March 26, 2004 There will be no supreme court announcements on Monday March 29th. So I won't be doing an update Monday. As a reminder, oral argument in the Interrogatories appeal is set for Wednesday, March 31st at 9 a.m. in the supreme court. March 25, 2004 Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued 17 published decisions, which are (or will be) summarized below. In a vehicular homicide case, the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury that the victims' failure to use seatbelts constituted an intervening cause of their injuries. The court agreed with numerous decisions from other states that reached the same conclusion. People v. McAfee The Colorado Constitution's prohibition on trapping and poisoning of wildlife does not prohibit the poisoning of nontargeted wildlife which is incidental to the poisoning of prairie dogs by a person who intends to control rodents. The court held the constitutional provision to be ambiguous, concluding that the amendment could be read as either precluding all poisoning of nontargeted wildlife, or as permitting some poisoning of nontargeted wildlife where the poisoner intends to control rodents. The court determined that the voters did not intend to prohibit poisoning of nontargeted wildlife incidental to poisoning permitted by the amendment to control rodents. Rocky Mountain Animal Defense v. Colorado Division of Wildlife The court issued a trio of decisions on the waiver of the right to counsel. I expect one or more of these will wind up on review before the supreme court: Trial court failed to advise defendant adequately about right to counsel, and therefore defendant's purported express waiver of the right to counsel was invalid. The court held that the trial court's inquiries were not adequate to establish that defendant was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Further, defendant was not advised of his right to court-appointed counsel if he were deemed indigent. People v. Rawson Where no counsel had been appointed and defendant repeatedly indicated that she wanted and needed counsel, but was unable to pay the retainer or fees, no waiver of right to counsel occurred. The court noted that the trial court should appoint counsel to represent a defendant if, through the defendant's affidavit or testimony, or the court's investigation, the court determines that the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel. Judge Roy, joined by Judge Piccone, wrote the majority decision. Judge Casebolt dissented, concluding that the defendant had impliedly waived the right to counsel: "the totality of the circumstances supports the trial court's finding of an implied waiver and leads to the conclusion that defendant was attempting to manipulate the right to counsel to impede the efficient and effective administration of justice." People v. Alengi (Nancy) (Alengi I) On the other hand, and on the same facts, the defendant did impliedly waive the right to counsel. In the companion case to Alengi I, a different division of the court came out the other way. Chief Judge Davidson, joined by Judge Loeb, concluded that the record "fully supports the trial court's conclusions that, regardless of his financial status, defendant did not want a court-appointed attorney, that defendant had been given ample opportunity to obtain private counsel, and that consequently, by his behavior, defendant forfeited his right to counsel." Judge Dailey dissented, finding it "significant that (1) nothing in the record indicates that defendant understood the concept of indigency; and (2) the judge who ultimately required defendant to go forward without counsel was not the same judge who, during the course of the five prior hearings, accepted defendant's assertions of inability to afford counsel as grounds to continue the case." Judge Dailey concluded that there was no implied waiver of counsel. People v. Alengi (Paul) (Alengi II) It seems to me that in light of the inconsistent decisions in the Alengi cases, the supreme court will have to review them. Trial court erred in permitting a constructive amendment of a charge of child abuse resulting in death during trial following the close of evidence. The court concluded that a jury instruction constructively amended the count in the information because the instruction substituted an element, "permitted a child under the age of sixteen to be unreasonably placed in a situation that may have endangered the child's life or health," for "cause[d] an injury to the life and health of . . . a child less than sixteen years of age, resulting in the death." The court held the instruction to be plain error. People v. Weinreich Statutory scheme which sets discretionary parole for sex offenders but mandatory parole for non-sex offenders, does not violate equal protection. People v. Harper Defendant's (1) refusing to leave the residence she shared with depressed person who later committed suicide and (2) commencing or continuing an argument with him were not sufficiently extreme or outrageous to support a claim for relief, even though the defendant was aware of the decedent's depressive and suicidal thoughts. English v. Griffith Statutory speedy trial right not violated. The court held that C.R.S. § 19-2-508(3)(a)(IV)(D), not § 19-2-509(4)(b), governed the calculation of a juvenile's his statutory speedy trial right. The court rejected the juvenile's argument that because he was subject to a no-bond hold, §19-2-509(4)(b) applied. People In the Interest of T.A. Under Colorado Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act , when a subsidiary has received the benefit of a loan made to its parent, the subsidiary's payments on the parent's debt are made in exchange for reasonably equivalent value. Accordingly, on the facts of this case, the trial court erred in finding a fraudulent transfer. Ciccarelli v. Guaranty Bank Court of appeals applies Trinity rule to motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Therefore, in resolving factual disputes relating to personal jurisdiction, the trial court did not need to resolve all facts in favor of the plaintiff. The court upheld the trial court's conclusion that there was no personal jurisdiction over the defendants. Archangel Diamond Corporation v. Arkhangelskgeoldobycha (I'm not sure if the defendant's name is the longest single word in a party name in a reported Colorado decision, but I wouldn't bet against it.)
Declaratory relief is available to determine rights and obligations under the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) . A water conservation district had sought a declaration of its rights and obligations under CORA. The court held that "Such a declaration is a type of relief expressly contemplated under the declaratory judgments law." Citizens Progressive Alliance, et al. v. Southwestern Water Conservation District Grocery store was not additional insured on insurance policy issued to a janitorial company, which had a contract with grocery store for cleaning services. Therefore, insurance company was not required to defend or indemnify grocery store for injury sustained on its property. First Financial Insurance Company v. Albertson’s, Inc. Whether to grant discovery on jurisdictional issues is a matter of trial court discretion. And where a plaintiff fails to present facts that show how personal jurisdiction might be established if discovery were permitted, it is not an abuse of discretion to deny discovery on the issue. Wenz v. National Westminster Bank, PLC Where district court did not have a transcript of a hearing before the magistrate, the court correctly determined that it must assume that the magistrate's factual findings were supported by the evidence. C.R.M. 7 does not require that a transcript be filed at all in a review proceeding, and it provides no guidance on the procedures for filing a transcript. Therefore, as a matter of appellate procedure it is the obligation of the party asserting error in a judgment to present a record that discloses that error, because a judgment is presumed to be correct until the contrary affirmatively appears. Marriage of Rivera Where expert disclosures failed to meet the minimum requirements of C.R.C.P. 26(a)(2)(B)(I) either in the initial or supplemental disclosures, and plaintiff provided no justification for the noncompliance, the trial court was justified in striking the plaintiff's expert as a sanction under C.R.C.P. 37(c). Svendsen v. Robinson Court of appeals may review a district court's reversal of a magistrate's determination of delinquency. Such review does not violate double jeopardy. People In the Interest of J.G. March 24, 2004 The list of court of appeals' decisions coming down tomorrow is here. The court will release 17 published decisions and a bunch of unpublished ones. I'll summarize the published decisions tomorrow. March 22, 2004 The supreme court case announcements for today are here. The court issued one decision, summarized below. The court granted cert. in three cases, and the issues in those appeals are listed below. Warrantless re-entries into home following initial consensual or emergency-aid entry were not within the emergency-aid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Therefore, the trial court properly suppressed evidence seized during those re-entries. The officer had responded to a hang-up 911 call and discovered that a domestic dispute had taken place. He arrested the husband and removed him from the home. He then twice re-entered the home where he found incriminating evidence of drug use. The supreme court held that no immediate crisis existed and that the officer did not re-enter the house to render emergency assistance but instead to conduct a criminal investigation. Therefore, the re-entries did not fall within the emergency-aid exception, and the evidence was suppressed. People v. Allison The court granted cert. in the following cases: Woellhaf v. People, No. 03SC664, (court of appeals opinion), addressing the following issue: Whether a single incident of sexual assault on a child (or sexual assault on a child-position of trust) can be broken down into fragments to support multiple sexual assault on a child counts, resulting in multiple sexual assault on a child convictions, without violating the principles of double jeopardy. Bobrik v. People, No. 03SC694, (court of appeals opinion), involving this question: Whether separate convictions and sentences for identically worded counts
of the information violate double jeopardy and must merge. Bovard v. People, No. 04SC4, (court of appeals opinion), presenting this question: Where Petitioner’s appeal from his county court conviction resulted in a trial de novo in district court due to loss of the record, whether the court of appeals denied Petitioner his right to appeal by holding that he may not pursue a direct appeal of the district court’s judgment to the court of appeals and that his only remedy was to request a writ of certiorari from the supreme court.
March 18, 2004 Here are today's case announcements from the court of appeals. The court issued only unpublished decisions. March 17, 2004 The list of court of appeals' decisions coming down tomorrow is here. The court will release unpublished decisions only. Oral argument in the Interrogatories case will take place at 9 a.m. on March 31 at the supreme court. The issues are: Do the elements specified in House Bill 04-1098 that define "custodial moneys" comport with principles of separation of powers under Article III of the state constitution, the legislative power of appropriation under sections 32 and 33 of article V of the state constitution, and the precedent of the Supreme Court construing such powers? Can House Bill 04-1098 constitutionally exclude from the definition of "custodial moneys" any moneys granted by the federal government to Colorado for the support of general or essential state government services of the type for which expenditures are made in the most recently approved annual general appropriation act, including but not limited to additional payments received by the sate under the "jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003"? The State Commission on Judicial Performance will hold a public hearing on the matter of retention for the court of appeals judges standing for retention in the November 2004 election. The judges up for retention are Judges Casebolt, Graham, Kapelke, Roy, Taubman, and Webb. The hearing will be in Denver on Monday April 5, 2004, from 6-8 p.m. at 1301 Pennsylvania Street, 1st Floor Conference Room. Happy St. Patrick's Day. I've fixed the glitch and am able to post pdf files now. So I'm posting the briefs in the Interrogatories case. The General Assembly's Opening Brief is here. The Governor's Opening Brief is here. Response briefs will be filed on Thursday, and I will try to have those posted on Friday. March 16, 2004 I will be posting the briefs in the Interrogatories case the supreme court will hear on March 31, as soon as I fix a technical glitch. March 15, 2004 Beware the Ides of March! The supreme court's case announcements for today are here. The court issued three decisions discussed below. In addition, the court granted cert. in two cases. The questions presented in those appeals are listed below as well. County failed to establish claim of right requirement, and therefore public road was not created by prescription. The supreme court reiterated that in order to prove a claim for a public road by prescription, the claimant must show that (1) members of the public have used the road in a manner adverse to the landowner's interest and under a claim of right; (2) the public has used the road, continuously, for twenty years; and (3) the landowner had actual or implied knowledge of the public's use and made no objection to that use of the road. The court concluded that in this case, the county failed to show any overt action indicating its intention to treat a footpath as a public road, and therefore the county could not establish the claim of right requirement. Importantly, the court concluded that the requirements for private prescriptive rights and public prescriptive road rights are not equivalent. Justice Martinez, joined by Chief Justice Mullarkey, dissented. Justice Martinez said that the majority had inserted an additional requirement into the statutory test for prescription of a public road. McIntyre v. Board of County Commissioners Spanish Miranda advisement form that contained mistranslations of the right to remain silent, detective's use of confusing words regarding right to an attorney, and detective's failure to respond to the defendant's questions regarding how to exercise his right to an attorney, justified trial court's suppression of defendants' incriminating statements. The supreme court concluded that under the circumstances the advisement was insufficient and therefore the defendant's waiver of those rights could not have been knowing and intelligent. People v. Aguilar-Ramos Plaintiff was not bound by her calculation of damages set forth in her initial disclosures filed under C.R.C.P. 26(a)(1). The defendants moved for judgment against them and asked the trial court to enter judgment in the amount set forth in the plaintiff's initial disclosures. The trial court did so, and the plaintiff filed an original action with the supreme court, objecting to that judgment. The supreme court held that the trial court erred in granting judgment in the amount set forth in the plaintiff's disclosures. The court noted that the defendants' motion was not an offer of judgment or settlement, that the judgment was not entered after a hearing following confession of judgment, and that the court was not imposing sanctions. In the particular procedural context of the case, the supreme court concluded that the initial disclosure statement could not be given binding effect on the calculation of damages. The supreme court held that trial court's action presented three problems: (1) it placed undue significance on the failure to label the damages calculation as an estimate only; (2) it took the initial disclosure of damages out of context as it was based on information then known and reasonably available to plaintiff; (2) it ignored the importance of an early exchange of information and the resulting need to update disclosed information. The court ordered the district court to deny the defendants' motion for judgment against them. In Re: Morgan v. Genesee Co. The court granted cert. in two cases: In re the Parental Responsibility of J.N.G., No. 03SC751, addressing this issue:
Whether the district court may order a custodial parent to live in a specific location when it determines the best interest of the child. Kmart Corp. v. Pfantz, No. 03SC754, addressing these issues:
Whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s imposition of an adverse inference against a defendant in a personal injury action for spoliation of evidence upon finding the defendant acted in bad faith and that defendant’s conduct was “either intentional or so reckless that it must be held accountable.”
Whether the trial court’s imposition of an adverse inference created an irrebuttable presumption of liability and causation against the defendant. The court modified its decision in Widder v. Durango Sch. Dist. No. 9-R. The modified decision is here. March 12, 2004 The May 2004 oral argument schedule for the court of appeals is here. The supreme court will issue three decisions on Monday. None was argued, so I don't know what the issues are. (I'd say the suspense is killing me, but that would be lying.) The cases are McIntyre
v. Board of County Commissioners, No. 02SC803 March 11, 2004 Today's court of appeals announcements are here. The court issued seventeen published decisions, which are summarized below (be patient, the posts will appear over time--that's a lot of cases to read). Prosecution may proceed on basis of superseding indictment. The court also held that under C.R.S. § 18-1-408(1) and People v. Bartowsheski, 661 P.2d 235, 245-46 (Colo. 1983), a defendant may not be simultaneously convicted of felony murder and the felony upon which the felony murder conviction rests. But the court refused to vacate the defendant's felony murder conviction, instead vacating the underlying kidnapping conviction, the predicate felony that most directly contributed to the death. People v. Huynh Failure to reinstruct jury on the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt and instead relying on juror notebooks was not structural error. The court did emphasize, however, that as a matter of practice a trial court should read all instructions to the jury before closing argument. People v. Baenziger Trial court erred by admitting a prior conviction into evidence as an element of harassment by stalking charges. But the prosecution is only required to prove the prior conviction by a preponderance of the evidence, and it may be properly determined by the trial court sitting without a jury. Under the circumstances of the case, however, the court of appeals concluded the admission of the conviction as an element was not harmless error. The court also held that C.R.S. § 18-9-111(4)(b)(I) and (III) are not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. People v. Cross Defendant was not deprived of a fair trial because the trial court denied his challenge of a prospective juror for cause based on her statement that she would have difficulty following the court's instructions concerning the proximate cause element of a vehicular homicide charge. People v. Lopez Postsecondary education expenses are a form of child support obligations, and therefore, the magistrate erred in failing to grant a father's request for declaratory relief to modify his postsecondary education obligation to conform to the statutory child support limits. In re Marriage of Chalat No forced entry occurred where police officers with valid arrest knocked on door, defendant's wife answered, and officers entered. Where no forced entry occurs, there is no knock-and-announce requirement. The court also held that the execution of valid arrest warrants was not a pretext for an unlawful search of the defendant's residence. People v. Miller CCIOA's plain language including individual units in the common interest community makes clear that an owner's association has standing to assert claims of individual unit owners. The court also held that the trial court did not err by holding costs of repair to be the measure of damages rather than diminution in value. Heritage Village Owners Association v. Golden Heritage Investors, Ltd. General
Assembly did not intend the ninety-day deadline for determining restitution
after judgment of conviction to be a jurisdictional limit that would
prevent the court from reconsidering a motion for restitution. Therefore,
the trial court had jurisdiction to impose restitution on the defendant.
People
v. Harman Tort settlement apportionment case was a separate cause of action, not an ancillary proceeding to a workers' compensation case, and therefore statute of limitations applied. The court held that the two-year catch-all statute of limitation was applicable to the apportionment case and held that the action was untimely. Harrison v. Pinnacol Assurance Appeal dismissed as moot, where deported defendant challenged only his sentence but not the underlying conviction. Because he did not challenge his conviction, the outcome of the appeal could have no practical effect on him. People v. Garcia Legal validity of city ordinances and city's actions are reviewed under C.R.C.P. 57, not 106(a)(4). The court held that two Boulder ordinances were invalid: "Ordinance 7038 is invalid because Section 8 of that ordinance allows the City to bypass the due process requirements set forth in [Boulder City Code] § 10-13-1 et seq., and [] Ordinance 7103 is also invalid because it was passed pursuant to Section 8 and accordingly did not adhere to those due process requirements." Native American Rights Fund, Inc. v. The City of Boulder Findings that warrant appointment of a conservator do not equate to a determination of testamentary incapacity. Estate of Gallavan Magistrate had jurisdiction to consider parenting time issues, including residential placement, in this case, where the magistrate was not asked to and did not change the original grant of joint legal custody, a matter over which he lacked jurisdiction. The court dismissed a portion of the appeal without prejudice, concluding that the magistrate's order was not a final order and therefore the time for district court review had not begin to run. In re Marriage of Roosa District court abused its discretion in excluding evidence as a discovery sanction. In the absence of willful misconduct or a pattern of neglect demonstrating a need for modification of a party's discovery practices, a court should use sanctions only as a means to cure the prejudice resulting from the discovery violation. The court noted that the least severe sanction to remedy the violation should be imposed and that trial courts should avoid excluding evidence as a sanction due to the potential windfall to defendants. People v. Daley Termination of parental rights reversed where the trial court did not substantially comply with the procedural requirements of the Parent-Child Legal Relationship Termination Act of 1987, § 19-3-601, et seq., C.R.S. 2003. The court concluded that the absence of a timely dispositional hearing prejudiced the father's ability to preserve his parental rights. Judge Marquez dissented, concluding that the trial court substantially complied with statutory requirements, including § 19-3-505(7)(b), requiring a dispositional hearing. Judge Marquez argued that the majority ignored the statutory requirement of § 19-3-604(3) that in considering termination of the parent-child legal relationship, the court should give primary consideration to the physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs of the child. People in the Interest of D.R.W. General
contractor was not a party to condo association bylaws and therefore
arbitration provision did not apply to it. The court of appeals
concluded that the same facts would be involved in both the arbitrable
and nonarbitrable claims in this construction defects case, and therefore
the trial court properly denied a motion to compel arbitration. Trial court must consider and eliminate less drastic alternatives before entering an order of termination of parental rights. But there is no requirement that the department of social services make special inquiry and independently identify and evaluate other possible placements within or outside the family. On the record before it, the court concluded the trial court's termination of parental rights was not error. People in the Interest of D.B-J. March 10, 2004 Here is the list of cases the court of appeals will release tomorrow. The court will issue 17 published opinions, which I will summarize (gulp) in tomorrow's post. March 8, 2004 The supreme court's announcements for today are here. The court issued two decisions, which are discussed below. The court also granted cert. in 6 cases. The questions presented in those cases are listed below the new case summaries. Whether to approve a plan for removal for treatment of an insanity acquitee is a matter of trial court discretion. The trial court had refused to approve a plan that would include the possibility of release into the community without supervision. Because the district attorney objected to the plan, C.R.S. § 16-8-118 required approval of the plan by the district court. The supreme court concluded that the approval was a matter of trial court discretion, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in approving the plan. In concluding the issue is one of discretion, the supreme court noted that the overriding concern was public safety. Justice Martinez, joined by Justice Bender dissented, concluding that the "majority's interpretation of the statute is not functional," and the legislature did not intend such a result. People v. Rigg C.R.C.P. 105 requires courts to adjudicate all claims regarding real property in one action. In this quiet title action, the court also held that a treasurer's deed otherwise void on its face may be reformed through the use of extrinsic evidence, under limited circumstances. Under the facts of the case, the court held that a 1964 deed that was void on its face could be reformed. Therefore, the county acquired good title to the property and the respondent could not acquire the property by adverse possession, since adverse possession is not available against the sovereign. Board of County Commissioners of Pitkin County v. Timroth The court granted cert. in the following cases: Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Longmont Toyota, Inc., No. 03SC450, addressing this question: Whether the court of appeals erred when it construed section 8-42-105(4) as permanently barring claimants who are responsible for their separation from employment from receipt of temporary disability benefits when their conditions attributable to work-related injuries worsen. Friedland v. The Travelers Indemnity Co., No. 03SC681, addressing these issues: Whether the traditional late notice rule announced in Marez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 286 (Colo. 1981), should be overruled with respect to liability insurance policies.
Whether the district court erred in characterizing the instant case as a “no notice” case, rather than a “late notice” case, because notice was given after the underlying litigation was settled.
Whether the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law, that untimely notice barred the petitioner’s claim despite the presence of disputed material facts regarding the reasonableness of, and justification for, the timing of the notice.
Whether the district court erred in denying coverage for defense costs incurred before the date that the court determined the petitioner first had access to the insurance policies and could have given notice. Peterson v. McMahon, No. 03SC685, involving this question: Whether or not the court of appeals holding that allows punitive damages against a trustee for not guaranteeing a 20% return on investment is contrary to decisions of this court or existing law holding that actions in equity are not subject to punitive damages. People v. Cunefare, No. 03SC782, addressing these issues: Whether the crime of tampering with a witness or victim requires proof that the witness or victim was legally summoned to an official proceeding.
Whether the General Assembly intended “legally summoned” to mean “subject to legal process.”
Whether a letter to a prosecutor urging him or her to drop the charges against the defendant constitutes the crime of forgery when it is penned by the defendant and forged with the victim’s signature, and without the victim’s knowledge or consent. In re Board of Directors, Metro Wastewater Reclamation District, No. 03SC486, addressing this issue: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the traditional late notice rule as set forth in Marez v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 638 P.2d 286 (Colo. 1981) applies to the notice provisions of the proposed AIG liability insurance policy rather than the Notice/Prejudice rule. Krause v. Sorter Construction, Inc., No. 04SC22, addressing this question: Whether a temporarily totally disabled employee medically incapable of earning any wages from any employer is disqualified from receiving temporary total disability benefits by operation of sections 8-42-105(4) and 8-42-103(1)(g), 3 C.R.S. 2003. March 5, 2004 Martha Stewart convicted on all four remaining counts. I know it's unrelated to Colorado appellate happenings, but it may make for an interesting appeal in the Second Circuit. We shall see. The supreme court will issue two decisions Monday, People v. Riggs, No. 02SC543, and Board of County Commissioners of Pitkin County v. Timroth, No. 02SC704. Riggs involves three questions: Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding that the objecting party, and not a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, has the burden of proof in a hearing to determine whether a defendant is eligible for temporary release from the state hospital for treatment and rehabilitation activities. Whether the court of appeals erred by adopting trial court standards to assess when and under what circumstances a criminal defendant, found not guilty by reason of insanity, should be permitted to be temporarily released from the state hospital for treatment and rehabilitation activities. Whether the trial court has discretion to conclude that the victim's family's letters are relevant and admissible for a determination of whether a defendant is permitted to be temporarily released. Timroth involves one question: Whether the court of appeals erred by refusing to admit
extrinsic evidence under C.R.C.P. 105 tending to support the validity
of a treasurer's deed otherwise void on its face. March 4, 2004 Today's court of appeals announcements are here. The court issued only unpublished decisions. March 3, 2004 Here's the list of decisions the court of appeals will release tomorrow. Only unpublished decisions will come down. March 1, 2004 Today's supreme court announcements are here. The court issued two decisions, discussed below. An urban renewal authority does not retain the power to condemn a portion of a parcel situated within an area that was determined to be blighted at the outset of an urban renewal project, where the entire parcel had been sold by the authority, developed in accordance with the urban renewal plan, and formally released. Once a parcel within a redevelopment area has been sold, developed, and released in this manner, an urban renewal authority may not exercise its condemnation power over any part of that parcel absent renewed findings of blight by the appropriate authority. Once blight has been cured or eliminated from a particular parcel, an urban renewal authority loses its statutory condemnation power with respect to that parcel. Arvada Urban Renewal Authority v. Columbine Professional Plaza Association, Inc. In the context of C.R.S. § 17-2-103(7), upon a finding of good cause by the parole board, a parole revocation hearing can be delayed beyond thirty days after the parolee's arrest and a parolee can be held in custody for a reasonable time pending the revocation hearing. The supreme court disagreed with the district court's interpretation of section 17-2-103(7) to require that a parolee may be held for only thirty days after his arrest. Section 17-2-103(7), the supreme court said, governs both the instances in which a parolee might be entitled to release from custody and the circumstances in which a revocation hearing can be continued and a parolee can be detained pending that hearing. Colorado Dep't of Corrections v. Madison In addition, the court granted cert. in one case, Coffman v. Colorado Common Cause, No. 03SC397, which will address these issues: Whether public resources initially expended by the State Treasurer to perform his official duties to analyze an initiated measure which delegated responsibilities to the State Treasurer can be counted as public resources to express an opinion on the measure.
Whether the Treasurer’s issuance of advisories violated the Fair Campaign Practices Act (“FCPA”) section 1-45-117, C.R.S. (2000). Finally, the court modified Davison v. ICAO and Mobley v. ICAO, an opinion issued on February 9th. The modified decision, including a blacklined version, is here.
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