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1995), does not require that plaintiffs be permitted to attend the defendants’ interviews with the non-party medical providers. Samms did not create a blanket rule that a plaintiff is always entitled to attend an interview of a non-party medical provider. Instead, it held
that the trial court should take appropriate measures to protect against the divulgement of residually privileged information, and that allowing the plaintiff to attend interviews with nonparty
medical providers is the preferred measure where there is a high risk that residually privileged information will be divulged. In this case, the medical providers were “in consultation with” each other in a unified course of treatment -- a course of treatment that forms the basis of the malpractice action. The risk that residually privileged information will be divulged in this sort of situation is relatively low. Thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to require that the plaintiffs be permitted to attend the defendants’ interviews of the non-party medical providers.
In Re: Reutter v. Weber

The trial court ordered the suppression of evidence collected by an insurance investigator after determining that the Fourth Amendment applied to the investigator’s search of the crime scene. The supreme court reversed, holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search conducted by the insurance investigator. The investigator had an independent motive to search the arson crime scene apart from assisting law enforcement, and the record does not reveal that law enforcement officers encouraged or instigated the investigator to conduct the search to the degree necessary to establish that the investigator was acting as an agent of the government. Absent such agency, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the investigator’s search. People v. Pilkington

The court granted cert. in Arko v. People, No. 06SC798, on this question:

Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that petitioner’s right to present a defense was not denied when, over defense counsel’s objection, the trial court refused to give the tendered third-degree assault instruction to the jury, based on the court’s holding that defendants have a fundamental constitutional right to decide whether to submit a lesser non-included offense.

April 27, 2007

The supreme court will issue the following four decisions on Monday:

06SA213, In Re: Board of County Commissioners of the County of San Miguel v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission

05SC591, Schupper v. People

06SA79, In Re: Reutter v. Weber

06SA327, People v. Pilkington, no orals.

Yesterday's court of appeals announcements are here. The court issued only unpublished decisions.

April 25, 2007

The court of appeals will release the following unpublished decisions tomorrow (no published opinions):

No.: 03CA2135 Daniel-Barry Construction, Inc. v. Phillip David Haskett
No.: 04CA1380 People v. Bodashon Wilkins
No.: 04CA1502 People v. John W. Turner
No.: 04CA2235 People v. Linda Z. Cary
No.: 05CA0336 People v. David Michael Rome
No.: 05CA0530 Grace Stoufer v. XYZ Metro Taxi, Inc., et al.
No.: 05CA0772 People v. Charles Edward Pruitt
No.: 05CA0819 People v. Jason T. Cherry
No.: 05CA0886 People v. Brian Adrian Green
No.: 05CA1662 People v. Nicole Faith Gutierrez
No.: 05CA1683 People v. Christopher Jay Cox
No.: 05CA1711 People v. Victor Arnold Gabler
No.: 05CA1732 David R. Landing and Conrad T. Landing v. Roger T. Landing
No.: 05CA1804 Marriage of Jennifer Mertes and Rick Mertes
No.: 05CA1963 People v. Jerry Michael Weir
No.: 05CA1964 People v. Stanley Eugene Jones
No.: 05CA1967 People v. Brian William Grasman
No.: 05CA1986 Ann Hough and Michael Roy v. Carl Fosmire
No.: 05CA2025 Samuel R. Weaver, et al. v. Salida Motors, Inc., et al.
No.: 05CA2061 George Lloyd Bracksieck; et al. v. North and East Telluride Investment Co., LLP; et al. and Town of Telluride
No.: 05CA2088 Marriage of Shari Wareham and Robert Wareham and Concerning Diane Carlton
No.: 05CA2332 People v. Antonio Abraham Alcantar
No.: 05CA2363 Sanford B. Schupper v. Wayne Cole
No.: 05CA2375 Marriage of Elizabeth I. Walker and David L. Walker
No.: 05CA2378 People v. Alfredo Serna
No.: 05CA2420 People v. Charles Robert Shepard
No.: 05CA2486 Michael J. Kellam, et al. v. Gary Johnson, et al.
No.: 05CA2522 Waterstone Environmental Hydrology and Engineering, Inc. and Holland & Hart, LLP v. Alecta Pensionsforsakring Omsesidigt, et al.
No.: 05CA2663 People v. David M. Valenzuela
No.: 05CA2736 In the Matter of the Estate of Ernest Richard Cure v. Jane Hubbard, Theresa Muñiz, and Kathleen Unrein
No.: 06CA0050 Cruz Subia v. Tanya L. Garcia
No.: 06CA0141 Hubbert H. Roy v. Warden Carochi, et al.
No.: 06CA0142 Hubbert H. Roy v. Warden Carochi, et al.
No.: 06CA0150 Jesse Billings, Jr., Roy Bowman, et al. v. American Furniture Warehouse, Inc.
No.: 06CA0275 People v. Larry Leroy Vandenberg
No.: 06CA0411 People v. Robert E. Van Allen
No.: 06CA0570 People v. Sammie Lee Denson, Jr.
No.: 06CA0574 People v. Sally Sabori
No.: 06CA0671 People v. Raymond Warren Scott
No.: 06CA1016 Adam Weeks v. Colorado Department of Revenue, Division of Motor Vehicles
No.: 06CA1043 Bruce Delagerheim v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, et al.
No.: 06CA1247 People v. Troy D. Davidson
No.: 06CA1428 People In the Interest of A.L.B., M.L.A., B.R.A., and A.A., Children,
and Concerning B.L.A.
No.: 06CA1432 People v. Craig Ray Montgomery
No.: 06CA1501 People v. Teddy Roy Bartelli
No.: 06CA2216 People v. Walter Lee Stegall, II
No.: 06CA2267 People v. Hazhar A. Sayed
No.: 06CA2584 People v. Sylvester Davis
No.: 06CA2636 People v In the Interest of N.T., a Child, Upon the Petition of the El Paso County Department of Human Services, and Concerning B.T.

April 23, 2007

Here are today's announcements from the supreme court. The court issued four decisions, summarized below. The court also granted cert. in two cases. The questions presented in those appeals are below the case summaries.

The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) cannot regulate a municipal utility, but if the PUC makes a finding supported by the record that a home rule city’s utility service is substantially inadequate and the municipal utility is unwilling or unable to provide the service, the PUC does have
constitutional and statutory authority to grant a certificate of public convenience and necessity (“CPCN”) to a natural gas utility, authorizing it to operate within a home rule city’s boundaries if the PUC finds that the municipal utility service is inadequate. The court also concluded that § 40-5-102 does not prohibit the PUC from issuing a CPCN to a utility that has not yet received a local permit, but the constitution and statutes reserve to the local government the reasonable exercise
of its police powers. The court therefore reversed the judgment of the district court and reinstated the PUC’s decision granting a CPCN to KN Wattenberg to provide firm natural gas transportation service to Leprino and Excel. Justice Coats dissented, disagreeing "with the majority’s narrow construction of Article XXV’s restriction on the powers it grants to the Public Utilities Commission." Justice Coats "would construe the constitutional proviso’s prohibition against PUC interference with municipally-owned utilities to leave untouched a home rule city’s power to exclude other utility providers in matters of purely local concern." C
ity of Fort Morgan v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission

Death sentence vacated. The supreme court, exercising its jurisdiction to conduct an independent review of the death sentence of Edward Montour, Jr., held that Colorado's death penalty statute (18-1.3-1201(1)(a), C.R.S. (2006), which states that a capital defendant waives his right to a jury trial on sentencing facts when he pleads guilty) cannot deprive the defendant of his Sixth Amendment jury trial right on the facts essential to the death penalty eligibility determination when that defendant pleads guilty. Montour pled guilty and under the Colorado death penalty statute, his guilty plea automatically waived his right to have a jury determine his sentence. The court held that the statute unconstitutionally linked the waiver of a defendant's jury sentencing right to his guilty plea. The court therefore affirmed Montour's guilty plea and applied the severability clause in the death penalty statute to excise the unconstitutional language in the death penalty statute. The court remanded the case to the district court to set a new sentencing hearing before a newly-impaneled jury unless Montour waives his right to jury sentencing. To be valid, Montour's waiver of his Sixth Amendment right must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, and not linked to his guilty plea. Justice Martinez concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing with the majority's conclusion that Colorado’s death penalty statute unnecessarily and unconstitutionally burdens a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by linking a defendant’s guilty plea to an automatic waiver of
his right to a sentencing jury, but disagreeing with the majority's "reinterpretation" of the statute to to add a sentencing jury after a defendant pleads guilty. Justice Martinez said, "by creating a subsequent jury sentencing procedure, where no statutory language provides for one, the majority goes further in exercising our power to review and construe legislation than I would go." Justice Coats dissented entirely, stating "Because I object to almost every aspect of the majority opinion, from its jurisdictional explanation to its remedy, I respectfully dissent."
People v. Montour

The supreme court holds that evidence of virginity is inadmissible to prove the source of a current vaginal injury, because its minimal probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect under Colorado Rule of Evidence 403. Because evidence of virginity spans such a lengthy period of time it includes remote, non-probative evidence of lack of sexual activity, and thus is too broad and over-inclusive to be admissible in light of its prejudicial effect. C.R.E. 403 bars the admission of this evidence. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence of the victim's virginity. But the court held the error to be harmless, and thus affirmed the court of appeals' judgment on different grounds. Fletcher v. People

The supreme court reversed the court of appeals’ holding that petitioner could not state an ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel claim because there is no right to effective assistance of postconviction counsel. The supreme court concluded that there is a limited statutory right to postconviction counsel in Colorado and that, where the right exists, postconviction counsel must meet the two-prong test of effectiveness in Strickland v. Washington. Justice Coats dissented, concluding "Unlike the majority, I believe section 21-1-104(1)(b) C.R.S. (2006), which falls within a section entitled, 'Duties of public defender,'authorizes the public defender to represent indigent defendants under specified circumstances but creates no right of representation that does not already exist." Silva v. People

The court granted cert. in these cases:

Leyva v. People, No. 07SC60, on this issue:

Whether a motion for postconviction relief is timely filed if it is filed within three years of the date that an illegal sentence is corrected by the district court.

Hernandez v. People, No. 07SC133, on this question:

Whether section 16-11.7-105(1), C.R.S. (2006) mandates sex offender treatment as a condition of probation in all cases or whether a sentencing court has discretion to order treatment “to the extent appropriate to such offender.”

April 20, 2007

The supreme court's oral argument calendar for May is here. The court will hear arguments on May 1-3.

The supreme court will issue four decisions Monday:

06SA118 City of Fort Morgan v. Colorado Public Utilities Commission

02SA365 People v. Montour, Jr.

05SC646 Fletcher v. People

05SC519 Silva v. People

The court of appeals' announcements for yesterday are here. The court issued five published decisions, summarized below.

Where prosecutor disclosed original surveillance tape to defense counsel before trial, in
accordance with Crim. P. 16, prosecution was not required to also disclose derivative trial exhibits of identical content that the prosecutor has prepared from the disclosed material. Thus, absent any showing of prejudice, defendant was not entitled to relief based on the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the realtime version of the videotape. People v. Armijo

Colorado Constitution, art. II, § 14 and C.R.S. § 38-1-102(3) do not authorize condemnation of an easement for a private way of necessity for the purpose sought by petitioners – to construct and
maintain a natural gas pipeline and related connection equipment and facilities.
Akin v. Four Corners Encampment

Where defendant's sentence was the product of the operation of multiple statutes and was within the special penalty range defined by the legislature, it did not violate the rules stated in Apprendi and Blakely. But the court agreed with defendant that he sufficiently stated a claim that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance in not timely seeking a reduction of his sentence pursuant to Crim. P. 35(b), so it remanded for a hearing on that claim. People v. Trujillo

Trial court properly dismissed claims against all but two defendants. As to those two defendants, there was sufficient contacts to establish personal jurisdiction. The court of appeals also concluded, though, that Plaintiff had standing only to assert its fraud claim against those two defendants. The remaining claims were derivative claims that could only be brought by the bankruptcy trustee. First Horizon Merchant Services, Inc. v. Wellspring Capital Management, LLC

In a case under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, the trial court held that plaintiff did not have a private right of action for defendant's failure to include
required identifying information on its facsimile advertisements. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that there is no private right of action to enforce the regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 68.318(d) (2006). Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on that issue. USA Tax Law Center, Inc. v. Office Warehouse Wholesale, LLC

April 18, 2007

I haven't done an update on original proceedings in the supreme court for some time, so one appears below the list of tomorrow's court of appeals decisions. I will summarize the court of appeals' published decisions on Monday, as I will be tied up the rest of the week.

The court of appeals will release the following decisions tomorrow, including 5 published decisions

Published Opinions

No.: 04CA2404 People v. Jerry Joseph Armijo
No.: 05CA1228 Jack Akin and Carol Stepe v. Four Corners Encampment, et al.
No.: 05CA1389 People v. Vincent Trujillo
No.: 05CA2370 First Horizon Merchant Services, Inc. v. Wellspring Capital Management, LLC, et al.
No.: 05CA2742 USA Tax Law Center, Inc., d/b/a US Fax Law Center, Inc. v. Office Warehouse Wholesale, LLC, d/b/a OWW, LLC

Unpublished Opinions

No.: 04CA1232 People v. Michael I. Martinez
No.: 05CA0179 People v. Edwin Rodriguez
No.: 05CA0217 People v. Shannon Lee Snook
No.: 05CA0414 People v. Michael Joseph Horn
No.: 05CA0424 People v. Luis Antonio Morales
No.: 05CA1079 People v. Mendylen Sansom Strickland
No.: 05CA1182 People v. Stephanie L. Martinez
No.: 05CA1442 People v. Peter Matthew Compton
No.: 05CA1530 In the Matter of the Estate of John DeMots, Deceased. Sharon R. Slater v. Martin A. Bloom
No.: 05CA1897 People v. Freddie A. Diaz
No.: 05CA2042 People v. Daniel L. Anderson
No.: 05CA2056 People v. Ernest R. Llamas
No.: 05CA2059 People v. Joseph Anthony Locastro
No.: 05CA2096 People v. Lee Roy Vazquez-Diaz
No.: 05CA2123 Donna Wolf v. Gregory K. Bixby, D.D.S.
No.: 05CA2193 Sallyann M. Paschall, et al. v. Robert J. Goscia, et al.
No.: 05CA2474 People v. Michael John Bobrik
No.: 05CA2486 Michael J. Kellam, et al v. Gary Johnson, et al.,
No.: 05CA2504 People v. Rita Jane Erickson a/k/a Rita Jane Davis
No.: 05CA2543 People v. Patrick R. Owen
No. 05CA2549 Frederick Wyman II Trust, et al. v. Remonov & Company, Inc.
No.: 05CA2564 People v. Kenneth Coquette Fisher
No.: 05CA2574 People v. George Aaron Velky
No.: 06CA0062 Marriage of Kathleen Carroll and Alfred C. Carroll
No.: 06CA0086 Rodney Dewalt v. Quebec Iliff Joint Venture, and Estate of Kal Zeff and Florence Larsen
No.: 06CA0369 In the Interest of A.C.T., a Child, Upon the Petition of Kimberly Ann Rose, and Concerning Tyson Jay Tabler
No.: 06CA0794 James R. Duncan v. Fitzgerald, et al.
No.: 06CA0970 People v. Juanita Anna Felland
No.: 06CA1321 Bill Davis v. Warden of the Fremont Correctional Facility
No.: 06CA1410 People v. Mark D. Hoosier
No.: 06CA1456 People v. Rachel Joy Galindo
No.: 06CA1896 People In the Interest of C.F. and A.F., Children, and Concerning C.S.
No.: 06CA1902 People v. Julio Medina
No.: 06CA2200 People In the Interest of M.M.S., a Child, and Concerning N.P.
No.: 06CA2394 People v. Tiffany C. Moreno
No.: 06CA2419 People v. David James Evans
No.: 06CA2501 People In the Interest of M.D., M.D., and J.D., III, Children, and Concerning W.D.

The supreme court has recently issued rules to show cause in the following cases, including one involving Terry Lynn Barton, who started the Hayman fire:

No. 07SA102

El Paso County District Court Case No. 06CV3800 (Judge David S. Prince)

In Re:

Plaintiff:

WILLIAM ETCHIESON,

v.

Defendants:

CENTRAL PURCHASING INC. d/b/a HARBOR FREIGHT TOOLS, USA INC. and PRECISION MASTECH ENTERPRISES CO. of Hong Kong, China.

Plaintiff Etchieson alleged he was injured by a defective electrical meter sold by Central Purchasing, Inc. and manufactured by Precision MasTech Enterprise Co. of Hong Kong, China. Plaintiff Etchieson and defendant Central Purchasing seek relief from the trial court's order dismissing plaintiff's claims against defendant Precision for lack of personal jurisdiction.

On April 3, 2007, the court issued an order to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondent Precision is directed to answer on or before May 3, 2007, and petitioners, Etchieson and Central Purchasing, have 30 days from receipt of the answer within which to reply.


No. 07SA81

In re:

The People of the State of Colorado,

In the Interest of:

A.K., a Juvenile,

and Concerning:

M.G. and M.G.

Synopsis:

Petitioner Mesa County Attorney’s Office, on behalf of the Mesa County Department of Human Services (MCDHS) seeks relief from an Order entered by the El Paso County Juvenile Court directing the MCDHS to immediately assume jurisdiction over juvenile defendant, A.K., who has been ordered to be placed at the Mental Health Institute in Pueblo until July 2007 pursuant to an incompetence finding made by the Weld County Juvenile Court.

On March 15, 2007, the Court issued a rule to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondents, the Honorable Regina M. Walter and Beverly Lopez, Guardian Ad Litem, are directed to file a written answer on or before April 16, 2007. Petitioner Mesa County Attorney’s Office has thirty days from receipt of the answer within which to reply. Other parties or organizations have been granted permission to file a brief in support of the positions held by the named petitioner and the named respondents.


No. 07SA50

District Court, City & County of Denver Case No. 06CV555 (Judge Michael A. Martinez)

In re:

Plaintiff:

STEPHEN COMPTON,

v.

Defendant:

SAFEWAY, INC.

Synopsis:

Plaintiff Stephen Compton seeks relief from the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion to compel to obtain employees' statements recorded by defendant's risk management department arguing that the recorded statements are not protected from discovery by either the attorney work product privilege or the attorney client privilege.

On February 22, 2007, the court issued a rule to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Defendant Safeway, Inc. is direct to file a written answer on or before March 26, 2007. Plaintiff Stephen Compton has thirty days from receipt of the answer within which to reply.

 

No. 07SA65

Eagle County District Court Case No. 05CV345 (Judge Frederick Gannett)

In re:

Plaintiffs:

AARON STAMP and KELLY STAMP

v.

Defendants:

THE VAIL CORPORATION, a Colorado Corporation d/b/a VAIL ASSOCIATES, INC., and MARK CHARD;

Third Party Defendant:

TERRY DELLIQUADRI.

Synopsis:

Plaintiffs Aaron Stamp and Kelly Stamp seek relief from the trial court ruling denying plaintiff’s motion to amend their complaint to add a claim for exemplary damages on grounds that the Colorado Wrongful Death Act is implicated.

On March 1, 2007, the Court issued a rule to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondents The Vail Corporation and Mark Chard, along with third party defendant Terry Delliquadri are directed to file a written answer on or before April 1, 2007. Petitioners Aaron Stamp and Kelly Stamp have thirty days from receipt of the answer within which to reply.

 

No. 07SA58

Teller County District Court Case No. 02CR237

In re:

Plaintiff:

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

v.

Defendant:

TERRY LYNN BARTON.

Synopsis:

Defendant Terry Lynn Barton seeks relief from two related trial court rulings allowing the prosecution to withdraw from an accepted plea agreement, on grounds that the defendant's appeal effected a change in the law subsequent to the plea agreement and breached the plea agreement in contravention of an appeal waiver provision.

On February 22, 2007, the Court issued a rule to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondent, the People of the State of Colorado, is directed to file a written answer on or before April 9, 2007. Petitioner Terry Lynn Barton has forty-five days from receipt of the answer within which to reply.

 

No. 07SA24

Pueblo County District Court Case No. 01CV388

In re:

Plaintiff:

GORDON PULSIFER

v.

Defendants:

PUEBLO PREOFESSIONAL CONTRACTORS, INC., a Colorado Corporation, D&W CUSTOM BUILDERS, INC., a Colorado Corporation, and WOODBUSTERS CONSTRUCTION.

Synopsis:

Defendant Pueblo Professional Contractors seeks relief from the trial court’s order denying its motion for a determination that § 8-41-401(3), C.R.S. (2006) limits Plaintiff Pulsifer’s damages to $15,000 in this workers’ compensation case.

On January 30, 2007, the Court issued a rule to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondent Gordon Pulsifer is directed to file a written answer on or before March 1, 2007. Petitioner Pueblo Professional Contractors, Inc., has thirty days from receipt of the answer within which to reply.

 

06SA382

Prowers County Case Nos. 05T275, 05T390, & 05T767 (Judge Larry Stutler)

In re:

Plaintiff:

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO

v.

Defendant:

VICKI SARA ARIATTI.

Synopsis:

Petitioner Vicki Ariatti seeks relief from the trial court's order that she pay certain fines, even though the court has determined that she is indigent, from an "estate" that is based on her husband's social security payments.

On January 4, 2007, the court issued a rule to show cause why the relief requested in the petition should not be granted. Respondent, the Honorable Larry Stutler is directed to provide a written answer on or before February 20, 2007. Petitioner Ariatti has 45 days from receipt of the answer within which to reply.

April 16, 2007

The court of appeals' oral argument calendar for June is here.

Here are the supreme court's announcements for today. The supreme court issued one decision today, summarized below. The court granted cert. in one case, No. 06SC681, Trattler v. Citron, on this question:

Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s order that the nondisclosure was not harmless and in finding that C.R.C.P. 37(c)(1) mandates the preclusion of expert evidence when an expert fails to disclose recent testimony.

Supreme court concludes trial court abused its discretion when it committed to ordering the suppression of DNA results for testing that had not yet been conducted if the district attorney refused to pay the expense of a defense expert and the CBI refused to permit videotaping. The CBI was destructive (or consumptive) testing, meaning that the test itself would complete consume the evidence and the defense would not be able to conduct its own testing. The defense sought to videotape the testing, but CBI prohibits that, leaving the defense to have to hire its own expert to view the testing, a considerable expense. The trial court therefore ordered the prosecution to pay any defense expert costs in excess of $1,000. Applying C.R.S. § 16-3-309, the court noted that the touchstone of the statute is the reasonableness of the state’s conduct. Thus, when the sample is destroyed the trial court may be asked to suppress the test results as a sanction for unreasonable state conduct. Under these circumstances, the statute requires that the court consider whether the state performed the testing in good faith and gave the defendant an opportunity to have an expert present during destructive testing. The court said that an order suppressing results prior to testing could only be based on possible future conduct, and therefore when a trial court commits to ordering test results suppressed before evidence has been destroyed in testing the court acts outside its discretion because it is in no position to assess the reasonableness of the prosecution’s future actions. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in this case. The supreme court emphasized that instead of deciding whether evidence will be suppressed, the trial court’s role prior to testing is to oversee the preservation of evidence. The court further noted that trial courts have broad supervisory authority to oversee the preservation of evidence. The supreme court expressly adopted American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Standard 3.4(e), authorizing the trial court to require procedures that permit an independent evaluation of the analysis, including but not limited to videotaping the preparation and testing. The court emphasized that the trial court’s authority was over the evidence, and did not extend to
ordering the CBI to test the evidence in accordance with adopted procedures or to ordering the district attorney to pay for a defense expert.

Justice Coats, joined by Justices Eid and Rice, concurred in the judgment only, with rather choice words: "While I would also vacate the trial court’s order, I neither join the majority opinion nor pretend to comprehend it." Justice Coats took the trial court to task for accepting defense's counsel's portrayal of the financial difficulties in acquiring an expert: "The record does not even remotely suggest that funds already appropriated to the public defender would have been insufficient to pay for a competent expert to observe in this case, much less that the legislature would have denied a supplemental appropriation, had one been necessary. In fact, however, the trial court did not find the defendant unable to pay for an expert or in any way condition its ultimatum on the availability of public funding for that purpose. Instead, the court simply disapproved of the CBI’s refusal to permit videotaping as an alternative to contemporaneous observation by a defense expert, and it imposed a financial disincentive on the prosecution as a means of bludgeoning the CBI into changing its internal operating procedures. In doing so, I believe the trial court abused its discretion in a host of ways and for a host of reasons, not least because the defendant had no right, constitutional or otherwise, to demand that the state submit its internal operations to videotaping in lieu of permitting a defense expert to be present and observe consumptive testing in person." Justice Coats also took the majority to task for adopting the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: "by adopting wholesale a provision of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards on DNA Evidence, the majority would authorize trial courts to order the videotaping of DNA testing and prohibit testing that does not comply with the procedures they have ordered. See maj. op. at 9-10. While I would object to this kind of legislating from the bench in any event, I find it particularly troubling when done, as the majority does here, virtually without debate or justification; in an area already regulated by the legislature; and in the very act of disapproving the trial court’s order for other reasons. In fact, I am more than a little confused by the majority’s adoption of a standard authorizing orders for the videotaping of DNA tests and its simultaneous disapproval of such an order before testing has actually occurred because the sample has not yet been consumed." In re People v. Wartena

April 12, 2007

Today's court of appeals announcements are here. The court issued unpublished decisions only.

April 11, 2007

The court of appeals will announce the following unpublished decisions tomorrow:

No.: 04CA0117 Onebeacon Insurance Company v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company, et al.
No.: 04CA1389 Michael T. Dagner v. Cox, Mustain-Wood, Walker, & Schumaker, et al.
No.: 05CA0190 Douglas M. McKenna v. MBA Financial Group, Inc.
No.: 05CA0350 People v. Rosauro Saenz
No.: 05CA0707 People v. Darren E. Heimann
No.: 05CA0708 People v. Darren E. Heimann
No.: 05CA0905 People v. Samuel Julius Martinez
No.: 05CA1498 People v. Margaret McCarthy
No.: 05CA1519 People v. Sherman Turner
No.: 05CA1560 People v. David V. Greening
No.: 05CA1692 People v. Adam Marcus Schulter
No.: 05CA1773 People v. Tho Nguyen
No.: 05CA1882 Matthew Boczkiewicz, et al. v. Rajeev Soin
No.: 05CA2008 People v. Christopher Ball
No.: 05CA2026 Bellco Credit Union v. Bullwinkles Auto, Inc.
No.: 05CA2037 James Hayes v. Colorado Department of Revenue, DMV
No.: 05CA2207 Marriage of Wendi L. Wright v. Caleb R. Hawkins
No.: 05CA2300 People v. Ryan Alexander Pettigrew
No.: 05CA2615 People v. Scott Dackery Horton
No.: 05CA2680 Lawrence Brooks v. Colorado Department of Revenue, DMV
No.: 05CA2686 Enclave West, Inc. v. City of Commerce City,
No.: 06CA0058 People v. Peyman R. Bahadori
No.: 06CA0098 People v. Jeffry Alan Roberts
No.: 06CA0106 People v. Warren Karl Seymour
No.: 06CA0111 Paul Pollard v. Colorado Department of Corrections; et al.
No.: 06CA0204 Jerry W. Brooks v. Colorado Department of Corrections, et al.
No.: 06CA0288 Joyce Wilkins v. Judith Redwine
No.: 06CA0332 People v. Anthony Luke Veloz
No.: 06CA0356 People v. Tomas Antonio Vialpando
No.: 06CA0428 Title Insurance Company of America v. Daryl J. Walker, et al.
No.: 06CA0482 Marriage of Brenda Anvari and Edward Anvari
No.: 06CA0892 Stephen G. Glover; et al. v. State of Colorado; et al.
No.: 06CA0895 People v. Leo Nicks, Jr.
No.: 06CA0898 Marriage of Jamie L. McElfresh and Kenneth J. McElfresh
No.: 06CA1659 People v. Claude Edward Burton III
No.: 06CA2250 Eric S. Noffsinger v. Industrial Claims Appeals Office, et al.
No.: 06CA2307 People In the Interest of A.M., J.D., and P.D., Children, Upon the Petition of the Denver Department of Human Services, and Concerning P.D. and F.D.
No.: 06CA2335 People In Interest of A.P., C.P., and E.T., Children, and Concerning J.P. and R.P. and D.T. and D.L. and E.L.
No.: 06CA2342 People In Interest of J.L.S., I.M.S. and D.J.S., Children, and Concerning T.M.S.
No.: 06CA2615 People In the Interest of C.T., C.D., A.D., and A.D., Jr., Children,
and Concerning B.T. and A.D., Sr.

April 9, 2007

Today's supreme court announcements are here. The court issued two decisions, summarized below. The court also granted cert. in four cases, and the questions presented in those appear below the summaries.

In an interlocutory appeal, the prosecution sought to reverse the trial court’s suppression of statements made during the interrogation of the defendant , as well as physical evidence collected during the interrogation. The trial court ruled that the defendant unambiguously and unequivocally requested an attorney early in the interrogation, which the police detective failed to scrupulously honor. The trial court ruled that all statements made after defendant requested an attorney were inadmissible at trial. The trial court also found that a swab of defendant’s mouth collected
during the illegal interrogation must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. Applying People v. Adkins, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the defendant unambiguously and unequivocally requested an attorney during interrogation. But the court reversed the trial court’s determination that physical evidence collected during the illegal interrogation was fruit of the poisonous tree. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is not applicable to Miranda violations. Justice Coats, joined by Justices Rice and Eid, concurred in part and dissented in part, concluding that the defendant's request for an attorney was not unambiguous: "Far from being unambiguous, the defendant’s 'request' for counsel in this instance was a classic example of an equivocal request, expressly conditioned on the strength of the evidence against him, already in the possession of the police." Justice Coats continued, "Because I believe the majority’s open hostility to the use of confessions as a legitimate investigative tool strikes an improper balance between protecting the constitutional rights of defendants and the state’s interest in protecting future victims of crime, I respectfully dissent from that portion of its opinion affirming the suppression of [defendant’s] statement."
People v. Bradshaw

Cities are not immune from liability under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act for deaths of children which occurred in separate 1997 accidents at municipal sanitation facilities. The supreme court held that an amendment to the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, enacted by House Bill 03-1288, operates only prospectively and thus did not apply in determining the rights and liabilities at issue in cases, such as these, that arose before July 1, 2003, the effective date of the act. Therefore, the court affirmed the court of appeals’ rulings in Powell v. City of Colorado Springs, 131 P.3d 1129 (Colo. App. 2005), and Henry-Hobbs v. City of Longmont, No. 03CA2187, (Colo. App. Sept. 8, 2005). Justice Eid, joined by Justice Coats, specially concurred in part, taking issue with the majority's use of legislative history in its analysis. City of Colo. Springs v. Powell; City of Longmont v. Henry-Hobbs and City of Colo Springs v. Speight Family Partnership (There are two separate opinions, but the main analysis is in the first listed above.)

The court granted cert. in these cases:

Robinson v. Colorado State Lottery Division, No. 06SC385, on these issues:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that petitioner’s claims against the state lottery are barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act.

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the state lottery was entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 13-17-201, C.R.S. (2006).

Colorado Department of Transportation v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., No. 06SC667, on this question:

Whether the court of appeals erred in determining that the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act does not bar respondent’s unjust enrichment, contribution, and declaratory judgment claims despite the actual State conduct underlying these claims.

Crider v. People, No. 06SC799, on this issue:

Whether prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, which is objected to, must be reviewed under the constitutional harmless error standard and whether, applying this standard to petitioner’s case, petitioner’s due process rights to a fair trial were denied by the prosecutor’s repeated characterizations of petitioner as a liar who lied during his testimony.

In Mintz v. People, No. 06SC410, cert. was granted, and the judgment vacated and remanded in light of Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007).

April 6, 2007

The supreme court will issue the following four decisions on Monday:

06SA366 People v. Bradshaw (no orals)

05SC743 City of Colo. Springs v. Powell

05SC744 City of Colo Springs v. Speight Family Partnership

05SC746 City of Longmont v. Henry-Hobbs

The court of appeals will arguments on May 1 at Monte Vista High School in Monte Vista as part of Law Day. The court will hear two cases, described in the press release as follows:

No. 06CA808, James F. Blum v. The People of the State of Colorado: Mr. Blum seeks review of the district court order affirming his attempted fraud conviction and the failure of the district court to address his additional claims for relief.

No. 05CA94, The People of the State of Colorado v. Ifty Christopher Benavidez: Mr. Benavidez was convicted of first degree murder after deliberation on December 12, 2003 by jury trial, and sentenced to life in prison.

The panel will be Judges Marquez, Roy and Furman.

April 5, 2007

The court of appeals' annoucements for today are here. The court issued 12 published decisions, summarized below.

Because the property owner continues to be deprived of his or her property so long as the thief retains that property, the crime of theft by deception continues until the deception ends. Therefore, an individual who obtains property through deception continues to commit the crime of theft by
deception so long as he or she possesses property without revealing or having another reveal that he or she has taken it.
People v. Roberts

Defendant asserted that two "Notices" he sent to judicial officers did not constitute "true threats" as required for a conviction under C.R.S. § 18-8-306 (attempting to influence a public official by, inter alia, threats of violence) and that under argues that his convictions must be reversed because the statements contained in the two “Notices” were protected by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The court of appeals rejected defendant's position, concluding that while true threats are indeed required, the People did prove that the statements constituted true threats. Judge Vogt specially concurred, concluding, contrary to the majority, that Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), requires a showing that the defendant subjectively intended to make a threat in order for his conviction to pass constitutional muster: "Under Black as I read it, speech may not be constitutionally punished simply because a reasonable person would understand it as a threat, if the speaker did not mean for the speech to be so understood." Judge Vogt concluded that there was sufficient evidence that defendant intended to threaten the judges. People v. Stanley

Evidence that murder victim wanted to end his relationship with defendant was relevant to show that defendant had a motive for killing the victim and to rebut her testimony that she had not
intended to kill him. The evidence was not inadmissible hearsay. It could be admitted either under CRE 803(3) or nonhearsay evidence of the victim's state of mind. Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to admit it.
People v. Welsh

Although two sources of marijuana were discovered in close proximity and within a short time, they were different parcels of drugs that the jury could infer were to be used for different
purposes. One pound of marijuana that was the subject of a charge of possession of eight or more ounces was found in the trunk in a piece of luggage in a Ziploc plastic bag, among other personal items. The packaging and location suggested it was meant for personal use only. In contrast, fifty pounds of marijuana that was the subject of a possession with intent to distribute charge was found, wrapped in PVC, black plastic, and cellophane, in a secret compartment located behind the back seat of the passenger area. The packaging and amount suggested it was meant for distribution to others. Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the offenses were sufficiently distinct to warrant separate convictions and sentences.
People v. Valencia

No authority exists for the proposition that a trial court must remind a defendant of his or her remaining peremptory challenges. Therefore, failure of trial court to sua sponte remind defense counsel it had one remaining peremptory challenge was not error. The court of appeals also concluded that defense counsel’s failure to exercise a peremptory challenge was not so extraordinary that it relieved defendant of the obligation to satisfy the Strickland prejudice prong in order to demonstrate ineffective of counsel. People v. Vieyra

In a continuing trespass case, a plaintiff may recover all past damages suffered during the applicable limitations period as a result of the defendant’s trespass, including those incurred after the commencement of the action but before the trial. The court concluded that its holding "best
effectuates the principle that injured parties are entitled to be made whole for their actual losses suffered as a result of the tortfeasor’s wrongful act." Hawley v. Mowatt

While loss of future royalties, like future lost profits, is by its nature, difficult to show, that difficulty alone does not bar a court from awarding future damages. Loss of royalties as a result of a breach of contract must be established with reasonable certainty. The plaintiff's expert’s opinion of the present value of future royalties was not to a mathematical certainty, but such certainty is not
required to establish reasonable certainty. Therefore, the court affirmed the damage award. Technics, LLC v. Acoustic Marketing Research, Inc.

C.R.S. § 15-10-401 requires notice be given to any interested person if a hearing on any petition is
required. Notice was sent to an old address for one interested person, and a second notice was sent to an updated address, but the numbers were transposed. Interested person was entitled to notice of intestacy hearing, and a remand was necessary to determine whether under the circumstances she in fact received such notice. If she did then her claims were time-barred. In re the Estate of Evarts


In a challenge to the Pharmacy Board's promulgation of a rule prohibiting pharmacists from dispensing prescription drugs resulting from Internet-based questionnaires, Internet-based
consultation, or a telephonic consultation without a valid preexisting patient-physician
relationship, the Board substantially complied with the rulemaking procedures of the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act (APA), C.R.S. § 24-4-101. In addition, the court rejected the appellant's argument that the Board exceeded its statutory authority in enacting the rule.
Brighton Pharmacy, Inc. v. Colorado State Pharmacy Board

Court upholds summary judgment concluding that insurance company had neither the duty to defend nor indemnify insured. The policy contained an exclusion for bodily injury arising out of the ownership, use, or entrustment to others of any automobile rented or loaned to the insured. It contained an endorsement, however, for “non-owned autos," but that term did not include a an auto leased under a "long-term lease" and insured under another policy. Miller v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company

In property division dispute arising out of dissolution of marriage, husband argued that 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1), (a)(3)(A), applicable to military disability benefits, and 42 U.S.C. § 407, applicable to Social Security disability benefits, required the district court’s property division to be reversed. Both provisions state, using similar language, that disability benefit payments are not subject to attachment, levy, seizure, or other legal processes. But the court of appeals concluded the husband read the provisions too broadly. They preclude treating the disability payments
themselves as marital property. But the Supreme Court has held that veterans’ disability payments lost their exempt character under a predecessor statute to 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) when they were used to purchase notes and bonds held as investments. Based on this and other authority, courts in other states have determined that income derived from disability benefits belonging solely to one spouse becomes marital property if commingled with marital assets. The court of appeals agreed with that reasoning. Marriage of Green

Mandatory arbitration provision of the Realtors’ Code states: "In the event of contractual disputes or specific noncontractual disputes as defined in Standard of Practice 17-4 between Realtors
(principals) associated with different firms, arising out of their relationship as Realtors, the Realtors shall submit the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the regulations of their Board or Boards rather than litigate the matter." National Ass’n of Realtors, Code of Ethics & Standards of Practice art. 17. The court of appeals concluded that this provision did not apply to disputes, either contractual or noncontractual, that arise between or among realtors, such as here, who have been associated with the same firm. Therefore, the code did not apply to tort claims of defamation and interference with contractual relations claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. Winter Park Real Estate and Investments, Inc. v. Anderson

April 4, 2007

The court of appeals will release the following decisions tomorrow, including 12 published opinions:

Published Opinions

No.: 03CA1787 People v. George Cecil Roberts
No.: 04CA2164 People v. Richard Eugene Stanley
No.: 04CA2581 People v. Claire Christine Welsh
No.: 05CA0572 People v. Sergio Valencia, a/k/a Cesar Holguin
No.: 05CA0958 People v. David A. Vieyra, II
No.: 05CA1572 Norma A. Hawley and Larry N. Hawley v. David S. Mowatt
No.: 05CA2075 Technics, LLC v. Acoustic Marketing Research, Inc., d/b/a Sonora Medical Systems, Inc.
No.: 05CA2319 In re the Estate of E. Keith Evarts, a/k/a, Keith Evarts, Deceased.
Nancy Olson and Joyce Hill v. Alice Nugent and Laurel Ann Evarts and David R. Evarts
No.: 05CA2358 Brighton Pharmacy, Inc., et al. v. Colorado State Pharmacy Board
No.: 05CA2412 James David Miller, et al v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company
No.: 05CA2642 Marriage of Dorrance E. Green and Arlene M. Green
No.: 05CA2773 Winter Park Real Estate and Investments, Inc., et al. v. Marilyn Anderson

Unpublished Opinions

No.: 04CA0736 People v. James John McVickers
No.: 05CA0979 People v. Hillery R. Wade
No.: 05CA1162 People v. Gabriel Ramirez
No.: 05CA1177 ADP Total Source/Asphalt Professionals, et al. v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, et al.
No.: 05CA1241 People v. James Donald Williams
No.: 05CA1348 Swanson Bros. Ranch Co. v. Jodi Hill, et al.
No.: 05CA1522 People v. Elias R. Gonzales
No.: 05CA1564 People v. Raul Trujillo
No.: 05CA1724 People v. Ramon D. Romero
No.: 05CA1731 People v. Allen Dwight Benson
No.: 05CA1848 Marriage of Julie Brady and George Cunningham
No.: 05CA1883 People v. Kelly Sue Miller
No.: 05CA1995 People v. Dale Allen Hunt
No.: 05CA2065 People v. Terry Leroy Richert
No.: 05CA2094 People v. Michael James DiPentino
No.: 05CA2143 Douglas Staton v. Ouray County School District No. R-2, a/k/a Ridgway School District No. R-2
No.: 05CA2194 Ann Pinney v. Joe Rota, D.D.S.
No.: 05CA2274 People v. Ryan David Merritt
No.: 05CA2359 People v. David N. Delfino
No.: 05CA2602 People v. Furman Lee Leyba
No.: 05CA2739 People v. Kenneth Paul Keller
No.: 05CA2747 People v. Wayne Lee Sloan
No.: 06CA0135 People v. Jeffrey Allen Knedler
No.: 06CA0154 Marriage of Mary Brown and Joseph C. Brown
No.: 06CA0303 People v. Shawn Dewitt Allen
No.: 06CA0557 People v. Jeremy Lucero
No.: 06CA0740 People v. Reynaldo Lopez-Garcia
No.: 06CA0875 People v. Jerry L. Watson
No.: 06CA1003 People v. Jonathan A. Kasper
No.: 06CA1223 People v. Jerry L. Watson
No.: 06CA1422 Jose V. Salgado-Nunez v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, et al.
No.: 06CA1834 People v. John C. Martinez
No.: 06CA2185 People v. Randall Kareem Marshall
No.: 06CA2293 People In the Interest of I.A.G., A.N.G., and J.G., Children, Upon the Petition of the Denver Department of Human Services, and Concerning C.T.G.

April 3, 2007

I'm back. I was on vacation in Florida and had some other things that kept me from blogging of late. But this post contains all the necessary updates.

First, here are yesterday's supreme court announcements. The court issued no new decisions, and did not grant cert. in any cases.

Here are the court of appeals announcements from March 29. The court issued only unpublished decisions.

Finally, the supreme court announcements for March 26 are here. The court issued three decisions, summarized below. The court granted cert. in four cases, and the questions presented in those cases follow the summaries.

In an important case on expert evidence, the supreme court determined that the "reasonable medical probability/certainty" standard is an outdated standard that has been replaced by the Colorado Rules of Evidence. The court of appeals' decision under review had held that the expert testimony of a certified pediatric nurse practitioner in a sexual assault case should not have been admitted by the trial court. The nurse described her findings as "suspicious" and testified that her conclusions were not based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty. The supreme court reversed, rejecting the "reasonable medical probability/certainty" standard. The court noted that the Colorado cases that used this standard were based in prior cases addressing sufficiency of evidence rather than admissibility of expert testimony. Applying the Colorado Rules of Evidence instead of the "reasonable medical probability/certainty" standard, the court held the nurse's testimony was sufficiently reliable and useful to the jury to be admissible. In addition, the court noted that the testimony was not speculative, even though it was not definitive and the nurse used the descriptive term "suspicious" to label the category for her finding. Inadmissible speculative testimony is opinion testimony that has no analytically sound basis. The nurse's
testimony, however, was based on her medical examination of the victim for signs of sexual assault, which is a reasonably reliable scientific principle. People v. Ramirez

The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' ruling that respondent was immune from suit under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA"). Examining the plain language of §§ 24-10-118(2)(a) and 24-10-106(1), the court held that because respondent was driving his personally-owned vehicle at the time of the motor vehicle accident, he was immune from suit. Under the CGIA, a public employee's immunity for injuries arising out of the course of employment is waived if the injuries resulted from the employee's operation of a vehicle owned or leased by a public entity. Because respondent was driving his own vehicle, immunity was not waived. Ceja v. Lemire

Plaintiffs sued two defendants in one action for the death of a decedent based on separate torts
allegedly committed in different counties. One defendant moved to sever the plaintiffs' claim against it and have venue over the claim transferred to the county where that defendant is
located. The trial court granted the defendant's motion. In a C.A.R. 21 proceeding, the supreme court issued a rule to show cause and made it absolute. The supreme court concluded severance and transfer of the plaintiffs' claim against one of the defendants created a second civil action, thereby violating the Wrongful Death Statute's limitation of"only one civil action" for the recovery of damages based on the death of one person. Under the statute, when a plaintiff files a wrongful death action against multiple defendants, the satisfaction of proper venue as to one defendant is sufficient to establish proper venue as to all other co-defendants. In re Hernandez v. Downing

The court granted cert. in these cases:

Granite State Ins. Co. v. Ken Caryl Ranch Master Association, No. 06SC627, on these issues:

Whether Colorado Revised Statute section 10-4-110.5(1) (Notice Statute) imposed upon petitioner a full-term renewal of a prior commercial property insurance policy that covered the property of respondent when petitioner provided a notice of a change in coverage that was late, but was given prior to the policy's expiration.

Whether, during the period that respondent's prior policy was extended by operation of the Notice Statute, the Notice Statute also prevented the parties from mutually entering into a new insurance contract that raised the coverage limits and both incorporated and put into effect the terms of respondent's renewed insurance policy.

People v. MacLeod, No. 06SC705, on this question:

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that defendant's failure to follow the procedures outlined in the Rape Shield statute did not prevent his cross-examination of a witness regarding her past history of being a victim of child sexual abuse.

Barrera v. Ruff, No. 06SC845, on these issues:

Whether the court of appeals properly applied the elements of civil fraud.

Whether the court of appeals erred by affirming summary judgment for civil fraud and conspiracy based on its conclusion that there was no disputed issue of material fact on the element of making a false representation with the intention that the representation be acted upon.

Whether the court of appeals erred by finding petitioner's statement was the proximate cause of respondents' damages, when a statement by one of the respondents was the basis for the retaliation claim.

Whether the court of appeals properly applied the wrongdoer exception to the American Rule when it awarded attorney fees as damages to respondents.

Whether the court of appeals erred in awarding appellate attorney fees in this case.

Vasquez v. People, No. 07SC50, on these questions:

Whether the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" doctrine applies, eliminating a defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, in the absence of any facts indicating that the defendant's purpose was to silence the witness.

Whether a defendant who loses his confrontation rights under the "forfeiture by wrongdoing" doctrine also loses his due process right to a fair trial based on reliable evidence admitted in accordance with the rules of evidence.


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