October 31, 2006 Happy Halloween! No news from the courts today. One week to election day, though many voters, myself included, have already cast their ballots. I don't ordinarily weigh in on politics, since it's not generally germane to this blog's purpose. But I do have some recommendations related to Colorado appellate judges, which are within the purview of this publication. First, I urge voters to vote No on Amendment 40 (appellate judicial term limits). It is an unwise, unwarranted and unnecessary measure that will harm the Colorado appellate courts and I believe make the selection of appellate judges in Colorado more political (in the negative sense of that word). Second, I urge voters to vote to retain the five court of appeals judges on the ballot--Judges Carparelli, Davidson, Loeb, Marquez and Russel. In particular, I strongly urge the retention of Judge Marquez, who has recently come under unfair criticism in an attack of questionable motive and origin. I refer you to this great editorial written by a bipartisan group of election law attorneys that appeared in today's Rocky Mountain News and supports Judge Marquez's retention. The group is truly bipartisan, consisting of attorneys from both sides of the political aisle who typically disagree on just about everything. They unanimously and vigorously support Judge Marquez. And rightly so. The attack against Judge Marquez is baseless, unfair and disturbing. Judge Marquez is the quintessential appellate judge, hard-working, soft-spoken, thoughtful, insightful and eminently fair. He and all his colleagues up for retention deserve to retain their positions because Colorado deserves their continued excellent public service. October 30, 2006 The supreme court issued no case announcements today. October 25, 2006 The court of appeals case announcements for Thursday, October 26th, will be here. (This link won't be active until the court releases the announcements Thursday morning. I'm posting it now though, because I will be out of the office the remainder of this week.) The court will issue these unpublished decisions: No.: 03CA1745 People v. Joseph S. Marino October 24, 2006 The supreme court has recently added these three original proceedings to its original proceedings page: No. 06SA272 District Court, City & County of Denver, 06CV1765 (Judge Michael A. Martinez) In re: Plaintiff: J.A. WALKER CO., INC., a Colorado corporation v. Defendants: 450 SEVENTEENTH, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; 450 COMPANY, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; REGENT TERRACE, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; CAMBRIA CORPORATION, a Colorado limited liability company; 450 AMIGAS UNIDAS, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; EXCEL METELS, Inc., a Colorado corporation; READY MIXED CONCRETE COMPANY, a Colorado Corporation; REDD IRON, Inc., a Colorado corporation; URBAN MARKET DEVELOPMENT, LLC, a Colorado Corporation; GUARANTY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, a Colorado banking corporation; L&W SUPPLY CORPORATION, d/b/a BUILDING SPECIALTIES, INC.; CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, a municipal corporation of the State of Colorado; The PUBLIC TRUSTEE OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER; CHRISTINE H. OWEN, an individual; and STEPHEN L. OWEN, an individual, BRUNDAGE-BONE CONCRETE PUMPING COLORADO INC., a Colorado Corporation. Petitioner J.A. Walker Co., Inc., a subcontractor on a construction project, seeks relief from the trial court’s order requiring the petitioner to arbitrate its mechanic lien dispute with Respondents 450 Seventeenth LLC and Cambria Corporation. On September 6, 2006, the court issued a rule to show cause why the relief requested should not be granted. Respondents 450 Seventeenth, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; 450 Company, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; Regent Terrace, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; Cambria Corporation, a Colorado limited liability company; 450 Amigas Unidas, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; Excel Metels, Inc., a Colorado corporation; Ready Mixed Concrete Company, a Colorado Corporation; Redd Iron, Inc., a Colorado corporation; Urban Market Development, LLC, a Colorado Corporation; Guaranty Bank and Trust Company, a Colorado banking corporation; L&W Supply Corporation, d/b/a Building Specialties, Inc.; City and County of Denver, a municipal corporation of the State of Colorado; the Public Trustee of the City and County of Denver; Christine H. Owen, an individual;and Stephen L. Owen, an individual, Brundage-Bone Concrete Pumping Colorado Inc., a Colorado Corporation are directed to provide a written answer on or before September 26, 2006 why the relief requested in the petition should not be granted. Petitioner has twenty days from receipt of the answer within which to reply. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No. 06SA316 Adams County District Court Case No. 06CR293 (Judge Scott Crabtree) In re: Plaintiff: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO v. Defendant: STEVIE MILLS Petitioner Stevie Mills seeks relief from two pre-trial orders issued by the Adams County district court in this criminal case. First, Mr. Mills challenges the district court’s denial of a request by the deputy state public defender representing Mr. Mills to appoint private, conflict-free counsel to address the validity of two prior felony convictions in cases previously handled by another deputy state public defender who is currently employed in the public defender’s Arapahoe County trial office. Second, he seeks relief from the denial of a request by the deputy state public defender to withdraw from Mr. Mills’ case altogether, due to the conflict he contends was created by the trial court’s refusal to appoint conflict-free counsel to address the prior convictions. On October 13, 2006, the court issued a rule to show cause why the relief requested should not be granted. Respondent the People of the State of Colorado are directed to provide a written answer on or before November 13, 2006. Petitioner has thirty days from receipt of the answer within which to reply. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- No. 06SA317 Adams County District Court Case No. 06CR89 (Judge Scott Crabtree) In re: Plaintiff: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO v. Defendant: ANTHONY PRYOR-RILEY Petitioner Anthony Pryor-Riley seeks relief from two pre-trial orders issued by the Adams County district court in this criminal case. First, Mr. Pryor-Riley challenges the district court’s denial of a request by the deputy state public defender representing Mr. Pryor-Riley to appoint private, conflict-free counsel to address the validity of two prior felony convictions in cases previously handled by another deputy state public defender who is currently employed in the public defender’s appellate division. Second, he seeks relief from the denial of a request by the deputy state public defender to withdraw from Mr. Pryor-Riley’s case altogether, due to the conflict he contends was created by the trial court’s refusal to appoint conflict-free counsel to address the prior convictions. On October 13, 2006, the court issued a rule to show cause why the
relief requested should not be granted. Respondent the People of the
State of Colorado are directed to provide a written answer on or before
November 13, 2006. Petitioner has thirty days from receipt of the answer
within which to reply. October 23, 2006 Here are today's supreme court announcements. The court issued three opinions. It did not grant cert. in any cases. The case summaries appear below. The summaries of the court of appeals' decisions from last Thursday follow the supreme court summaries. Interpreting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), the court held that police must meet two requirements before entering a residence to execute an arrest warrant: (1) police must have a reasonable belief that the suspect lives in the residence, and (2) police must have a reasonable belief that the suspect is within the residence when they enter. But even though the Payton standard was not satisfied in this case, exigent circumstances existed as an independent basis for police entry to the home, and therefore provided a basis for the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress evidence. People v. Aarness In three consolidated workers' comp. cases, the court held that section C.R.S. § 8-40-216(19)(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act does not require claimants who lose their jobs to purchase continuing or converted health insurance under COBRA in order for the benefit of health insurance to be included in the employee’s average weekly wage. Resolving a split in the decisions of the court of appeals, the supreme court overruled Midboe v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 88 P.3d 643 (Colo. App. 2003), to the extent that it was inconsistent with today's opinion. Justice Coats dissented, taking issue with the majority's interpretation of the statute and its approach to statutory interpretation. ICAO v. Ray When brokers
enter into real estate transaction referral fee agreements, and they
previously Here are the summaries for the court of appeals' published cases decided October 19th: The first degree kidnapping statute, C.R.S. § 18-3-301(1)(b) has only a single intent requirement: namely, an intent “to force the victim or any other person to make any concession or give up anything of value in order to secure a release.” The phrase “in order to secure a release” simply describes the purpose of the concession the offender must intend to force the victim to make. It does not require that the kidnapper intend to release the victim upon obtaining the concession sought. Therefore, the defendant's conviction for first degree kidnapping and felony murder were not inconsistent. People v. Weare The plain language of the second degree kidnapping of a child statute, C.R.S. § 18-3-302(2), does not require proof that a child be taken for any particular duration in order to show that the actor had the “intent to keep or conceal the child from his parent or guardian.” To prove second degree kidnapping of a child in violation of § 18-3-302(2) the prosecution need not prove the perpetrator took the child without the consent of a parent. People v. Ortiz Court of appeals affirms the trial court's order denying release of a state grand jury report of the CU football team scandal team, under C.R.S. § 16-5-205.5. Because the grand jury issued an indictment in the matter, § 16-5-205.5 prohibited its release. The court rejected the A.G.'s argument that the investigation that led to the report was different from the investigation that led to the indictment. In re 2003-2004 Term of the State Grand Jury Trial court
erred did not in granting motion to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff's
contract claim Trial court was correct in allowing stacking of two insurance policies. But the trial court erred in finding that the policy issued by Defendant was co-primary with the Plaintiff's policy, and in prohibiting defendant from obtaining a full setoff of the tortfeasor's payment. Defendant was the primary insurer and therefore bore the greater risk. Under C.R.S. § 10-4-609(5), it was entitled to the offset. Progressive Specialty Insurance Company v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company In a case involving
a letter alleged to be a holographic will, the trial court erred in
interpreting C.R.S. § 15-11-503(2) to require a document to be
both signed and acknowledged by a decedent as his or her will. The court
concluded that it was neither a formal will, nor a holographic will,
and remanded to the trial court to determine whether the defects in
decedent’s letter were technical drafting mistakes that should
not be allowed to frustrate decedent’s testamentary intent and,
thus, Because great-uncle
did not have physical care of the child for six months or more with
mother’s In termination
of parental rights case, the trial court was not required to hold a
dispositional hearing separate from the termination hearing. Father
received a hearing and an opportunity to litigate the issue as to whether
no treatment plan could be devised for him because of his unfitness.
Therefore, the proceedings were in substantial compliance with the statutory
scheme. October 20, 2006 The supreme court will issue 5 opinions on Monday. Or more accurately, the court will decide these 5 cases on Monday: No. 05SC237 People v. Aarness No. 05SC632 ICAO v. Ray No. 05SC652 ICAO v. Marsh No. 05SC757 ICAO v. Ashmore No. 06SA49 Lane v. Urgitus (no orals) The three cases
in which the ICAO is the petitioner all involve the same question, "Whether
a claimant is required, pursuant to section 8-40-201(19)(b), C.R.S.
(2005), to purchase continuing health insurance coverage in order to
have the cost of such coverage included in calculating his or her average
weekly wage." So it could be that the court will issue a single
opinion deciding those three cases. I will have summaries of those cases
and Thursday's published decisions posted sometime on Monday. October 19, 2006 Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued 8 published decisions. I will try to post summaries by the end of the day Monday (I've got a cert. petition to draft and file before then). I have posted links to the cases below. People
v. Weare October 18, 2006 The court of appeals will issue the following decisions tomorrow, including eight published opinions: Published Opinions No.: 04CA0333 People v. Darnell Weare Unpublished Opinions No.: 03CA2070 People v. Gary Crider October 16, 2006 Here are today's supreme court announcements. The court issued two decisions and granted cert. in four cases. The case summaries and questions presented are below. In an original
proceeding, involving a determination of the proper venue for a lawsuit
concerning the validity of H.B. 1041 land-use regulations passed by
the Pueblo County Board of Commissioners, the supreme court affirmed
the trial court decision to transfer venue from the El Paso County District
Court to the Pueblo County District Court. Under C.R.C.P. 98(b)(2),
when an Defendant's trial of was continued three times; twice due to the pregnancy of a prosecution witness called to testify about defendant's prior inconsistent and inculpatory statements. The court of appeals had dismissed on statutory speedy trial grounds. The supreme court reversed, concluding that statements made by the prosecutor were sufficient for the trial court to rule on the materiality of the unavailable evidence and that defendant's statutory speedy trial rights were not violated. In so holding, the court concluded that in order for evidence to be material under the speedy trial statute, the evidence must be of some greater consequence to the state’s case beyond mere relevance, and it is the prosecutor’s burden to show that the evidence is material. People v. Roberts The court granted cert. in these cases: Pringle v. Valdez, No. 06SC92, on this question:
Whether the court of appeals erred as a matter of law in reading section 42-4-237(7), C.R.S. (2005) to limit only “pain and suffering” damages, rather than all non-economic damages presumptively caused by a plaintiff’s failure to wear a seat belt. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Ross, No. 06SC257, on these issues:
Whether the court of appeals’ ruling, that under section 5-12-102, C.R.S. (2006) a liability insurer must pay a tort plaintiff prejudgment interest beyond policy limits, conflicts with this Court’s holding in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Allen.
Whether a plaintiff, who fails to obtain an enforceable judgment against a defendant, can then nonetheless compel a defendant’s liability insurer to pay prejudgment interest to the plaintiff, pursuant to Section 5-12-102, C.R.S (2006).
Whether the court of appeals lacks jurisdiction to order an insurer to pay prejudgment interest in an appeal from a garnishment judgment, where the court invalidated the underlying judgment on which the garnishment was based.
Whether court of appeals’ holding that the settlement agreement was not a valid Bashor agreement conflicts with the supreme court’s decision in Northland Insurance Company v. Bashor? Travelers Cas. Co. of Connectircut v. Village Homes of Colorado, Inc., No. 06SC471, on these questions: Whether the court of appeals erred in not following the precedent of
Browder v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 893 P.2d 132 (Colo. 1995), which
holds that coverage under a liability insurance policy is not triggered
by a third-party property damage claim against an insured brought by
a third-party claimant who acquired the property after the expiration
of the insurance policy. Whether the court of appeals erred in determining that coverage is
available under a liability insurance policy for third-party claims
brought against an insured by third-party claimants who did not suffer
any actual harm during the policy period. People v. Dison, No. 06SC439, which was vacated and remanded for further consideration: Petition for Writ of Certiorari is GRANTED as to whether Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) applies retroactively to convictions that were final at the time the decision in that case was announced; and the judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals is vacated. The case is remanded to the Colorado Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Johnson.
October 13, 2006 The supreme
court will issue two decisions on Monday, People v. Roberts, No. 05SC764,
and In
re City of Colorado Springs v. Board of Comm'rs, No. 06SA162. The court of appeals' oral argument calendar for December is here. Only 8 cases are set for argument. The remaining cases listed are submitted on the briefs. October 12, 2006 Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued only unpublished decisions. October 11, 2006 The supreme court's oral argument calendar for October is here. The court will hold arguments October 24 and 25. The court of appeals will issue the following unpublished decisions tomorrow: No.: 04CA0833 People v. Adam Ray Gonzales October 10, 2006 Here are today's supreme court announcements. The court issued two decisions, summarized below. The court granted cert. in one case, noted below. Below the supreme court post I have put up the summaries of the court of appeals' decisions from last Thursday. Uniform Commercial Code conflicts with the mandate of the stolen property statute, C.R.S. § 18-4-405, but the Uniform Commercial Code prevails because it is both more recent and more specific. Therefore, a subsequent good faith purchaser of a car obtains good title under the Uniform Commercial Code even though the car was acquired through an earlier fraud because the original owner of the car voluntarily parted with the car. Justice Eid, joined by Justice Coats, dissented, concluding that the stolen property statute was the more specific statute and therefore should control. West v. Roberts In an interlocutory
appeal of a suppression order, supreme court holds that the affidavit
in support of the warrant failed any indicia of reliability and lacked
probable cause. The court then concluded that the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule did not apply because the searching officer
could not, in good faith, reasonably rely on his own "bare bones"
affidavit that contained only assertions unsupported by facts. The court
therefore affirmed the suppression order. Justice Eid, joined by Justice
Coats, specially concurred, finding it unnecessary to reach the probable
cause issue. She would affirm on a "more fundamental" ground:
the search warrant failed to state with The court granted
cert. in No. 06SC424, City and County of Denver v. Crandall, on these
issues: The court also granted cert. and vacated and remanded No. 06SC18, Sharp v. People, for reconsideration in light of Davis v. Washington and People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006). Here are the court of appeals case summaries from last Thursday: The procedural
safeguards outlined in C.R.S. § 16-8-117 and People v. Branch do
not apply where a defendant seeks, via a Crim. P. 35(c) postconviction
motion, a determination nunc pro tunc whether he was competent at the
time he entered a guilty plea. The mandatory advisement outlined in
§ 16-8-117 is necessary to safeguard the defendant's Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights. Discharge of this responsibility requires a
trial court to advise a defendant that he has the right not to say anything
to the psychiatrist during the competency examination; that his statements
to the psychiatrist can be used against him at the guilt phase of the
trial as rebuttal or Prosecutor's
argument with respect to post-advisement silence clearly indicated that
he knew he was arguing post-advisement. The prosecutor's use of defendant's
post-advisement silence was not benign. Given that the prosecutor's
case was not particularly strong and turned ultimately on credibility,
the court concluded that the prosecution's reference to defendant's
post-advisement The decision whether to request a lesser nonincluded offense instruction implicates a defendant's fundamental rights, and therefore belongs to the defendant. A defendant's request for a lesser nonincluded offense instruction is tantamount to a defendant's consent to an added count being charged against him. Therefore, the decision whether to create exposure to additional culpability should rest with the defendant. Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to give a lesser nonincluded offense instruction requested by defense counsel but objected to by defendant. Judge Webb specially concurred, concluding that the defendant acquiesced in not receiving an instruction and therefore no further analysis of the issue was necessary. People v. Arko DOC regulation precluding verbal abuse by an inmate has a valid, rational connection to the state's legitimate governmental interest in the safe and efficient operation of its prison system. Therefore, where inmate could have filed a grievance without using offensive language, and language he chose was not relevant to the subject matter of the grievance even though he was given two opportunities to refile his grievance without using the offending language, and if use of unnecessary offensive language was not subject to discipline, the grievance process would be a forum where inmates could harass and abuse prison officials without consequence; and where inmate has not proposed a ready alternative to the verbal abuse rule, and rule is not an exaggerated response to prison concerns, there is more than a formalistic logical connection between the DOC's regulation and a legitimate penological interest. Accordingly, it did not violate the First Amendment to punish inmate for abusive language used in grievance. Alward v. Golder Whether an election official must include comments in opposition to the proposal made in bad faith by a proposal supporter is capable of repetition, yet could evade review, because of the short time between the collection of comments, the issuance of ballot notices, and the elections to which they relate. Therefore, issue was not moot. But plaintiff was not entitled to a declaratory judgment requiring election officials consider or discern the good faith or motives of persons who may submit comments for or against proposals in determining whether they are relevant under TABOR. Gresh v. Balink, El Paso County Clerk Recorder, in his official capacity C.R.S. 35-50-113(2) requires an appraisal by three appraisers, one appointed by the agricultural commission, one appointed by the owner of the property to be destroyed, and a third to be selected by these two. It further requires that livestock owners whose livestock are destroyed under this statutory scheme be compensated. Where Colorado Department of Agriculture did not comply with the statute in destroying livestock, it was required to paying the statutorily required compensation to livestock owners. Keyah Grande, LLC v. Colorado Department of Agriculture Court affirms
dismissal of ACLU's "spy files" lawsuit against Denver Police
chief. The ACLU appealed the trial court's refusal to allow a proposed
second amended complaint. That complaint stated a request for a declaratory
judgment that: "Police officers in the Denver Police Department In lender liability
case, the court notes that nothing in C.R.S. § 38-10-124(1)(d)
indicates that the term "bank" as used therein is limited
to state-chartered banks. Therefore, lender was a Approach to valuation of common elements that specifically addresses nonresidential common element improvements on residential land recognizes the various components of the property that need to be separately valued and assessed based upon their actual classification and actual use. Therefore, this approach is equally applicable to residential common elements constructed or installed on agricultural land and comports with the overall scheme of property taxation. As such, the assessment of common area parcels was proper. Nor was it error for the assessor to add the common area parcels. Jet Black, LLC v. Routt County Board of County Commissioners Where both parties
knew that plaintiff was legally married to another person throughout
the period of cohabitation with defendant, there is no record support
for the trial court's finding that there was a putative marriage under
C.R.S. § 14-2-111. Neither plaintiff nor defendant had a good faith
belief that the two were validly married, and therefore neither qualifies
as a putative spouse. Because the parties were not legally married and
the putative spouse statute does not apply, the trial court erred when
it characterized the parties' agreement as a separation agreement and It may be inferred that when an individual deliberately aims a loaded BB gun at someone and pulls the trigger, the shooter intends or expects to cause some harm. Where shooter shot 5 BBs into back of victim's head, facts alleged showed no possibility of accidental shooting. Therefore, the insurer had no duty to defend because the intentional act exclusion applied. Lopez v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company Offense of willfully
impeding the staff or faculty of an educational institution in violation
of C.R.S. § 18-9-109(2) requires the People to prove that defendant
acted by "the use of restraint, abduction, coercion, or intimidation
or when force and violence [were] present or threatened." The plain
language of § 18-9-109(2) makes clear that the force clauses apply
both to the student clause and the staff-faculty clause. Since the People
had insufficient evidence to prove the requisite force, the delinquency
petition was properly dismissed. People
In the Interest of C.A.J. October 5, 2006 Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued 12 published decisions which I will summarize by Monday or Tuesday. October 4, 2006 The court of appeals will issue the following decisions tomorrow, including 12 published ones. Unfortunately, I will be in a deposition all day Thurday and in court on Friday, so it is unlikely that I will get to post summaries until next week. Published Opinions No.: 04CA0081 People v. Andre J. Karpierz Unpublished Opinions No.: 03CA0694 People v. Jeffrey Alan Breeden October 3, 2006 The court of appeals' oral argument calendar for November is here. October 2, 2006 Here are today's supreme court announcements. The court issued four decisions, summarized below. The court granted cert. in two cases, and the questions presented in those cases appear after the case summaries. The Supreme
Court finds that C.R.S. § 8-40-202(1)(a)(I)(A) (1990 & Supp.
1997) irreconcilably conflicts with a more recently enacted statute,
C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(l)(IV.5)(E) (1996)(later repealed and replaced
by C.R.S. § 16-2.5-110(5) (2003)). Section 18-1-901(3)(l)(IV.5)(E)
mandates workers' compensation coverage of volunteer reserve police
officers by a city, county, or town. Consequently, the supreme court
finds that, insofar as the workers' compensation provision conflicts
with section 18-1-901(3)(l)(IV.5)(E), the conflicting portion of the
workers' compensation provision is repealed. Under section 18-1-901(3)(l)(IV.5)(E),
the City of Florence must pay the costs Leaving the Scene of an Accident with Serious Injury, an offense under C.R.S. 42-4-1601, constitutes a strict liability offense because the plain language of the statute does not require or imply a culpable mental state. Therefore, the supreme court reversed the court of appeals' determination that a culpable mental state should be read into the statute. People v. Manzo District court
had ruled that coverage limitations of six automobile policies issued
to plaintiffs by American Family and one motorcycle policy issued to
them by American Standard precluded the stacking of underinsured motorist
benefits provided by the individual policies. The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment. The supreme court reversed.
Because the anti-stacking provisions of all seven policies only applied
to policies issued by the same company, and the plaintiffs' motorcycle
policy was not issued by the same company as their car policies, the
existing record failed to support the district court's order it its
entirety. The supreme court held that the question of different insurance
companies should have been addressed once it was noticed by the appellate
court, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' failure to raise it in the trial
court or on appeal. Because the supreme court agreed with the court
of appeals that the anti-stacking provisions were conspicuously situated
in all seven policies, in any event, it In an original proceeding, the supreme court ordered the trial court to quash a subpoena, reversing the trial court's order requiring petitioner's criminal defense counsel to produce portions of his case file for in camera review. The trial court based its ruling on its belief that petitioner impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege when she entered into a plea agreement. The court held there was no implied waiver because petitioner neither placed privileged communications at issue by negotiating a plea agreement in which she agreed to testify truthfully, nor did she disclose privileged information to a third party. People v. Trujillo The court granted cert. in these cases: Frasco v. People,
No. 06SC314, on this issue Ceja v. Lemire,
No. 06SC375, on this question
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