June 29, 2007 The supreme court will issue the following five decisions on Monday, July 2. I likely will not get summaries posted until after the Fourth of July holiday. 06SC188 Medina v. People 06SC314 Frasco v. People 05SC849 Denver Foundation v. Wells Fargo 07SA316 In re People v. Mills 07SA317 In re
People v. Pryor-Riley June 28, 2007 Today's court of appeals announcements are here. The court issued nine published decisions, summarized below. A motion for attorney fees and costs under a statutory fee-shifting provision (as opposed to seeking attorneys fees as damages) did not not preclude a judgment on the merits from becoming final or toll the running of the forty-five-day period for filing a notice of appeal. Therefore, a notice of appeal filed more than 45 days after the entry of a motion directing verdict on the last remaining claim was untimely. Any failure by the trial court to enter judgment in conformity with C.R.C.P. 23(c)(3), did not affect the finality of the judgment for purposes of appeal. Goodwin v. Homeland Central Insurance Company Economic loss rule did not bar plaintiff's negligence claim against homebuilders. Because the homebuilders' negligence claim rested on a duty of care is independent of any contractual duty defendants may have owed, plaintiff should have been allowed to pursue simultaneously her claims for negligence and breach of contract. Andrews v. Picard In an appeal in C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) action, the court reviewed a determination of defendant Boulder County Board of Adjustment applying provisions of the Boulder County Land Use Code to a special use permit issued to the predecessor in interest of intervenor, Cemex, Inc. The Permit conditionally approved the use of discarded tires as fuel for the manufacturing of cement. The court also reviewed a claim that defendant Graham Billingsley, in his official capacity as Director of the Boulder County Land Use Department, violated the Colorado Open Records Act, § 24-72-201. The court held that the BOA did not abuse its discretion in its application of the Code to the Permit, but concluded the district court needed to conduct further proceedings to determine whether there was a violation of CORA, and whether plaintiff may be entitled to costs and attorney fees. Sierra Club v. Billingsley Trial court erred in dismissing claims as time-barred under the No-Fault Act because Plaintiff's claims did not accrue on the date of his automobile accident. Instead, Plaintiff's claims accrued on the date when he knew or should have known that the insurer failed to offer enhanced PIP benefits to the policyholder. Because the allegations in the complaint did not clearly demonstrate that the complaint was brought outside the statutory period, and because the application of the statute of limitations in this case presented a factual question that could not be resolved based on those allegations, dismissal was inappropriate. Wagner v. Grange Insurance Association Trial court erred in ordering restitution for the cost of installing locks in office of burglary victim. Defendant’s conduct did not create or increase the victim’s risk of future burglaries, it merely exposed an existing vulnerability (i.e., the lack of locks on internal offices). Awarding restitution not because of any damage or injury defendant did or would inflict, but solely to correct the pre-existing vulnerability would put the victim in a better financial position than it would have been in had defendant’s conduct not occurred. Therefore, the restitution order for the cost of installing locks was improper. People v. Reyes Court of appeals upholds trial court's permanent injunction, restraining property owner from renting its property on a short-term basis. The property was “held out primarily as a lodge for short-term rental,” something prohibited by a subdivision plat note, as interpreted by a 1979 ordinance. Such use thuse represented a change from the residential use for which the property was designed. The court of appeals rejected the property owner's argument that neither the subdivision plat nor the 1979 ordinance specifically excluded short-term rental of its duplex and that the rental operation did not render the duplex a “lodge” under the terms of the subdivision plat and 1979 ordinance. Jackson & Co. (USA), Inc. v. Town of Avon Husband and wife owed child a duty of support and therefore the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s order requiring husband to pay child support. But because the trial court did not specify a starting date or a monthly due date for the child support payment, the court remanded the case for the trial court to enter such orders. In re Marriage of Rodrick Defendant contended arbitration award should be vacated because of plaintiff’s alleged failure to comply with conditions precedent to arbitration. But the court of appeals concluded that the issue whether plaintiff failed to comply with procedural conditions precedent to the arbitration was for the arbitrator to decide, and that an arbitrator’s resolution of that issue, even if erroneous, is not a ground for vacating or refusing to confirm the award. The court therefore affirmed the arbitration award. BRM Construction, Inc. v. Marais Gaylord, L.L.C. Court of appeals upholds a district court's decision denying a waiver of the parental notification requirement of C.R.S. § 12-37.5-107, for a pregnant minor seeking an abortion. Petitioner stated in her petition, filed June 4, 2007, that she was approximately ten weeks pregnant and wanted to terminate her pregnancy by abortion without telling her parents. Upon receipt of the petition, the trial court held a hearing, at which petitioner appeared pro se. Following the hearing, the court entered an order denying the petition. It found, by clear and convincing evidence, that petitioner was not sufficiently mature to decide whether to have an abortion. The court of appeals noted that "the trial court appointed counsel to represent petitioner in an expedited appeal to this court pursuant to § 12-37.5-107(2)(d), C.R.S. 2006, and C.R.C.P. Chapter 23.5(3). Consistent with the confidentiality concerns set forth in § 12-37.5-107(2)(g), C.R.S. 2006, and C.R.C.P. Chapter 23.5(5), the identities of petitioner, her counsel, and the trial court are not shown on the caption page of this opinion." The court of appeals' opinion noted that the trial court found the petitioner lacked the maturity to decide whether to have an abortion, and that in making that determination, the trial court considered petitioner’s unwillingness to communicate with her mother or to consult with other adults, her focus on her own needs, and her failure to discuss the matter with a doctor. The court of appeals said, "While we recognize that there may be factors other than immaturity that would make a pregnant minor unwilling to communicate with her parent, the facts cited by the trial court were generally appropriate considerations in assessing petitioner’s maturity. In addition, the fact that petitioner exhibited only minimal understanding of the risks of the abortion procedure, and the fact that she was unemployed and being supported by her mother, could have been considered indicators of a lack of maturity." The court of appeals also noted that the petition stated it would not be in petitioner's best interest to tell her parent of the abortion, but concluded that there was nothing in the record to indicate that waiver should have been granted on this basis. Upon the Petition of Jane Doe 2 June 27, 2007 The supreme court has recently granted rules to show cause in the following two original proceedings: No. 07SA167 Delta County District Court Case No. 06CV37 (Judge Charles R. Greenacre) In re: Plaintiff: ANDREA GOETTMAN, for herself and in the Representative Capacity for the Estate, Heirs and Minor Children (LRG, JMG and MBG) of Michael Goettman v. Defendants: North Fork Valley Restaurant; Thirsty Parrot Pub; Lawrence Jakubiak; Gabe Neuenschwander; Patricia Medina; Kate Benton; Phillip Dunn; Hydramatic Engineering, Pty. Ltd; Aro Mining Products, USA, Inc. Petitioner Hydramatic Engineering, Pty. Ltd. Seeks contends that it is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Delta County District Court in this wrongful death action because Hydramatic is a company organized under the laws of Australia and residing there. It requests that the court issue a writ of prohibition directing the District Court to dismiss the suit against Hydramatic for lack of jurisdiction. On June 7, 2007, the court issued a rule to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondent Andrea Goettman, for herself and in the Representative Capacity for the Estate, Heirs and Minor Children (LRG, JMG and MBG) of Michael Goettman, is directed to provide a written answer on or before June 27, 2007. Petitioner Hydramatic has twenty days from receipt of the answer within which to reply. No. 07SA138 Adams County District Court Case No. 06CV555 (Judge Thomas R. Ensor) In Re: Plaintiff: ROBERT A. COOK v. Defendants: GUADALUPE FERNANDEZ-ROCHA and FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY. Synopsis: The trial court excluded the plaintiff’s treating physician from testifying as an expert witness because plaintiff failed to comply with discovery deadlines. The plaintiff claims the late disclosure was harmless and his expert should be allowed to testify under Todd v. Bear Valley Village Apartments, 980 P.2nd 973 (Colo.1999). On May 11, 2007, the court issued a rule to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondent, Farmers Insurance Company, is directed to answer on or before May 29, 2007, and petitioner Robert A. Cook has 10 days from receipt of the answer within which to reply. The court of appeals will release the following decisions tomorrow, including nine published opinions: Published Opinions No.: 05CA2038 Robert Goodwin, individually, et al. v. Homeland Central
Insurance Company Unpublished Opinions No.: 03CA2220 People v. Justin Howard Hoyt June 25, 2007 The supreme court's announcements for today are here. The court issued ten decisions, summarized below. The court also granted cert. in three cases, one of which was remanded. The issues in those cases follow the summaries. These are probably the last opinions out of the court for awhile. Typically, the court issues only a few decisions, if any, during July and August. Of course, if the court does release any decisions, I will have them here. It was not an abuse of discretion for the water court judge to recuse himself without providing a waivable reason for such recusal on the record. In addition, the record adequately supported the water court’s finding that the Individual Homeowners and their attorney were “stubbornly litigious” because they continued to relitigate a settled issue contrary to the water court’s explicit admonition. Therefore, the water court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a reasonable amount of attorney fees to the Association under C.R.S. § 13-17-102(4). Spring Creek Ranchers' Association v. McNichols In an interlocutory
appeal, the supreme court concluded the trial court abused its discretion
when it disqualified two assistant district attorneys and the entire
Mesa County District Attorney’s Office from further participation
in two pending cases against the defendant after finding special circumstances.
The court held that the trial court had insufficient grounds to disqualify
the prosecuting attorneys and the entire Mesa County District Attorney’s
Office. The prosecuting attorneys had previously represented three potential
witnesses in private practice on a variety of unrelated matters. Based
on the possibility that they obtained exculpatory information during
their representation of the witnesses, the trial court found that they
were barred from revealing that information, which created an irresolvable
ethical conflict in participating in the prosecution of The trial court need not give a unanimity instruction when a defendant is charged with a single transaction of solicitation. Here, the People charged and tried their case against defendant on the theory that he was involved in a single transaction of solicitation. Thus, the trial court was not required to give a unanimity instruction. Justice Coats, joined by Justice Rice, concurred in the judgment only, concluding that the majority opinion "presumes a general right to jury agreement that does not exist in either the federal or state constitution," and that "its interjection of the concept of a 'transaction of solicitation,' apparently in contrast to a single crime of solicitation, hopelessly confuses the scope of the crime itself, as well as the law of this jurisdiction governing a defendant’s right to compel an election among separate criminal acts sufficient in themselves to satisfy a single charge or count." He concurred in the judgment, though, because he concluded that "a defendant waives any right he may have to an election by failing to assert it in a timely manner, and therefore that a trial court’s failure to force such an election, sua sponte, cannot amount to error at all, much less plain error." Melina v. People The trial court had denied the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal, following the introduction of evidence to the effect that the defendant expressed her intent to kill a particular sheriff’s deputy with a pipe bomb; that she admitted learning the victim’s address and driving by his house; and that she possessed almost all of the components needed to build a pipe bomb, as well as materials to manufacture false identifications. The court of appeals reversed, finding the evidence insufficient to prove that the defendant took a “substantial step” toward commission of the crime. The supreme court reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence at trial to reach the jury on all of the elements of attempted first degree murder. People v. Lehnert When he was
thirteen years old, defendant committed a delinquent act which, after
he had turned fourteen, the prosecution charged as a crime of burglary
by filing an information directly in the district court. Under a plea
agreement, defendant was convicted and sentenced as an adult for second
degree burglary. Relying on the plain language of the direct filing
statute, the district court and the court of appeals concluded that
the prosecution had the discretionary authority to charge defendant
as an adult under the then-existing direct filing statute, because he
was fourteen when the charges were filed. The supreme court reversed,
concluding that the plain language of the direct filing statute, as
it existed when defendant was charged, was ambiguous as to whether a
juvenile must be fourteen when the charged delinquent act occurred or
when the prosecution filed The supreme court concluded that a successor court may decide Batson issues when it conducts a post-trial Batson hearing at which it can assess the peremptory challenger's credibility when providing his nondiscriminatory reasons for striking specific jurors, and the trial transcripts or juror questionnaires sufficiently confirm the existence of the proffered reasons. Here, the successor court, after concluding that a prima facie case of gender discrimination had been established, conducted a post-trial Batson hearing where the defendant proffered several nondiscriminatory reasons for striking the four female jurors. Because the facts in the juror questionnaires and the record of jury selection confirmed at least one of the nondiscriminatory reasons for striking each of the four female prospective jurors, the court concluded that the successor court did not abuse its discretion when it conducted the Batson hearing in this case. Craig v. Carlson Plaintiffs were current and former airline employees who claim to have suffered skin and respiratory problems because of exposure to environmental contamination at Denver International Airport (“DIA”) since the facility opened in 1995. In 2002, plaintiffs filed a notice of claim with Denver for personal injury and damages due to environmental contamination at DIA. Denver invoked governmental immunity, but following an evidentiary hearing the trial court refused to dismiss the claim. The trial court held that plaintiffs had discovered their injuries by 1999, but it adopted plaintiffs’ theory that their symptoms recurred within the CGIA 180-day period applicable to the 2002 notice of claim, and every time a symptom recurred a separate injury occurred for CGIA purposes. The court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court reversed, holding that the complaint, the C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) evidentiary hearing, and the trial court’s findings of fact all demonstrate that, by 1999, plaintiffs had discovered their injuries. Because they did not file their joint notice of claim with Denver until 2002, they were outside the 180-day CGIA requirement. Therefore, their claims had to be dismissed. City and County of Denver v. Crandall A waiver of attorney’s fees in a marital agreement is subject to review for unconscionability at the time of the dissolution. The supreme court first looked to the plain language of the Colorado Marital Agreement Act (“CMAA”) to determine whether the General Assembly intended for a waiver of attorney’s fees to be reviewable for unconscionability. Finding a conflict in the CMAA’s provisions, the court turned to other tools of statutory construction to discern legislative intent. Concluding such agreements are subject to unconscionability review, the court reversed the court of appeals, and upheld the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. Justice Eid, joined by Justices Bender and Martinez, specially concurred, noting, "Under the rationale adopted by the majority today, a district court can conduct an unconscionability review of all provisions of a marital agreement. Yet the legislature has permitted such review 'insofar, but only insofar, as the provisions of such agreement . . . relate to' the determination of spousal maintenance. § 14-2-307(2), C.R.S. (2006) (emphasis added). In my view, the attorney’s fees waiver provision at issue in this case can be reviewed for unconscionability not because all provisions in a marital agreement can be subjected to such review, as the majority effectively holds, but because it 'relates to' the determination of spousal maintenance." In re the Marriage of Ikeler In a C.A.R.
21 proceeding, the supreme court considered whether the fifteen thousand
dollar statutory limit on damages in C.R.S. § 8-41-401(3) of the
Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”) applies to a personal
injury suit brought by an independent contractor against the contractor
for whom he was performing services. The trial court ruled the limitation
on damages did not apply. In an interlocutory appeal challenging a grant of suppression of evidence, the supreme court reversed the trial court’s suppression ruling. The court reversed the trial court’s holding that the search of defendant's vehicle and purse was unconstitutional because there was no probable cause for a felony arrest. The court held that the search and seizure of a suspect is valid if an investigatory stop is valid and an investigating officer has a reasonable belief based on articulable facts that a suspect could be trying to gain control of a weapon. In this case, the investigatory stop of the defendant was valid and the search of the defendant’s vehicle was based on the investigating officer’s reasonable interpretation of defendant's suspicious actions. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court’s suppression of the evidence found in defendant's purse and her subsequent statements. People v. McDaniel The court granted cert. in the following cases: Bloom v. People, No. 06SC597, on these issues: Whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated when a prosecution witness testified that the only witness to support Petitioner’s defense had failed a polygraph examination regarding his statements to the police in the summer of 2002.
Whether the trial court erred and violated Petitioner’s constitutional rights when it found her competent to proceed to trial without conducting a meaningful competency evaluation. Kancilia v. Pearson, No. 07SC4, on this question: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that a creditor with non-dischargeable debt may garnish assets that a debtor claimed as exempt from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 522(l), where the exemption lacked a statutory basis under Colorado law. In Hoopeston Foods Denver Corp. v. Stokes Canning Co., No. 07SC156, cert. was granted, the judgment vacated and the case remanded to the court of appeals in light of Ingold v. Aimco/Bluffs L.L.C. Apartments, Case No. 06SA240 (May 29, 2007). June 21, 2007 Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued only unpublished decisions: June 20, 2007 The court of appeals will release the following unpublished decisions tomorrow: No.: 04CA1025 People v. Derrick Turner June 15, 2007 The court of appeals' oral argument calendar for August is here. The supreme court will have no case announcements on Monday. So unless there is other appellate news that day, I will not post an update. Happy Fathers' Day everyone! June 14, 2007 Happy Flag Day! Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued 10 published decisions, summarized below. In an appeal from a judgment enforcing statutory liens against developers' property, the Lease Purchase Agreement stated that the Lease and payments made thereunder were not multiple fiscal year indebtedness or any other kind of debt, and did not constitute debt or a financial obligation within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory provision. Therefore, the Lease was not an indebtedness within the meaning of C.R.S. § 32-1-1006(1)(h)(I)(C) and (E). Accordingly, the Lease Purchase Agreement could not be used to assess and calculate availability of service or facilities fees (ASF). The court concluded that there was no legal basis for a foreclosure claim against the developer for unpaid ASF and late fees, and reversed the district court's judgment on that issue. Skyland Metropolitan District v. Mountain West Enterprise, LLC A defendant may not recover attorney fees under C.R.S. § 13-17-201 when (1) the plaintiff’s action includes both tort and nontort claims and (2) the defendant has obtained dismissal of the tort claims, but not of the nontort claims, under C.R.C.P. 12(b). The court concluded that the dismissal of less than the entire “action” is insufficient to trigger an award under the plain language of the statute. The court noted that had the legislature intended to authorize recovery for something other than dismissal of the entire action, it would have employed different language. Sotelo v. Hutchens Trucking Company, Inc. The court upheld
HB 1455, concluding it did not run afoul of Amendment 35, enacted by
the voters. The court noted that the plain language of Amendment 35
"clearly and unambiguously provides that the General Assembly is
responsible for setting the spending levels for health-related A corporate
entity can be considered a public employee under the Colorado Governmental The trial court
abused its discretion by admitting a laboratory report without testimony
from the Negligence claims
brought by safehouse that had its shelter address inadvertently disclosed
by directory assistance and Dex, were barred by the filed tariff doctrine
and by federal law, and that the tariffs limit Qwest’s liability
to zero as a matter of law. Safehouse
Progressive Alliance for Nonviolence, Inc. v. Qwest Corporation Defendant appealed
the trial court's order denying his Crim. P. 35(a) motion for postconviction
relief, contending he has a liberty interest in a reduced prison sentence;
that the court improperly denied him due process when it modified his
sentence without providing (1) notice of a violation of a condition
of that sentence, (2) disclosure of the evidence against him, (3) a
fair opportunity to be heard and to present evidence, and (4) the right
to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; and that, thus, the
court improperly imposed a new sentence in an illegal manner. The court
of appeals agreed and reversed. The appeal arose because the trial court
had received a letter from a DOC sex offender treatment program manager,
stating that defendant had not successfully completed the program, but
would benefit from further treatment. No motion was pending at the time.
The court, sua sponte, entered an order vacating defendant's ten-year
suspension and imposing a twenty-five year sentence. People
v. Sisson In a case involving
conservation easement tax credits, the court of appeals vacated and
remanded the district court's summary judgment in favor of the taxpayers.
The version of the Conservation Easement Tax Credit Act, C.R.S. §
39-22-522(2), in effect when the taxpayers donation was made provided
that each “taxpayer” who donated a conservation easement could
claim a credit not to exceed $100,000 per donation over a twenty-year
period. “Taxpayer” was then defined as “a resident individual
or a domestic or foreign corporation [with certain tax exempt status].”
Colo. Sess. Laws 1999, ch. 247, § 39-22-522( 1) at 976. The plaintiffs,
two married couples, split the value of the easement ($154,700) and
each took a tax credit of $77,350. In 2000 and 2001, each In an appeal
from the termination of parental rights, the court of appeals remanded
for an evidentiary hearing on whether the mother received ineffective
assistance of counsel. In a highly unusual procedure, the court of appeals
requested and considered an offer of proof from appellate counsel to
show ineffectiveness. Based on that offer of proof, the court of appeals
concluded an evidentiary hearing was necessary. At the hearing, the
trial court must determine (1) whether the mother's former attorney
acted outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance Because consent of the parties was not necessary for the magistrate to hear this delinquency action, C.R.S. § 19-1-108(1) (authorizing a magistrate to hear any juvenile delinquency matter except where a jury trial has been requested, or in transfer proceedings), the procedures to be followed to obtain review of the adjudication were not governed by C.R.M. 7(b). Rather, the filing of a petition for review in the district court was a prerequisite to the court of appeals’ review of the juvenile’s delinquency adjudication that had been tried before a magistrate. Because the district court’s order denying the juvenile’s petition for review as untimely did not indicate whether the court took account of the Estep-Baker considerations, and because at least one of these factors the potential prejudice to the People that would result from allowing a late filing – requires the resolution of factual issues, the court of appeals remanded for additional findings and reconsideration in light of the Estep-Baker factors. In the event the district court concludes that the juvenile’s right of review should be reinstated, the district court was directed to conduct a review of the magistrate’s judgment pursuant to C.R.S. § 19-1-108(5). People In the Interest of M.A.M. June 13, 2007 The court of appeals will release both published and unpublished decisions tomorrow. Here is the list of opinions being issued tomorrow: Published Opinions No.: 04CA2605 Skyland Metropolitan District, et al. v. Mountain West
Enterprise, LLC, et al. Unpublished Opinions No.: 04CA1969 People v. Edward Ray Williams June 11, 2007 Here are today's supreme court announcements. The court announced decisions in four cases, two of which were affirmed by operation of law (C.A.R. 35(e)), meaning the court was equally divided 3-3. No opinion is issued in such cases. The two cases were Trimble v. People, and Carton v. People. Also, the court did not grant cert. in any cases. Defendant did not forfeit his confrontation rights, and therefore it violated the Confrontation Clause for the district court to admit a videotaped interview with one of the child victims in lieu of her live testimony. The court of appeals had held that Crawford v. Washington barred admission of the out-of-court interview, and the error was not harmless. It also rejected the People’s claim that by causing her unavailability, the defendant forfeited his right to confront the child. The supreme court affirmed, holding that because the People did not prove that the defendant had any intention of subverting the criminal justice system by preventing or dissuading the child from being a witness against him, the record failed to demonstrate that he forfeited his confrontation right. People v. Moreno In an interlocutory appeal by the People, the supreme court reversed the trial court’s suppression of statements made by the defendant-motorist in response to roadside questioning by a law enforcement officer. The supreme court held that the trial court erroneously found the defendant to be in custody at the time of questioning for purposes of Miranda. The officer’s retention of the defendant’s driver’s license, his order that the defendant remain in his vehicle during a records check, and his order that the defendant step out of the vehicle while the officer conducted a consensual search, were not together sufficient to establish custody. In addition, the officer’s statements to the defendant in this case did not create custody because they were unaccompanied by any significant degree of restraint on the defendant. The court therefore reversed the trial court’s suppression order. People v. Stephenson June 8, 2007 The supreme court will issue the following four decisions on Monday: No. 05SC762, Trimble v. People No. 06SC26, People v. Moreno No. 06SC436, Carton v. People No. 07SA16,
People v. Stephenson (no orals) June 7, 2007 Here are the court of appeals' announcements for today. The court issued the following unpublished decisions (no published decisions): No.: 03CA1330 People v. William Allen Davis On June 1, the court issued a new decision in Ferrel v. Colorado Dep't of Corrections, and withdrew the opinion it had issue on May 17. The court granted the Plaintiff-Appellant's motion to modify the language of the decision, but it's not clear what that modification was. What is clear is the plaintiff still lost. June 5, 2007 The supreme court's announcements from yesterday are here. The court issued one decision, summarized below. The court did not grant cert. in any cases. In an appeal
of a trial court’s suppression order involving the seizure of evidence
as result of a traffic stop, the prosecution argued that an officer’s
observation of an air freshener hanging from the rearview mirror justified
the stop, relying on C.R.S. § 42-4-201(4) (prohibiting the obstruction
of a driver's vision). The prosecution further argued that the fellow
officer rule provided additional support for the stop. The supreme court,
however, affirmed the suppression order, holding that an June 1, 2007 The supreme court will issue one decision on Monday, No. 07SA17, People v. Arias, which appears to be an interlocutory appeal by the People. In the last couple of months, the supreme court has issued rules to show cause in the following C.A.R. 21 proceedings and accepted a certification request under C.A.R. 21.1 in one case: No. 07SA150 Adams County District Court Case No. 06CV546 (Judge John Edward Popovich) In Re: Plaintiff: CYNTHIA CARDENAS, Mother and Next Friend of ISABELLE PEREZ, v. Defendants: VANDNA JERATH, M.D. and ST. ANTHONY HOSPITAL NORTH. Plaintiff Cynthia Cardenas, on behalf of her daughter Isabelle Perez, alleges that Perez’s brain damage was caused by the negligence of Defendants during Perez’s birth. Plaintiff seeks relief from trial court orders shielding St. Anthony’s internal investigation through the use of a “Hawkins letter”, and an order requiring Plaintiff to execute unlimited authorizations allowing for the release of medical records and information. On May 22, 2007, the court issued an order to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondent St. Anthony Hospital North is directed to answer on or before June 22, 2007, and petitioner, Cynthia Cardenas has thirty days from receipt of the answer within which to reply.
No. 07SA125 United States District Court for the District of Colorado In re: Plaintiffs: AE, INC, a Colorado corporation, and ROSEMARIE GLAS, v. Defendant: THE GOOD YEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, an Ohio corporation. Synopsis: Pursuant to C.A.R. 21.1 the U.S. District Court requested that the Colorado Supreme Court accept the following certified question of law: Whether Colorado adopts Section 171 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971) in determining which state’s laws apply to the question of entitlement to pre-judgment interest. On May 10, 2007, the court accepted the certified question.
Boulder County District Court Case No. 06CV424 (Judge Maria E. Berkenkotter) In re: Plaintiff: LESLIE LANAHAN, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lynn Gordon Bailey, Jr. v. Defendants: CHI PSI FRATERNITY, ALPHA PSI DELTA CORPORATION OF CHI PSI, individually and as a chapter and agent of Chi Psi Fraternity, PATRICK STEPHENSON WALL, NICHOLAS AARON ABRAHAMSEN, FRANK WILLIAMSON DARDEN, BRETT JAMISON HERTER, CHRISTOPHER NELSON JONES, MICHAEL BURNS RYAN and ALAN JOSEPH WILLIAMS. Plaintiff Leslie Lanahan, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Lynn Gordon Bailey, brought suit against the Chi Psi Fraternity and various of its members for wrongful death. Plaintiff claims that her son Gordie died as a result of hazing by fraternity members, the failure of the members to obtain medical assistance that would have saved his life, and the failure of the national fraternity and its local chapter to properly train and supervise their members. She asserts that each of the defendants either participated in the events causing death or failed to properly supervise the participants. The question raised by this Rule 21 Petition is whether the noneconomic damages cap under the Wrongful Death Act, C.R.S. Section 13-21-203(1)(a), applies to each defendant in a case and does not apply to the total amount a plaintiff may recover. The Boulder District Court held that section 203 (1)(a) caps damages on a per claim, not per defendant, basis. On April 19, 2007, the court issued an order to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondents Chi Psi Fraternity, Alpha Psi Delta Corporation of Chi Psi, individually and as a chapter and agent of Chi Psi Fraternity, Patrick Stephenson Wall, Nicholas Aaron Abrahamsen, Frank Williamson Darden, Brett Jamison Herter, Christopher Nelson Jones, Michael Burns Ryan and Alan Joseph Williams are directed to answer on or before May 21, 2007, and petitioner, Leslie Lanahan, has 30 days from receipt of the answer within which to reply.
No. 07SA109 District Court, City & County of Denver, 05CV6451 (Judge John N. McMullen) In Re: Archdiocese of Denver Cases- Group 1 This filing relates to consolidated cases 05CV6451, 05CV6582, 05CV7025, 05CV7438, 05CV7437, 05CV9632, 05CV10016, 05CV10351, 06CV243, 06CV244, 06CV870, 06CV3208. Respondents claim negligence against Petitioners related to alleged child sexual abuse by former priest that occurred approximately 40 years ago. Petitioners seek relief from the trial court’s order denying Petitioners’ Motion to Dismiss based on the statute of limitations. On April 19, 2007, the court issued an order to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondents are directed to file a written answer on or before May 9, 2007, and Petitioners have 20 days from receipt of answer within which to reply.
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