June 29, 2006 Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued 10 published decisions, which I hope to summarize below by the end of today. Trial court erroneously limited the jury’s consideration of self-defense principles to only those involving the use of deadly physical force. A factual dispute existed whether defendant used ordinary physical force or deadly physical force, and the jury should have been allowed to consider the applicability of self-defense principles relating to the use of ordinary physical force. People v. Vasquez It did not violate due process for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury or allow evidence of defendant's acquittal of prior sexual assault charges, where the victims in those cases testified in defendant's trial here under CRE 404(b). The court concluded that whether to advise the jury of the acquittals was within the trial court's discretion. Judge Ney dissented. People v. Kinney A mutual protection
order to prevent domestic abuse may be issued only if each party has
met his or her burden of proof regarding the existence of an imminent
danger to himself or herself, as required by C.R.S. § 13-14-102(4),
and the court has made sufficient findings of fact to support the The term “one
story” as used in restrictive covenants was ambiguous and unenforceable
when applied to an addition because the provision did not establish
an enforceable height restriction. Insurer and agent complied with C.R.S. § 10-4-609 by offering and providing the maximum UM/UIM coverage required by the statute. They therefore had no common law duty to offer higher UM/UIM coverage consistent with insured's liability coverage. Kaercher v. Sater Remedies provided under C.R.S. 1-1-113 are not exclusive, and therefore a § 1983 action can be litigated under § 1-1-113. The prevailing plaintiff may be entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988, and the case was remanded for that determination. Brown v. Davidson Consequential damages are not recoverable under former § C.R.S. 4-9-507(1). Proactive Technologies, Inc. v. Denver Place Associates Limited Partnership Ordinarily, it is reversible error for the trial court to fail to hold a hearing on a claim of exemption from garnishment under C.R.C.P. 103(6)(c)(1) and § 13-54.5-109(1)(a). The trial court improperly refused to set a hearing on defendant’s claim of exemption until defendant complied with its order regarding the possession and ownership of a dog (which had been awarded to plaintiff). The error was harmless, though, because the defendant's claim for exemption was properly denied. Defendant claimed exemption for the proceeds of a workers' comp. settlement, but proceeds from a workers’ compensation settlement are no longer exempt from garnishment once they are deposited into the judgment debtor’s bank account. Borrayo v. Lefever Defendant was
taken into protective custody to be evaluated by a mental health counselor. Political opinion polls did not constitute "electioneering communications" under Art. XXVIII of the Colorado Constitution because they did not seek to influence the outcome of Colorado elections. Therefore, the polls were not subject to the disclosure requirements of Art. XXVIII and the Fair Campaign Practices Act. Harwood v. Senate Majority Fund, LLC June 28, 2006 Check below for the supreme court update. The court of appeals will issue the following decisions tomorrow, including 10 published ones: PUBLISHED OPINIONS No.: 03CA1821 People v. Tommy Vasquez UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS No. 02CA2368 Archangel Diamond Corporation v. Arkhangelskgeoldobycha
and The supreme court's announcements for Monday are here. The court issued 10 decisions, summarized below. The court granted cert. in one case, No. 05SC763, Arteaga-Lansaw v. People on "Whether the admission of victim hearsay statements to police requires reversal." The supreme
court holds that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars Appellants from
asserting that they own the water rights disputed in this case. Appellants
failed to challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the Summit County
District Court in a previous case and are therefore barred from collaterally
attacking that court’s subject matter jurisdiction here. In
the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of Elk Dance Colorado,
LLC Answering a question certified from the Tenth Circuit, the supreme court concludes that Colorado law permits outside reverse piercing of the corporate veil. Outside reverse piercing occurs when a corporate outsider seeks to disregard the corporate form and attach liability on the corporation for the obligations of a dominant shareholder or other corporate insider. The court held that Colorado law permits outside reverse piercing of the corporate veil due to the similarities in purpose between traditional veil piercing and outside reverse piercing. A court may outside reverse pierce the corporate form when (1) the controlling insider and corporation are alter egos of each other, (2) justice requires recognizing the substance of the relationship over the form because the corporate fiction is utilized to perpetuate a fraud or defeat a rightful claim, and (3) an equitable result is achieved. Justice Eid, joined by Justices Rice and Coats, dissented, concluding that this was "an inappropriate case in which to adopt this new form of liability that would permit a shareholder’s creditors to reach corporate assets." In re Phillips C.R.S. §
20-1-107(2), as amended by the General Assembly in 2002, eliminates
“appearance of impropriety” as a basis for disqualification
of district attorneys. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion
in basing disqualification on an appearance of impropriety. The court
also held that disqualification is not warranted in this case. Justice
Bender, joined by Chief Justice Mullarkey and Justice Martinez, dissented
in part, concluding that the statute is unconstitutional , as violating
the separation of powers doctrine, to the extent that it purports to
set forth an exhaustive limiting set of circumstances by which a trial
court may disqualify the district attorney. Justice Bender would have
held that courts may disqualify for an appearance of impropriety.
In re People in the interest of N.R In two related
cases, the court reversed an order disqualifying the district attorney's
office based on an “appearance of impropriety.” But the court
further concluded that the fact that an assistant district attorney
formed an attorney-client relationship with the defendant in connection
with the instant charges amounts to “special circumstances”
that require disqualification of the assistant In another related case, the court concluded it was unable to determine the legal basis for the trial court’s disqualification order and therefore remanded to the trial court for a determination of whether disqualification is necessary under C.R.S. § 20-1-107. Justice Bender, joined by Chief Justice Mullarkey and Justice Martinez, dissented, concluding that the grounds for disqualification are not limited to those in the statute and concluding that the trial court's order could stand on other disqualification grounds. People v. E.L.T. The supreme
court upholds economic incentive development agreements entered into
by the City of Golden and various real estate developers. Because the
Colorado Constitution prohibits To accommodate both the General Assembly’s “best interests of the child” intent and the “special weight” and “special factors” requirements of Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion), the court held that the appropriate standard for issuance of an order for grandparent visitation under C.R.S. § 19-1-117 requires: (1) a presumption in favor of the parental visitation determination; (2) to rebut this presumption, a showing by grandparents through clear and convincing evidence that the parental visitation decision is not in the child’s best interests; and (3) placement of the ultimate burden on grandparents to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the visitation schedule they seek is in the best interests of the child. The court must apply this standard in grandparent visitation cases and, if it orders grandparent visitation, it must make findings of fact and conclusions of law identifying those “special factors” on which it relies. Justice Coats, joined by Justice Eid, dissented, concluding "the United States Supreme Court has expressly declined to define the scope of any parental due process right in the visitation context, I would similarly refrain from attempting to do so. Because I also believe the magistrate’s visitation order in this case rests comfortably within the due process limitations so far identified by the Supreme Court, I would affirm his order." In Justice Coats' view the majority "simply legislates a new statutory scheme, reflecting its own approach for avoiding possible constitutional conflict." In the Matter of the Petition of Adoption for C.A. In termination of parental rights case, maternal grandmother’s assertion of Cherokee ancestry and the El Paso County Department of Human Services’ own report characterizing her as Native American gave the department and the district court reason to believe that a federally-recognized Indian tribe could consider child to be a tribal member or the eligible biological child of a member, and thus potentially affected tribes were entitled to notice of the proceedings prior to any determination by the court. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and the case was remanded with instructions to order that notice be given in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act and the Colorado Children’s Code. If it is ultimately determined, after proper notice, that the child is not an Indian child, the district court’s order terminating parental rights shall stand affirmed. If the child is determined to be an Indian child, the district court must proceed in accordance with the Act. B.H. v. People Juvenile defendant
was not properly advised of his right to have a parent present during
police interrogation. Due to the insufficient advisement, the juvenile
defendant was not fully aware of the scope and content of his rights
as required by C.R.S. § 19-2-511, and could not provide a valid
waiver of those rights. The court therefore affirmed the trial court's
suppression order. People
v. Barrow June 23, 2006 The supreme court will issue the following ten decisions on Monday. I will not be able to summarize those on Monday, as I will be tied up out of the office on a personal matter. But I will tried to get them posted as quickly as I can next week. 04SA328 In the Matter of the Application for Water Rights of Elk Dance
Colorado, LLC The court of appeals announcements from yesterday are here. The court issued only unpublished decisions. June 21, 2006 I'm finally up-to-date. The summaries of the June 15 court of appeals' decisions can be found in the June 19 post. The supreme court has posted the pleadings in Marc Holtzman's appeal here. Holtzman has requested a stay of the district court's order dissolving the preliminary injunction that required the Secretary of State to put his name on the Republican primary ballot. I will try to post an update in the event the supreme court rules on the stay request today. The court of appeals will issue the following unpublished decisions tomorrow (no published opinions): No.: 03CA1107 People v. Christopher John Moon June 19, 2006 The judicial branch website now has this page on ballot initiatives, including links to the various pleadings filed in the supreme court on those initiatives. I am in the process of summarizing the court of appeals' decisions from June 15. The summaries will be finished sometime this week. I'm posting them as I finish them, so keep checking back. The Colorado Consumer Protection Act does not, as a matter of law, make actionable a statement which would otherwise be mere puffery. Therefore, a homeowners association could not maintain its CCPA claim. But the court concluded that since general contractors are under an independent tort duty to act without negligence in the construction of homes," the trial court erred in dismissing the HOA's negligence claims under the economic loss rule. Park Rise Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Resource Construction Company A 15-year-old female may consent to a common law marriage, the court held. The court's analysis was straightforward: Common law marriages are not governed by the Uniform Marriage Act ("UMA"). Courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly declared that the common law age of consent applies to common law marriages, even when statutes otherwise require parental or judicial approval for persons under a specified age, unless those statutes expressly modify or abrogate the common law. "Under English common law, children below the age of seven were incapable of marrying. After that age they could marry, but the marriage was voidable until they became able to consummate it, which the law presumed to be at age fourteen for males and twelve for females." Therefore, several jurisdictions have adopted those ages as the age of consent for common law marriages. Relying on this authority, the court of appeals concluded the trial court incorrectly relied on the UMA and erroneously held that persons under the age of sixteen may not enter into a valid common law marriage without judicial approval. The court of appeals noted that if common law marriage is to be abolished, or the requirements for entering into it changed, the modification must be made by the legislature, not the courts. In re the Marriage of J.M.H. When a trial court refuses to dismiss on the basis of allegations of willful and wanton conduct that would eliminate a public employee’s immunity, its order is not immediately appealable. But when a public employee challenges the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ notice of claim, the challenge raises an issue of sovereign immunity, and the trial court’s decision is immediately appealable under C.R.S. § 24-10-118(2.5). The court rejected the employee's argument that under Finnie v. Jefferson County School District R1, 79 P.3d 1253 (Colo. 2003), the trial court’s ruling that the CGIA “creates a tort for willful and wanton conduct” raises an issue of sovereign immunity that is immediately appealable. Carothers v. Archuleta County Sheriff Where plaintiff's opening brief violated C.A.R. 28(a)(4), which requires the brief to set forth “the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on,” and also violated C.A.R. 28(g), which imposes limitations on the lengths of briefs, the court of appeals refused to review the trial court’s order granting summary judgment. The court also awarded attorney's fees and costs against the plaintiff's attorney, under C.A.R. 38(d) and C.R.S. § 13-17-103, for filing a frivolous appeal. Castillo v. Koppes-Conway Browder v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 893 P.2d 132 (Colo. 1995), did not
compel the Trial court erred in denying City's motion for limited intervention to collect reimbursement for legal expenses from defendant deputies under C.R.S. §24-10-110(1.5)(a) of the GIA. The City had a statutory right to intervene in the underlying lawsuit, and its request to do so was timely. Lattany v. Garcia Court rejects
employer's contention that the general assembly permits apportionment
of medical and temporary disability benefits between an employer and
the claimant, when a prior injury or condition contributes to the final
disabling result. The court concluded that the two statutory sections
relied on by employer, CRS §§ 8-41-301(1)(c) and 8-42-101(1)(a),
do not authorize any type of apportionment, let alone the type that
employer sought to apply. Instead, the provisions merely state general
conditions and obligations that are consistent with the full-responsibility Trial court erred in concluding that parent's release barred ordinary negligence claims arising out of a child's fall from a rock-climbing wall. The trial court improperly applied CRS§ 13-22-107, which generally allows parents to prospectively waive negligence claims but not claims involving willful, wanton, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct on behalf of their children, retroactively to the release because that statute did not become effective until after the cause of action had accrued. Pollock v. Highlands Ranch Community Association, Inc. Here are today's supreme court announcements. The court issued no decisions and did not grant cert. in any cases. June 16, 2006 Here are yesterday's court of appeals announcements. The court issued 8 published decisions. Here are some of the summaries that I've fallen woefully far behind on. The only decisions yet-to-be summarized are yesterday's court of appeals decisions, which I hope to get to on Monday. June 5, 2006 supreme court decisions: Trial courts may “declare rights, status, and other legal relations,” CRS§ 13-51-105, when relief would “terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty." This broad power is not limited to written contracts. Therefore, the court concludes a trial court may grant declaratory relief in oral contract disputes where relief would “terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty.” Zab, Inc. v. Berenergy Corporation C.R.C.P. 54(b) applies to probate proceedings. Scott v. Scott June 12, 2006 supreme court decisions: Definitional headnotes in the state general appropriations or “long” bills are not “items” subject to the Governor’s item veto power in article IV, section 12 of the Colorado Constitution. The supreme court upholds the trial court’s judgment for the Governor, however, because the headnotes violate the separation of powers by intruding on the authority of the executive branch to administer the laws. It found unconstitutional the headnotes defining full time equivalent; health, life and dental; personal services; shortterm disability; lease purchase; leased space; vehicle lease payments; legal services; operating expenses; utilities; purchase of services from computer center; capital outlay; and multiuse network payments. The court also upholds the trial court’s decision invalidating the Governor’s attempt to use his item veto power to strike a $10,000 appropriation in a substantive bill creating an education task force, whileapproving the rest of the bill. Colorado General Assembly v. Owens C.R.S. § 37-92-305(8) specifies what a water court decree must demand of the state engineer and that the water court complied with the statute’s mandate by imposing a duty of curtailment on the state engineer in the precise terms of the statute. Concerning the Application for Water Rights of the Ground Water Management Subdistrict of the Central Colorado Water Conservancy District in Adams, Larimer, Morgan and Weld Counties In a 4-2 decision, the court held that Initiative #55 violates the single subject prohibition by presenting at least two, unrelated and incongruous purposes: (1) decreasing taxpayer expenditures contributing to the welfare of individuals not lawfully present in Colorado; and (2) restricting access to administrative services. Accordingly, the supreme court reversed the action of the Title Board. Justice Coats, joined by Justice Rice, dissented, concluding that the single-subject requirement was not violated, and expressing his concern over the court's inconsistent application of that requirement. In the Matter of the Title and Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2005-2006 #55 (Initiative #55 prohibits the State of Colorado, as well as all cities, counties, and political subdivisions thereof, from providing any nonemergency services to persons who are not otherwise lawfully present in the United States) May 18, 2006 court of appeals' decisions: In an appeal by the People following acquittal, the court of appeals disapproves the trial court's ruling granting judgment of acquittal. The court concluded the trial court erred in granting an acquittal on defendant's perjury. The court of appeals held that by signing an application for court- appointed counsel, the defendant made the statements contained therein under oath, and that those statements were made as part of an official proceeding. The trial court therefore erred in concluding that the statements were not made in an official proceeding and should not have granted an acquittal. (Defendant claimed to be indigent but in fact had considerable assets.) The court also concluded that the trial court should not have dismissed a charge of attempt to influence a public servant. People v. Schupper A defendant may waive the right to appeal a conviction as part of a negotiated plea agreement as long as the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. The court concluded that the defendant did waive his right to appeal and therefore dismissed part of his appeal. The court also held, however, that a defendant cannot waive the right to challenge an illegal sentence because there can be no valid agreement to an illegal sentence. The court rejected defendant's argument that his sentence was illegal. People v. Bottenfield In an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals affirms the denial of qualified immunity for the City and County of Denver. The Plaintiffs brought a class action to recover damages for injuries they allegedly received as a result of exposure to harmful environmental conditions at Denver International Airport (DIA), which is owned and operated by the City. The court upheld the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs' notice of claim was proper for any injuries they suffered on or after February 2, 2002. Crandall v. City and County of Denver In an appeal addressing property division in a dissolution case, the court remanded to the trial court to consider the parties' arguments concerning dissipation and husband's alleged underemployment. In re Marriage of Campbell Former spouse had standing to bring a partition action after entry of a final divorce decree. The action was not a collateral attack on the dissolution decree. Wilson v. Prentiss Defendant was an excess insurer and therefore plaintiff's claim was not ripe for adjudication. After Plaintiff received the basic PIP benefits provided under another insurance policy, he sued that insurer, claiming that the PIP benefits were insufficient to compensate him fully for his losses. While that action was pending, he sued the excess insurer. Because the lawsuit regarding the PIP benefits was not resolved, the claims against the excess insurer were not ripe. DiCocco v. National General Ins. Co. A vehicle does not necessarily qualify for registration under C.R.S. § 42-6-139(2)(a) simply because it is owned by a business. Rather, although ownership by a business is one criterion, the vehicle must also be operated primarily for business purposes. Upholding the district court's reversal of a hearing officer's determination, the court of appeals concluded that § 42-6-139(2)(a) applies to vehicles that are both (1) owned by a business and (2) operated primarily for business purposes, and that § 42-6-139(2)(b) applies to all other vehicles, including business-owned vehicles that are not primarily operated for business purposes, such as those primarily used for personal purposes. Stevinson Imports, Inc. v. City and County of Denver If amotion for reconsideration may be deemed a motion for review, a motion for extension of time to file the former may also be construed to allow the late filing of the latter. On the facts, the court held that since a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration of the magistrate's order was timely filed and was granted, and the district court treated the motion for reconsideration of the magistrate's order as a motion for district court review, the extension of time granted extended the time for the filing of a motion for district court review. In re Marriage of Cooprider A divided panel upheld an award of death benefits for the widow of a Loveland Police Officer who committed suicide. The majority held there was sufficient evidence in the record to satisfy the requirements of C.R.S. § 8-41-301(2)(a), which permits a claim for death benefits to be based on mental impairment. Judge Graham agreed with the majority's statutory interpretation but disagreed that an award of benefits was proper. City of Loveland Police Department v. ICAO City Charter did not vest jurisdiction over variances in municipal court. Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's Rule 106(a)(4) action against the city. North Avenue Center LLC v. City of Grand Junction Absent safety concerns, a parent is entitled to face-to-face visitation, and correspondence between parents and children does not constitute visitation. The trial court may not delegate the determination of entitlement to visitation to caseworkers, therapists, and others. People in the Interest of D.G. June 1, 2006
Court of Appeals Decisions: Expatriation Act of 1868 does not remove jurisdiction from a state court in a criminal prosecution where the offense was committed within that state. People v. Jones Plaintiffs brought
a declaratory action alleging RTD failed to accurately summarize the
comments for and against Referendum 4A by including "con"
comments made by a proponent masquerading as an opponent and by deleting
legitimate "con" arguments. Plaintiffs requested that certain
"con" statements in the ballot issue notice be deleted and
that other "con" statements be added. The district court rejected
their claims. The Supreme Court denied emergency relief before the 2004
election, and remanded to the court of appeals to consider the appeal.
Since the Referendum passed at the 2004 election, Plaintiffs' claims
were moot and the appeal was dismissed. Taxpayers
Against Congestion v. RTD In the absence
of a legislative enactment addressing the specific situation, the statute
of Blakely announced a new rule of law and therefore does not apply retroactively. People v. Wenzinger C.R.S. § 14-10-128.1 does not permit the parenting coordinator to make decisions or resolve disputes that the parents are unable to resolve. In re Marriage of Dauwe Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a UIM benefits case precluded plaintiff from bringing bad faith claims in a later action. The trial court did not err in applying the “transactional approach” from Restatement § 24 in determining that the third claim preclusion element (identity of claims for relief) was satisfied. Salazar v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. BAA erred by
valuing the land component of property under the cost approach based
on ALJ correctly
dismissed appeal of penalty imposed on candidate committee by the Douglas
County Clerk and Recorder fined the committee $4450 for violating Colo.
Const. art. XXVIII, § 7 and C.R.S. § 1-45-108(1)(a)(II). The
basis of the penalty was the committee’s failure to disclose, in
a report on funds received for the ballot issue, the occupation and
employer of four individuals who had contributed $100 or more. Relying
on Colo. Const. art. XXVIII, § 10(2)(b)(I), the committee appealed
to the secretary of state, who referred the matter to an ALJ. The ALJ
dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The ALJ
concluded that the report at issue was filed not in connection with
the candidacy for the general assembly but solely in connection with
candidate’s position as a county commissioner. Thus, the ALJ correctly
determined that, for purposes of the report and penalty at issue, appellants
were persons required to file with the county clerk and recorder, not
with the secretary of state. Therefore, the secretary of state had no
jurisdiction. Sullivan
v. Bucknam School board’s attempt to "nonrenew" teacher's contract was formal action improperly taken during an executive session and, therefore, was invalid. Consequently, the board had no authority to direct the transmission of such a document to the teacher Barbour and, accordingly, as the trial court correctly determined, the letter advising Barbour of that decision was of no effect. Barbour v. Hanover School District No. 28 The cost of
continuing health insurance coverage and, later, the employee’s
cost of converting to a similar or lesser plan are includable in employee’s
average weekly wage. Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. ICAO Where a parent
chooses to remain in a relationship with a person who poses a threat
to the C.R.S. § 1-12-207 of the Election Code applies to director vacancies for Ground Water Management Districts. Deutsch v. Kalcevic June 14, 2006 The court of appeals will issue the following decisions tomorrow, including 8 published opinions: PUBLISHED OPINIONS No.: 04CA0091 Park Rise Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Resource Construction
Company UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS No.: 02CA2497 People v. Albert Ferguson June 12, 2006 Here is the August oral argument calendar for the court of appeals. The supreme court's announcements for today are here. The court issued three decisions, and links to the decisions appear below. Summaries of those decisions will appear later this week, along with the court of appeals case summaries for May 18 and June 1. Colorado General Assembly v. Owens (the line-item veto case) In the Matter of the Title and Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2005-2006 #55 (Initiative #55 prohibits the State of Colorado, as well as all cities, counties, and political subdivisions thereof, from providing any nonemergency services to persons who are not otherwise lawfully present in the United States) The court granted cert., vacated and remanded one case, No. 05SC207, Trujillo v. People. The court asked the court of appeals to reconsider in light of Liggett v. People, No. 05SC142 (Colo. May 15, 2006). The court granted cert. in one case, No. 06SC21, Turbyne v. People, on the following questions: Whether the district court erred when it reversed the county court and ruled that good cause for noncompliance with a driver’s request for a blood test under the Express Consent Law means a factual situation that the officer did not create, rather than the law enforcement system as a whole.
Whether the district court erred when it engaged in a de novo review of the operative facts to find an exceptional circumstance that it concluded amounted to good cause for noncompliance with petitioner’s request for a blood test and Colorado’s Express Consent Law. (Disclosure: My firm is counsel to Petitioner). June 9, 2006 The supreme court will issue the following three decisions on Monday, including the line-item veto case: Colorado General Assembly v. Owens, 04SC816 Harmony Ditch Company v. Ground Water management Subdistrict of the Central Colorado Water Conservancy District, 05SA205 Gonzalez-Estay v. Lamm & Title Board, 06SA20 (no oral argument) Here are yesterday's court of appeals announcements. The court issued unpulished decisions only. Below is the list of cases decided by the court. Nos.: 02CA2046 & 03CA0234 Frank Aloi v. Union Pacific Railroad June 5, 2006 Here are today's supreme court announcements. The court issued three decisions, granted cert. in one case, and granted cert., vacated and remanded 9 cases to the court of appeals to reconsider in light of Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005); DeHerrera v. People, 122 P.3d 992 (Colo. 2005); People v. Isaacks, No. 05SC87 (Colo. April 24, 2006); and People v. Huber, No. 05SC40 (Colo. April 24, 2006). The lower court decisions in the Denver gun ordinance cases were affirmed by operation of law, meaning that the court was split 3-3. Chief Justice Mullarkey and Justices Hobbs and Martinez favored affirmance, while Justices Bender, Rice and Coats would have reversed. Since the decision was affirmed by operation of law, there is no substantive opinion of the court, so we have no way of knowing the reasoning of any of the justices. Justice Eid did not participate, and I suspect she could not have participated, which might be why the court allowed the case to be decided as it did rather than set it for reargument. State of Colorado and Bill Owens v. City and County of Denver, 04SA396; Sternberg v. City and County of Denver, 05SA22 I will post summaries of the other two cases by the middle of next week, when I should be caught up with my backlog of posts. There will probably be no other posts before this Friday at the earliest, since I have an arbitration this week. Below are links to the other two decisions from the court this morning, and below that is the question presented in the one case the court granted cert in. Zab, Inc. v. Berenergy Corporation The court granted cert. in People v. Moreno, No. 06SC26, on this issue:
Whether a defendant whose offense traumatizes his victim so badly that she is unable to testify against him at trial thereby forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to confront that witness at trial. June 2, 2006 The supreme court will issue the following 3 or 4 decisions on Monday, depending on how the firearm ordinance decision is written up: State of Colorado
and Bill Owens v. City and County of Denver, 04SA396 Zab, Inc. v. Berenergy Corporation, 04SC547 Mark Scott v.
Samuel Scott, 05SC199 June 1, 2006 Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued 12 published decisions, which I will summarize by mid-June.
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