February 4, 2010 Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued 6 published decisions, summarized below. Creating an intra-court conflict, the court of appeals expressly rejected the conclusion in People v. Martinez, 36 P.3d 154 (Colo. App. 2001) that consent in a sexual assault case is an issue of mens rea. The court disagreed with Martinez and declined to follow it. Instead, the court concluded the defense theory of consent concerned the material fact of the actus reus of sexual assault shaped how the doctrine of chances applies to this case. The court concluded that in sexual assault cases in which the defendant claims that the victim consented, the doctrine of chances serves as a proper rationale to admit evidence of other sexual offenses because when one person claims rape, the unusual and abnormal element of lying by the complaining witness may be present. But when two (or more) persons tell similar stories, the chances are reduced that both are lying or that one is telling the truth and the other is coincidentally telling a similar false story. To ensure that the doctrine is not applied in such a way that the exception swallows the rule, the court adopted three criteria to be met when other acts are used to prove the actus reus through the doctrine of chances. First, is the evidence of other acts roughly similar to the charged crime? Second, does the number of unusual occurrences in which the defendant has been involved exceed the frequency rate for the general population? Third, is there a real dispute between the prosecution and the defense over whether the actus reus occurred? Applying these criteria, the court concluded that it was not an abuse of discretion to admit evidence of a previous sexual assault. People v. Everett Mother
was entitled to a presumption that, as a fit parent, she would act
in the best interests of the child, and that this presumption could
be rebutted only by findings based on clear and convincing evidence
that the grant of decision-making responsibility and parenting time
to the petitioners was in the childs best interests. Because
the trial court did not apply this standard of proof, the court of
appeals concluded that it erred. In so holding, the court rejected
the petitioner's position that the trial courts finding that
they were psychological parents was sufficient to protect mothers
rights. Husband contended that the trial court applied the wrong standard of proof in invalidating his marriage and, further, that the court abused its discretion in finding that his representation concerning his illness was fraudulent and in neglecting to determine whether that representation went to the essence of the marriage. The court of appeals rejected those contentions, concluding that the trial court did not err in applying a preponderance of the evidence standard and that the record supported a conclusion that Husband's misrepresentations went to the essence of the marriage. In re Marriage of Farr To determine whether an order in post-judgment collection proceedings is appealable, the court of appeals concluded that the order must end the particular part of the action in which it is entered, leave nothing further for the court pronouncing it to do in order to completely determine the rights of the parties as to that part of the proceeding, and be more than a ministerial or administrative determination. The court noted that "We employ the phrase 'particular part'to modify 'the action' because, in postjudgment collection situations, the underlying 'action' has already been concluded, by definition, with the entry of a judgment. Nevertheless, part of the action may still be 'live,'as when the final underlying judgment has not been satisfied and the judgment creditor seeks court assistance to obtain payment. Further, the requirement that the order must be more than a ministerial or administrative determination ensures that the order affects rights or creates liabilities not previously resolved by the adjudication of the merits." Luster v. Brinkman Trial court erroneously dismissed, as untimely, inmate's complaint under C.R.C.P. 106.5, challenging his disciplinary conviction. Inmate filed his complaint more than thirty days after the warden approved the conviction. But the cout concluded that fact was inconsequential because the wardens decision was not the final decision of the body or officer, within the meaning of C.R.C.P. 106(b). The court noted that by statute, a private prison lacks authority to [m]ake a final determination on a disciplinary action that affects the liberty of an inmate. C.R.S. § 17-1-203(1)(c). The final determination is made, under the governing regulations, by the DOCs Private Prisons Monitoring Unit. See DOC Admin. Reg. 150-01(IV)(E)(3)(r). Because Inmate filed his complaint within thirty days of the monitoring units review, his action was timely. Geerdes v. Director, Colorado Department of Corrections Courts may
not seal records of dismissed cases involving alleged sex offenders
who received deferred judgments. The court of appeals concluded that
C.R.S. § 24-72-308(3)(c) precludes such sealing. Therefore, the
court reversed an order sealing the records of petitioner's criminal
case. Petitioner had pled guilty to the class five felony attempted
sexual assault on a child and received a deferred judgment. Four years
later, the trial court concluded that petitioner had complied with
the terms of the deferred judgment. Accordingly, petitioner was allowed
to withdraw his plea and the case was dismissed. He then filed a civil
action seeking to seal the records of his criminal case, and the trial
court granted his request to seal. On appeal, the panel majority concluded
that a case dismissed after a deferred judgment still contains records
pertaining to a conviction, under C.R.S. § 24-72-308(3)(c).
Therefore, § 24-72-308(3)(c) precludes sealing because it prohibits
sealing "records pertaining to a [sex offense] conviction."
Judge Connelly wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Judge
Terry. Judge Webb dissented, concluding, "in my view, '[u]pon
full compliance with such conditions [of the deferred sentence] by
the defendant, the plea of guilty previously entered shall be withdrawn
and the charge upon which the judgment and sentence of the court was
deferred shall be dismissed with prejudice,' section 18-1.3-102(2),
means that the conviction has been wiped away. In cases where no trial
has occurred, without a guilty plea there can be no conviction. Therefore,
the absence of a conviction removes any basis for invoking section
24-72-308(3)(c)." M.T.
v. People February 3, 2010 The court of appeals will release the following decisions tomorrow, including 6 published decisions: Published Opinions February 1, 2010 The supreme court's announcements for today are here. The court issued two decisions, summarized below. The court also granted cert. in two cases, and the issues in those appeals follow the case summaries. The supreme court reversed an order suppressing drugs obtained from a closed backpack in the trunk of a vehicle after the defendant provided general consent to search the vehicle. The supreme court also reversed the trial courts order suppressing all subsequent statements as fruit of the poisonous tree after the search. The court held that the driver in control of a vehicle has the power to consent to a search of the vehicle even if he is not the registered owner and the registered owner is present at the time. The court also held that general consent to search a vehicle extends to all objectively reasonable places in which the implied object of the search may be found. That includes closed containers so long as no forcible destruction of property is necessary to access its contents. People v. Minor The supreme court reversed the district court's suppression of evidence seized in the execution of a search warrant for defendant's home. The district court found that the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to establish probable cause, largely because it failed to identify the person or agency conducting the audit from which the allegations of criminal activity were derived and because the records that were evaluated in the audit and sought pursuant to the warrant appeared to be several years old. The supreme court concluded that when considered in the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit provided a substantial basis to believe the information it contained was reliable, and there was a reasonable probability that evidence of the criminal activity it alleged would still be found at the defendants home. People v. Crippen No. 09SC627 No. 09SC887 January 28, 2010 I'm back. This post will catch me up. The supreme court had no announcements this past Monday. The supreme court's January 19th announcements are here. The court issued one decision, summarized below. The court did not grant cert. in any cases. Defendant impliedly waived his Miranda rights, under the facts of the case. Defendant went to the police station voluntarily in order to speak with police officers about a shooting. Before questioning, he was advised of and acknowledged each of his Miranda rights. He answered the officers questions without hesitation for almost an hour and forty-five minutes. During this time, the defendant had several opportunities to pause and consider his rights. He did not choose to assert his rights until after the officers told him that witnesses had identified him as the shooter. People v. Martin The court of appeals' oral argument calender for March is here. Here are the court of appeals' announcements from Thursday, January 21. The court issued 5 published decisions, summarized below. Delay in defendant's trial did not violate his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial. The procedural history of the case was described as extraordinarily "tortured and star-crossed," and included eight rescheduled trial dates, two mistrials, three replacements of defense counsel (including one because of a suicide and another because of a mental breakdown mid-trial), one interlocutory appeal by the prosecution, and two petitions to the supreme court by defendant preceded entry of the dismissal order. Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Vermont v. Brillon, the analysis for constitutional speedy trial challenges changed. In light of Brillon, the court of appeals attributed approximately twenty-three months of delay to defendant. This is more than half of the relevant time period (thirty to thirty-six months, depending on the charges). The court attributed at most seven months of the delay to the state, with little weight attached. The court acknowledged that defendant consistently asserted his right to a speedy trial (except when seeking to stay these proceedings during the federal litigation), but concluded that defendant made only a minimal showing of prejudice without ever specifying how the delay had impaired his ability to mount a defense to the charges. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded defendant did not carry his burden of proving a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. People v. Glaser Inmate alleged that his constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts was violated by the removal of a printer from the law library. The district court concluded that plaintiff's twenty-two-page, handwritten petition with attachments showed that plaintiff is capable of communicating his needs and legal issues. Therefore, the removal of the printer did not prevent plaintiff from raising legal claims in the courts, and plaintiff's claim was properly dismissed. Graham v. Maketa In order to recover damages for loss of use of a commercial chattel that is normally rented out for profit (in this case a rental car), its owner must demonstrate that it lost the opportunity to earn income from the chattel. The appropriate measure of damages is the net profit plaintiff would have received from rental of the chattel during the time period reasonably needed for repairs, less any expenses saved. In addition, the court of appeals concluded that a company taking assignments of debt not in default is not required to obtain a license, although it is subject to the other provisions of the Colorado Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The plaintiff here fell within the exemption found in C.R.S sec. 12-14-103(2)(b)(VII)(C) because at the time the debt was assigned to plaintiff. PurCo Fleet Services, Inc. v. Koenig Plaintiff obtained from Bank a commercial loan that was secured by real property. Bank invoked a provision in the loan agreement expressly providing for a prepayment penalty when plaintiff voluntarily tendered the entire principal balance before it was due. A prepayment penalty is not a type of liquidated damages in these circumstances. Even if plaintiff was correct that the prepayment penalty here was unreasonable, it was not void as a liquidated damages clause that amounts to a penalty because it was not based on a breach of the contract. Planned Pethood Plus, Inc. v. KeyCorp, Inc. Creditors of an LLC, as a group, have standing to sue an LLC member who knowingly receives an unlawful distribution under C.R.S. sec. 7-80-606. In addition, the limited fiduciary duty which directors of insolvent corporations have to the corporation's creditors also extends to managers of LLCs. Colborne Corporation v. Weinstein Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued the following unpublished decisions. 07CA0156 People
v. Matthew Gene Wartena January 15, 2010 A quick post. I will be in trial next week and part of the week after that, so I probably won't do any additional updates until the end of January. The court of appeals' oral argument calendar for February is here. The court
of appeals' announcements from yesterday are here.
The court released the following unpublished decisions: January 11, 2010 This post has both today's supreme court announcements and summaries and the court of appeals' from last Thursday. This may be my last post for a couple of weeks, as I'm getting ready for a trial that takes place next week and will have no time for posting. I will catch up towards the end of the month. Thanks for your patience. Here are today's supreme court announcements. The court issued five decisions, summarized below. The court granted cert. in five cases, and the issues in those appeals follow the summaries. Trial court erred in setting aside a default judgment. The defendant failed to respond to the complaint after service of process was hand delivered to an assistant of defendants registered agent, but the registered agent failed to find the process papers in his in-box. The supreme court held that the service was valid where the process server hand delivered the process papers to an assistant who performed administrative duties for the registered agent, even though the person served was not the registered agents primary assistant. Since service was proper, the trial court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant and the default judgment was not void under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(3). The court also held that a reasonably careful registered agent would not have neglected to find the process papers and therefore defendants failure to respond to the complaint constituted neither mistake nor excusable neglect under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). In re: Goodman Associates, LLC v. WP Mountain Properties, LLC In an interlocutory appeal challenging a district court order suppressing statements made during a custodial interrogation, the supreme court reversed, holding that the defendant did not make an unambiguous request for counsel and therefore the interrogating officer did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda and Edwards by continuing to question him to clarify whether he intended to invoke his right to counsel. People v. Broder The People challenge the court of appeals determination that the defendant is entitled to a new trial after the trial court denied his motion for substitute counsel. Defendant's motion for new counsel implicated three of his trial rights: the right to enter a plea of not guilty, the right to testify, and the duty of defense attorneys to reasonably investigate possible defense strategies. The supreme court determined that, although the defense lawyers did not impermissibly usurp their clients right to enter a plea of not guilty, the trial record was insufficient to determine whether others of Bergeruds trial rights were violated by his attorneys actions. Had his trial rights been violated, the denial of his request for substitute counsel would have resulted in a constitutionally offensive choice between continuing with counsel or exercising other guaranteed rights. The court therefore remanded for further factual findings by the trial court to resolve ambiguities in the record. Justice Coats, joined by Justices Rice and Eid, dissented, noting that in his view "the majority misapprehends the nature and limits of these particular rights and therefore the relationship between them. Perhaps even more importantly, I fear that the complexity and sweeping scope of the majoritys opinion is likely to force upon defense counsel and trial courts alike intolerable choices, necessarily based on imprecise predictions about the unfolding of events at trial." He would have simply reversed j udgment of the court of appeals and remanded to that court for consideration of any remaining assignments of error. People v. Bergerud A previous federal district court ruling did not preclude Plaintiffs legal malpractice action. The federal district court relied on three alternative grounds in denying Plaintiffs post-conviction motion for a new trial. In affirming this ruling, the Tenth Circuit relied on one of these grounds, expressly declining to consider the remaining two. The supreme court applied comment o to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, section 27 (1989), to hold that when a trial court relies on alternative grounds in its judgment and the appellate court affirms on only one ground and declines to reach the others, preclusive effect extends only to the ground that was actually considered and relied upon by the appellate court. Therefore, the preclusive effect extended only to the ground actually relied upon by the Tenth Circuit, and Plaintiff may relitigate the other two issues. Stanton v. Schultz The People
filed criminal impersonation charges against defendant in the Nineteenth
Judicial The court granted cert. in these cases: No. 09SC252,
Lewis v. People No. 09SC582,
Rubio v. People No. 09SC763,
Jones v. People No. 09SC781,
Kendrick v. Pippin No. 09SC916,
Jefferson County Board of Equalization v. Gerganoff Here are the court of appeals' announcements from last Thursday. The court issued the following decisions. The summaries of the published decisions follows the list. Published Opinions In an action seeking to set aside a public trustee foreclosure, plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment in favor of the foreclosing Bank and the purchaser of the property. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that C.R.C.P. 120 requires strict compliance and that the Bank did not do comply. But the court of appeals concluded C.R.S. § 38-38-505 does not supplant the notice requirements of C.R.C.P. 120 and that undisputed actual notice to plaintiff precludes a remand to set aside the sale. The court concluded that absent prejudice, lack of strict compliance with Rule 120 does not require the foreclosure be voided. The court said, "we discern no reason in Colorado law why a completed foreclosure must be set aside where the complaining party received timely actual notice and as a result the right to contest the default was not prejudiced." The court concluded, however, that potential bid rigging might void the sale, and therefore remanded the case to the trial court. On remand, the trial court shall void the public trustee's deed and then exericise its equitable discretion, based on appropriate findings, to determine whether, after voiding the deed, the public trustee should be directed to accept one of the other bids and issue the deed to that bidder, or whether the foreclosure sale should be voided and the public trustee directed to conduct a new foreclosure sale, with attendant redemption rights for Plaintiffs. Amos v. Aspen Alps 123, LLC Because the
trial court granted Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis
and he is an inmate, Plaintiff was required to pay his service fees
in installments under C.R.S. § 13-17.5-103(2). Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in requiring Plaintiff to pay service
of process fees on an installment schedule, as required by section
13-17.5-103. Nevertheless, the trial court could also determine to
waive reimbursement of any service of process fees expended from mandated
funds. But once the trial court had in its possession copies of Plaintiffs
summons and complaint, it was required to give those documents to
the sheriff to effectuate service of process, unless the court concluded
the claims were frivolous or filed in bad faith. Because the trial
court did not determine that the claims were frivolous of filed in
bad faith, the trial court erred in not effectuating service. The
court of appeals also concluded the trial court abused its discretion
in dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute. Edmond
v. City of Colorado Springs On appeal, Plaintiff conteded that the offer of settlement statute, C.R.S. § 13-17-202, is unconstitutional. The court of appeals declined to the argument because it concluded the issue was not preserved. In so holding, the court noted that although both parties certified that they complied with C.A.R. 28(k), they did not direct the court in their principal briefs to a place in the record on appeal where the constitutionality of the offer of settlement statute was raised and ruled upon. Nor did the court's review of the record reveal anywhere the issue was raised in the lower court. OQuinn v. Baca In an appeal challenging the imposition of penalties for the filing of an invalid final admission of liability (FAL), the court of appeals affirmed. The court concluded that Maximum Medical Improvement (MMI) is not divisible and cannot be parceled out among the various components of a multi-faceted industrial injury. Therefore, the determination that the FAL was invalid was proper. The court also disagreed with petitioners position that the FAL had to be filed in this instance to avoid possible penalties for the failure to timely admit. The court noted that the petitioners had other options available. First , because MMI is not divisible, the rating physicians report triggered no obligation to file an FAL and petitioners could have waited to admit liability for permanent disability benefits until the rating physician found claimant at MMI. Paint Connection Plus v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office Because the
obligation to pay which arises by application of the unjust enrichment
theory is not truly a contractual obligation as contemplated by the
economic loss rule, the existence of such an obligation does not bar
a tort claim: the obligation to pay necessarily exists independently
of a contract. Application of the economic loss rule arising from
a purely equitable obligation to pay would not serve to maintain any
distinction between tort and contract law, nor would it enforce any
bargained-for expectation or risk allocation. Therefore, the district
court erred in determining that the economic loss rule barred a civil
theft claim as a matter of law. Jorgensen
v. Colorado Rural Properties, LLC January 4, 2010 Happy New Year! The supreme court did not issue any case announcements today. Here are the court of appeals' case announcements for December 31. The court issued the following unpublished decisions: 08CA0549 In re the
Marriage of James D. Thompson and Linda G. Thompson Here are the summaries of the court of appeals' published decisions from December 24: Trial court erred by permitting the jury to engage in predeliberation discussions about defendant's criminal case, and court of appeals could not conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It therefore vacated defendant's conviction. Judge Webb concurred in part and dissented in part, concluding that predeliberation discussions in criminal cases is not constitutional error. Judge Webb said that the "existence of constitutional error should not be predicated on inaccuracy." He would have held the error to be nonconstitutional and would have affirmed because, in his view, the error did not substantially influence the verdict or affect the trial's fairness. People v. Flockhart Self-defense is an available defense against the charge of obstructing a peace officer when a defendant reasonably believes that unreasonable or excessive force is being used by the peace officer. Because defendant was precluded from asserting an affirmative defense of self-defense, his conviction on that charge was reversed. People v. Barrus Trial court erred in finding that defendant fit the definition of a sexually violent predator because the victims knew him as their neighbor, and therefore he was not a stranger under the statutory definition. Sexually violent predator means an offender whose victim was a stranger to the offender or a person with whom the offender established or promoted a relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization. Because the record did not support a finding that the victims were strangers to the offender as the statute requires, the court of appeals reversed the trial courts conclusion that defendant meets the statutory definition. People v. Hunter Trial court
erred in concluding Plaintiff lacked standing. Plaintiff has a legally
protected interest in avoiding financial liability for expenses covered
by her insurance policy. She suffered an injury in fact to this interest
when she paid the difference between the allegedly reasonable amount
a doctor charged for his services and the amount the insurer paid
him. To the extent she paid for covered services, she has standing.
The court also held that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying class certification. Reyher
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company A municipal ordinance imposed a duty on an owner of property adjacent to a public sidewalk to clear the sidewalk of snow and ice. Where such an ordinance exists, does the premises liability statute operate to abrogate the common law rule referred to as the no duty rule that such an owner does not owe a duty to pedestrians to clear naturally accumulated snow and ice from an adjacent public sidewalk? The court answered that question "no." Defendant-property owner did not assume a duty to pedestrians to clear the sidewalk merely because it complied with the snow removal ordinance at issue from time to time. Therefore, the "no duty" rule applies here, and Plaintiff's premises liability claim against property owner failed as a matter of law. Burbach v. Canwest Investments, LLC The personal cell phone billing statements of Governor Ritter, did not constitute public records subject to disclosure under the Colorado Open Records Act (CORA), C.R.S. §§ 24-72-201 to -206. The Denver Post had the initial burden to show that the bills were likely made, maintained, or kept by Ritter in his official capacity as governor. Because the Post did not meet its required burden, the trial court properly dismissed the complaint. Denver Post Corp. v. Ritter By definition, a true C.R.C.P. 56(h) order, without more, is not subject to C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification (since Rule 56(h) addresses issues of law that are not dispositive of a claim). Under the circumstances, though the trial court's order in effect constituted an order for summary judgment that was properly certified under Rule 54(b). On the merits, the court determined that the decedet mothers will was not effective, at the time of its execution and delivery to revoke a trust. Under the trust agreement, the powers to revoke could be exercised only by delivering written, signed notice to the trustee, and the revocation clause was clear that the settlor intended that the power should be exercised only during her lifetime. Therefore, the will was not effective in revoking the trust. In re Estate of McCreath Knowingly,
as used in the CCPA, requires actual knowledge. Constructive knowledge
is insufficient to satisfy the statute. State
of Colorado v. The Mandatory Poster Agency, Inc. Sheriff's decision not to reissue a concealed weapons permit was a quasi-judicial decision. On the merits, the court of appeals concluded that the Sheriff did not provide the requisite procedural due process in making that decision. The court held that the applicant was given inadequate notice or opportunity to respond, and therefore remanded for a new hearing. Copley v. Robinson Where a mistrial
is declared in a criminal prosecution over defense objection, double
jeopardy bars retrial unless there was manifest necessity
for the mistrial. Here, the county court declared a mistrial during
cross-examination of an alleged victim in the misdemeanor assault
case against defendant. Defendant then filed a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4)
action contending that retrial would violate double jeopardy. The
district court denied that relief. The court of appeals reversed and
remanded for entry of an order precluding retrial because the mistrial
was not manifestly necessary. The cross-examination question that
prompted the mistrial appeared to have been a proper one; "at
the very least," the court of appeals was not convinced it was
improper. Therefore, the prosecution failed to carry its heavy burden
of showing manifest necessity for the mistrial. December 30, 2009 This is my last post until after New Years. So have a happy end to 2009 and a great beginning to 2010. The supreme court issued no case announcements on Monday. Here are last Thursday's case announcements from the court of appeals. The court issued the following decisions, including 10 published decisions. I will post summaries when I can, though it won't be until sometime next week: Published Opinions 07CA0312 People
v. Rhoderick T. Flockhart December 21, 2009 Here are the supreme court's announcements for today. The court issued no decisions and did not grant cert. in any cases. This will probably be my last post until after Christmas. Happy holidays to all. December 17, 2009 The court of appeals' case announcements for today are here. The court issued one published decision, summarized below. In a divided decision, the court of appeals concluded that, under C.R.S. § 19-1-104(1)(b), a juvenile courts subject matter jurisdiction in neglect or dependency cases is based on the fact of the child being neglected or dependent. Since mother admitted that fact, the juvenile courts acceptance of her admission established the essential factual predicate for the courts exercise of its jurisdiction. The majority held that although the juvenile court did not enter an order sustaining the petition, its failure to do so did not divest the court of jurisdiction. Because the juvenile courts failure to enter an adjudicatory order did not deprive it of jurisdiction and mother failed to raise these contentions before the court, any procedural error has been waived. Judge Lichtenstein dissented, concluding that a child's status as dependent or neglected "is determined only by the entry of an order of adjudication." She therefore concluded that "the lack of an adjudicatory order divested the court of jurisdiction to terminate the mother-child relationship," and would have vacated the termination order. People in the Interest of N.D.V. December 16, 2009 The court of appeals will release the following decisions tomorrow, including one published decision: Published Opinions
December 14, 2009 The supreme court's announcements for today are here. The court issued 5 decisions, summarized below. The court also granted cert. in 4 cases. The issues in those cases follows the summaries. After that are the summaries of last week's court of appeals' decisions. The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that even assuming that theatrical smoking actually can amount to protected expressive conduct under some circumstances, the statutory ban on smoking does not impermissibly infringe on the plaintiffs constitutionally protected freedom of expression because it is content neutral and narrowly tailored to serve the states substantial interest in protecting the public health and welfare. Justice Hobbs dissented, concluding that "the Colorado Clean Indoor Air Act, as applied to theatrical performances when the script of a play calls for smoking, is unconstitutional because theatrical smoking constitutes expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment." He concluded the state did not carry "its burden of demonstrating that its prohibition of expressive conduct is narrowly tailored to meet a significant governmental interest . . . because the smoking ban leaves the theaters without adequate alternate channels for their expression." Curious Theatre v. Colo. Dept. of Health A statutory county may not refuse to process the location and extent review application of a fire protection district uncer C.R.S. § 30-28-110(1) of the County Planning Act because the district did not first seek modification of a planned unit development under § 24-67-106(3)(b) of the Planned Unit Development Act. To fulfill its statutory duty to provide fire protection services, the Respondent District intends to condemn a parcel of land within a PUD upon which to locate a new fire station. Boulder County refused to process the Districts application for location and extent review, asserting that the District first needed to seek modification of the PUD pursuant to section 24-67-106(3)(b). The supreme court upheld the affirmance of the district court's summary judgment in favor of the District, concluding that the long-standing rule that other political subdivisions may override the restrictions of local zoning regulations applies to the provisions of the PUD Act. Nothing in the PUD Acts modification provision functions to alter this conclusion. The General Assembly intended that a county not be able to use its zoning authority to frustrate the efforts of other political subdivisions to carry-out their statutory duties. Accordingly, although Boulder County is entitled to conduct location and extent review, it may not condition acceptance of the Districts application for location and extent review upon county approval of a PUD modification. Justice Martinez, joined by Justices Coats and Eid, dissented, concluding that the General Assembly has not "in any way expressed an intent to allow political subdivisions to override the 'innovative,' 'integrated,'and 'unified'approach to planning for 'particular sites'that is encouraged by the PUD Act." BOCC of Boulder v. Hygiene Fire Protection District Colorado Springs drainage fee system does not trigger the Regulatory Impairment of Property Rights Act. The supreme court held that the fee assessed to petitioner was promulgated by Colorado Springs via legislative process and uniformly assessed to all property owners occupying the drainage basin. Accordingly, the court held that the drainage fee system falls under the acts exception for legislatively formulated fees imposed upon a broad class of property owners. Justice Eid, joined by Justice Martinez, dissented, agreeing with the district court that "the imposition of fees in this case was made on an individualized, discretionary basis, not as a 'legislatively formulated assessment.'" She would have remanded the case to the court of appeals to consider petitioner's arguments challenging the district courts determination that its claim under RIPRA failed on the merits. Wolf Ranch v. City of Colorado Springs District
court did not err in holding a child competency proceeding in front
of the jury. In addition, an impermissible response by an expert witness
was an error invited by defense counsels questioning. The supreme
court also concluded that the child victims mental health records
were privileged and that the trial court was not required to review
them in camera. Finally, the supreme court held that education records
may be subject to an in camera review if the defendant shows a need
for the information that outweighs any privacy interests. In this
case, however, the education records did not relate to the evidence
presented at trial, and therefore the trial courts refusal to
review them was not error. Justice Martinez, joined by Justice Bender,
concurred in the judgment, Trial court properly suppressed evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful search of defendants tax returns and supporting documentation, which were found in his client file police seized from his tax preparers office. First, defendant had standing under the Fourth Amendment to object to a search of his client file. A taxpayer has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her tax returns and return information, even when that information is in the custody of a tax preparer. This reasonable expectation of privacy is based on federal and state laws that protect the confidentiality of tax returns and return information. Second, defendants client file was searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The affidavit supporting the warrant did not name defendant or refer to him in any way and therefore failed to establish individualized probable cause to search his client file. Finally, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply in this case because the affidavit supporting the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause to search defendants file that no reasonably well-trained officer could have relied upon it. Justice Rice, joined by Justice Eid, dissented, concluding that the police officers were acting in good faith, and therefore the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Justice Coats, dissenting separately, concluding that the search itself did not violate the Fourth Amendment. People v. Gutierrez The court granted cert. in these cases: No. 09SC229,
Estate of Ford v. Eicher No. 09SC377,
Foiles v. Whittman No. 09SC380,
Boulder County Board of Commissioners v. HealthSouth Corporation No. 09SC626,
Henisse v. First Transit, Inc. Here are the summaries of last week's court of appeals' opinions: After he pled guilty, defendant filed a postconviction motion alleging that the statute upon which his conviction was based violated his equal protection rights as applied to him. The court of appeals concluded that defendants guilty plea barred the as-applied equal protection challenge, and therefore dismissed the appeal. People v. Ford Specific evidence of value is not required to support a disqualification from the receipt of unemployment benefits based on theft. But while evidence of the value of the item allegedly stolen by an employee is not required in unemployment cases, where a theft is alleged as the basis for disqualification of unemployment benefits, the employer must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the mens rea required in theft or larceny cases. The court remanded for further proceedings on claimant's mens rea. Starr v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office Defendant appealed his conviction for second degree assault-causing serious bodily injury. The victim suffered a fractured rib and a lacerated spleen. Defendant argued neither of those injuries amounted to serious bodily injury, under C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(p) because the prosecution failed to show that (1) the victims broken rib was of the second or third degree or (2) the lacerated spleen involved a substantial risk of death or protracted loss or impairment of the function of that organ. The court concluded that any break or fracture is sufficient to establish serious bodily injury under § 18-1-901(3)(p). Judge Graham specially concurred, noting "I see no need to reach a question of statutory interpretation regarding 'breaks, fractures, or burns of the second or third degree. § 18-1-901(3)(p), C.R.S. 2009. Here, there was a substantial risk of the removal of the victims spleen and supporting testimony which, in my view, conclusively established that the victim suffered a serious bodily injury." People v. Daniels In a unilateral
land annexation case, the court of appeals concluded that a statutory
exception to municipal annexation power concerning public rights-of-way
does not include railroad rights-of-way, because railroad rights-of-way
are not public rights-of-way. Sinclair
Marketing Inc. v. The City of Commerce City December 10, 2009 The court of appeals' announcement for today are here. The court issued the following decisions, including four published opinions. I will summarize those later. Published Opinions December 7, 2009 The supreme court had no case announcements today. The court of appeals' oral argument calendar for January is here. December 4, 2009 The supreme court's announcements from Monday are here. The court did not issue any decisions and did not grant cert. in any cases. Here are last week's court of appeals announcements, and the summaries of the court of appeals' decisions from last Wednesday: Guilty pleas in Colorado are designed to waive the right to attack most pretrial decisions, including orders denying defendants motions to suppress. The court of appeals thus concluded that Colorado law does not presently provide for conditional guilty pleas. Therefore, the court dismissed appeal, noting that "because defendants plea was expressly based upon the condition that he be allowed to pursue this appeal, he must be permitted, if he desires, to withdraw his guilty plea when this case is returned to the trial court. If defendant elects to withdraw his plea, the prosecution must be given the option of reinstating all charges, and then deciding whether to offer defendant the same plea disposition or a different plea disposition, or to proceed to trial." People v. Neuhaus Trial court correctly permitted the jury to aggregate the value of stolen items received by defendant to meet the offense level. People v. Crawford A mentally ill defendant had a right to a jury trial under Colorados insanity statute, C.R.S. § 16-8-105.5(2), even after the prosecution conceded his insanity, because he objected to his counsels entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI), contended he did not commit the underlying charge, and did not personally waive a jury trial. People v. Laeke Where arbitration agreement indisputably empowered the arbitrator to decide whether to award attorney fees and costs, the ultimate award involved the merits of the dispute (not an issue of empowerment), and therefore cannot be overturned just because the arbitrator did not fully explain her reasoning. Judge Gabriel dissented in part, concluding that judicial review of arbitration awards is so no restricted "as to prevent a court from vacating an arbitration award when, as here, the arbitrator refuses to apply or ignores a legal standard agreed upon by the parties for resolution of their dispute." Treadwell v. Village Homes of Colorado, Inc. Since civil
theft claim could not have been proven without first proving that
defendants also breached their contract with plaintiff, the civil
theft claim was barred by the economic loss rule. Umbrella polices are not included under C.R.S. § 10-4-609 and, thus, are not subject to the UM/UIM coverage requirements of that statute. Apodaca v. Allstate Insurance Company As a matter
of first impression, the court of appeals held that that a health
care proxy decision-maker does not have authority to enter into arbitration
agreements for incapacitated patients. In an appeal of a driver's license revocation arising out of a DUI, the court held that the evidence at the revocation hearing was sufficient to support the hearing officers conclusions that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the initial traffic stop and probable cause to justify her later arrest in this incident. Judge Furman specially concurred, disagreeing with "the majoritys premise that in civil drivers license revocation proceedings, a licensee may properly raise issues concerning the legality of the initial investigatory stop." Baldwin v. Huber Expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care an appraiser must employ when appraising a structure that may be a mobile home. Hice v. Lott Colorado Constitution
Article XXVII, section 9(2)(a) does not establishes an absolute constitutional
right of a complainant to a hearing within forty-five days absent
a finding of good cause. Instead, a defendant is entitled to a continuance
of the hearing for up to forty-five days after the referral from the
secretary of state , without any showing of good cause. A defendant
must demonstrate good cause for any continuance beyond the forty-five-day
period. Johnson
v. Griffin In an appeal
raising the novel issue whether inquiry into a litigants immigration
status is relevant for purposes of contesting that litigants
ability to recover lost future wages, the court of appeals concluded
that the question of ones immigration status is almost always
relevant for purposes of considering lost wages; however, there is
no uniform resolution of whether an illegal alien should be banned
from recovering lost wages. The court held that where a claimant is
seeking to recover lost future wages as damages, the inquiry into
his right as an immigrant to earn such wages is The plain language of C.R.S. 38-33.3-123(1)(c) does not require a prevailing party to be a unit owner to collect attorney fees, and the omission of the language from this subsection, in light of its inclusion in other subsections of the statute, shows the General Assemblys intent not to limit recovery of attorney fees under that subsection to unit owners. Cody Park Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Harder C.R.S. § 39-1-102(1.6)(a)(I) does not requires that land be used continuously as a farm or ranch for at least two years preceding a January 1 assessment date to be classified as agricultural land. Instead, the plain language of the statute requires only that (1) it presently be used as a farm or ranch and (2) the land was used the previous two years. It need not be used continuously as a ranch or farm during that two-year period. Aberdeen Investors Inc. v. Adams County Board of County Commissioners Under C.R.S.
24-10-109(5), a statute of limitations is not tolled when the 90-day
waiting period required by the CGIA has expired prior to the expiration
of the applicable statute of limitations. Where record showed that trial counsel became upset when he became aware of an allegation that he advised defendant to abscond to Mexico, trial court did not err in finding an actual conflict of interest existed. That conflict caused prejudice and therefore defendant's 35(c) motion was granted and a new trial ordered. People v. Curren Here are yesterday's announcements from the court of appeals. The court released the following unpublished decisions: 06CA0121 People
v. Thomas Patrick Reinig November 24, 2009 Sorry for the blog silence. Work interfered. This post will get me caught up. It includes yesterday's supreme court decision, the list of unpublished cases the court of appeals released on November 19, summaries of the court of appeals' decisions from, and a list of the cases the court of appeals will release tomorrow. But not in that order. This will be my last post for the week, so Happy Thanksgiving. If you're driving don't drink, and if you're drinking, don't drive. Here are the supreme court announcements from yesterday. The court issued one decision, summarized below. The court granted cert. in one case, No. 09SC553, DeBella v. People, on this issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding the trial court did not commit reversible error by permitting the jury over defense objection and without a request from the jury to review during deliberations an ex parte videotaped interview of the victim without limiting the jurys use of the videotape and without instructing the jury not to place undue emphasis on the videotape. In a water court appeal, the supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part the water courts approval of the Applicants proposed plan for augmentation. The court held that the water court did not err in requiring the Applicant to provide replacement water for post-pumping depletions made before the filing of the augmentation plan application that have a continuing injurious effect on surface waters. The court also affirmed the decision that replacement obligations in the Box Elder Creek basin must be determined based on surface water conditions that would exist in the basin absent groundwater pumping in the area. The court declined to issue an opinion as to whether the State and Division Engineers have the discretionary authority to implement a groundwater administration system, termed well call by Applicants, when the water court declined to include such a provision in the decree. The court concluded that the issue was advisory. Finally, the supreme court reversed the water courts determination that substitute water supply plan appeals under C.R.S. § 37-92-308(4)should be reviewed de novo. While the issue of the proper standard of review to apply to such appeals was moot, the court nonetheless addressed it under the exception to the mootness doctrine applicable to issues that are capable of repetition, yet evade review. The court held that section 37-92-308(4) appeals should be reviewed under the Colorado Administrative Procedure Act, C.R.S. § 24-4-106. Concerning the Application for Water Rights of Well Augmentation Subdistrict of the Central Colorado Water Conservancy District and South Platte Well Users Association in Adams, Morgan, and Weld Counties Published Opinions Here are the summaries of the court of appeals' published decisions from November 12: A fictional fourteen-year-old girl, created by two police officers conducting an Internet sting operation, can be a victim within the meaning of the sexually violent predator statute, C.R.S. § 18-3-414.5. The court concluded that the term "victim" means intended victim in the context of a conviction for attempted sexual assault. People v. Buerge Airline asserted that section 44941 of the Federal Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) provides immunity from liability for its employees allegedly defamatory statements to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) connoting that plaintiff was a threat to a departing aircraft because he was mentally unstable and possibly armed. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court properly submitted the ATSA immunity issue to the jury; the record supports the jurys rejection of immunity; the employees statements to TSA were not protected opinions because they conveyed provably false negative connotations; reviewed de novo, the record includes clear and convincing evidence that the employee acted with actual malice; and plaintiff did not preserve his claims for prejudgment interest under Virginia law. Hoeper v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation The trial court erred in rejecting a self-defense instruction on an illegal discharge of a firearm charge. The jury could have concluded that defendant knowingly discharged his firearm in order to defend himself by scaring off his attackers. To hold that a defendant cannot claim self-defense to an illegal discharge of a firearm charge would have an improper result: a person would be criminally liable for firing a warning shot in self-defense, but could be acquitted of shooting a person in self-defense during the same episode. People v. Taylor A court may seal records involving a charge of false reporting if that charge was completely dismissed. C.R.S. § 24-72-308(1)(a)(I). But the district court could not seal the records that relate to petitionerss charge of false reporting because those records also pertained to a charge of failure to notify, a class 2 misdemeanor traffic offense. Section 24-72-308(3)(a)(I), forbids courts from sealing records pertaining to class 2 misdemeanor traffic offenses. Judge Russel, dissented, noting that "I think it is possible to seal a record insofar as it relates to one offense, even if that record must remain unsealed for other purposes." Clark v. People The court of appeals held, as a matter of first impression, that in a kinship adoption appeal governed by C.A.R. 4(a), the unique circumstances doctrine allows this court to accept notices of appeal filed past the seventy-five-day period set forth in that rule. Judge Gabriel, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed with the majoritys determination that the unique circumstances doctrine allowed the court to accept notices of appeal filed past the seventy-five-day period. In the Interest of C.A.B.L. District court did not erred by refusing to vacate an order reviving a judgment. The parties that purchased the property had actual notice of the judgment lien when they purchased the property. The court of appeals rejected their arguments that the the revival order should be vacated because they were not given notice of the revival motion and because they were not joined as indispensable parties in the revival proceeding. Hicks v. Joondeph Court of appeals had jurisdiction over an appeal of a district courts judgment that, consistent with a ruling from the Colorado Ground Water Commission, the Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District could adopt certain rules restricting the amount of underground water that could be withdrawn from alluvial and Denver Basin wells. The court noted that though the case was certainly a water case, it did not involve priorities or adjudications, and therefore the court had jurisdiction over the case. On the merits, the court affirmed. Meridian Ranch Metropolitan District v. Colorado Ground Water Commission The People appealed a trial courts sentence, following revocation of probation, reinstating probation for the defendant. The court of appeals rejected the People's contention that revocation of probation negated the Peoples recommendation for a waiver of the two-felony rule. Therefore, the court concluded that the trial court retained discretion to sentence the defendant to probation under C.R.S. § 18-1.3-201(4)(a)(I). People v. Nance Trial court
erred in dismissing complaint after concluding a snowplow is not a
motor vehicle under the Colorado Governmental Immunity
Act (CGIA). The court of appeals concluded that a snowplow is a "motor
vehicle" under the act, and therefore and sovereign immunity
is waived. The phrase under court rule in C.R.S. § 13-20-901(1) applies not just to C.R.C.P. 23 but also to court rules which prescribe the method of computing the time limit to appeal the grant or denial of class certification. Therefore, the court of appeals applied C.A.R. 26(a) together with the grant afforded under the statute to determine the ten-day deadline for briging an interlocutory appeal of class certification. On the merits, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court erred in certifying the case as a class action. Garcia v. Medved Chevrolet, Inc. The court of appeals' announcements from November 19 are here. The court released the following unpublished decisions and rulings on petitions for rehearing: 06CA1368 People
v. Carlos Yeazel November 16, 2009 Today's supreme court announcements are here. The court issued one decision, summarized below. The court granted cert. in 3 cases. The issues in those appeals follows the case summary. In a wrongful death action filed for the death of his mother, Plaintiff had signed an arbitration agreement for his mother, for whom he held a power of attorney. The defendant nursing home filed a motion to compel arbitration of the wrongful death action. The trial court denied the motion to compel, holding that a person possessing a power of attorney could not enter an arbitration agreement on behalf of an incapacitated patient under the Health Care Availability Act, C.R.S. 13-64-403. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a person possessing a power of attorney may sign an arbitration agreement on behalf of an incapacitated patient. The supreme court affirmed, holding that a person possessing a power of attorney is permitted to agree to arbitrate on behalf of an incapacitated patient under section 13-64-403. Absent a restriction or limitation on his authority under the power of attorney from his mother, plaintiff was authorized to enter into the arbitration agreement on her behalf. Finally, the supreme court held that there were material facts in dispute on whether the nursing home illegally conditioned the mother's medical care on the son signing the arbitration agreement. Thus, on remand, the trial court must conduct evidentiary proceedings to determine if the arbitration agreement violated subsection 13-64-403(7). Moffett v. Life Care Centers of America No. 09SC456,
Department of Transportation, State of Colorado v. Gypsum Ranch Co.,
LLC, Whether the
court of appeals erred in holding that CDOT does not have the authority
to take title to the subsurface mineral rights in condemnation proceedings
and settlements. No. 09SC665,
People v. Simon Whether each crime
for sexual assault between a defendant and his victim can be enhanced,
from a class four felony to a class three felony, if the crime is
one of the acts that constitutes part of the pattern of abuse. November 12, 2009 Today's court of appeals announcements are here. The court released the following decisions, including 10 published opinions. The court's list also includes the petitions for rehearing it has ruled on, which is an addition to the court's usual case announcement list that appears on the case announcements page. I will not be able to post summaries until sometime next week. Published Opinions 07CA2393 People
v. Gregory Alan Buerge November 9, 2009 The supreme court's announcements for today are here. The court issued one decisions, summarized below. A second case, Board of County Commissioners of County of Rio Blanco v. ExxonMobil, was affirmed, by operation of law, by an equally divided court (Justice Coats did not participate). The court granted cert. in 4 cases. The issues in those cases follows the summary. In an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, the supreme court held that a district court has the authority to restore a defendants right to a preliminary hearing where waiver of that right was based on a miscommunication of the plea agreement. Because the district court concluded that it could not reach the issue of whether the waiver was effective, the supreme court returned that issue to the district court for resolution. In re People v. Nichelson The court granted cert in these cases: No. 09SC483,
In the Matter of D.I.S. No. 09SC536,
Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Nelson No. 09SC586,
Benchmark/Elite, Inc. v. Simpson No. 09SC769,
City of Colorado Springs v. Bennett November 6, 2009 The supreme court will issue two decisions on Monday, No. 08SC698 BOCC Rio Blanco v. ExxonMobil, and No. 09SA182 In re People v. Nichelson. November 5, 2009 Today's court of appeals announcements are here. The court issued only unpublished decisions. November 4, 2009 The summaries of last week's court of appeals' decisions follow this list of unpublished decisions the court will release tomorrow: 06CA1946 People
v. Thomas Paul McLendon Beale Here are the summaries of last week's decisions: Noting that the "unpredictable nature of jury trials and the ebb and flow of strategy and tactics render it impossible conclusively to determine in advance whose testimony will actually be likely or necessary," the court of appeals concluded that the trial court's finding that the defendant would have a compelling need to call the public defender as a witness was not an abuse of discretion. It therefore was not an abuse of discretion to disqualify the public defender. The court remanded , however, to determine whether the admission of the victim's hearsay statements, violated the defendant's right to confront and whether the forefeiture by wrongdoing doctrine applies. People v. Hagos The court of appeals concluded that to qualify as a primary care-giver under Colorado Constitution article XVIII, section 14, a person must do more to manage the well-being of a patient who has a debilitating medical condition than merely supply marijuana. The court therefore affirmed the the defendant's various marijuana convictions. The court rejected defendant's argument that providing marijuana for medical use itself constitutes significant responsibility for managing the well-being of a patient.People v. Clendenin Defendant sought to vacate his conviction, contending that the district court intruded into the plea negotiation process and thereby coerced him into pleading guilty. The court of appeals declined to address the argument, concluding that since defendant neither withdrew his guilty plea before sentencing nor filed a motion to vacate his sentence under Rule 35(vc), the court could not consider his contention. The court also declined to address defendant's sentencing arguments because defendant was convicted of a misdemeanor and therefore the court lacked authority under C.R.S. § 18-1-409to consider his sentencing issues. People v. Kirk Trial court erroneously concluded that allegedly defamatory statements were libel per quod and therefore plaintiff was required to plead special damages. The court of appeals concluded the statements were libel per se, and therefore that plaintiff did not need to plead special damages. The court concluded that extrinsic evidence may be used to prove a publication refers to the plaintiff without rendering the statement defamatory per quod. The court therefore reversed summary judgment on the libel calim. The court also reversed summary judgment on an outrageous conduct claim, concluding "that reasonable jurors could view the first column as outrageous, going beyond all possible bounds of decency, atrocious, and utterly intolerable because it stated that [plaintiff], a crime victim, was disloyal to her late husband, whose murder she had witnessed." Judge Dailey dissented on the outrageous conduct issue, concluding that under the totality of the circumstances, defendants' conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to sustain the claim. Lee v. Colorado Times, Inc. C.R.S. § 12-47-801(1) & (3) imposes limited liability upon alcohol vendors for injuries caused to third parties by their intoxicated patrons. The court of appeals reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the statutory claim, holding that "the statute does not require the proximate causation that is, reasonable foreseeability required for common law tort claims. A plaintiff must prove that the vendors improper service of alcohol caused the patrons intoxication and that the patrons intoxication caused the injuries, but not that the vendor should have foreseen those injuries." Strauch v. Build It and They Will Drink, Inc. Guardians,
aunt and uncle of a minor child, appealed from the district courts
order considering the guardians income in the determination
of child support to be paid by the child's parents and requiring the
guardians to travel with the child to Massachusetts at their own expense
to allow for parenting time with the parents. The court of appeals
concluded that under C.R.S. § 14-10-115, a guardians income
should not be included in the determination of the amount of support
to be paid. Section 14-10-115 does not mention a guardians duty
of support. Rather, it states that child support is to be determined
based on the combined adjusted gross income of the parents. §
14-10-115(1)(b)(I). In addition, the court concluded that under plain
language of section 14-10-115(11)(a)(II), travel expenses for a child
shall be divided between the parents. Consequently, the district court
did not apply the correct legal standard when it ordered the guardians
to travel to Massachusetts at their own expense. Sidman
v. Sidman Petitioners appealed the district courts order concluding that two initiated ordinances they submitted consisted of administrative matters and therefore could not be placed on the ballot for the City of Aspen voters. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding "the proposed ordinances are administrative and not legislative in nature. They would reverse a host of administrative actions and decisions made not just by the citys administrative staff, but also by at least two administrative agencies CDOT and the FHA. . . . Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the hearing officer and district court erred in determining that the proposals were administrative and not suitable for legislative initiatives." Vagneur v. City of Aspen A pedestrian overpass on which plaintiff was injured constituted a sidewalk under the Coloroado Governmental Immunity Act, C.R.S. § 24-10-103(6), and therefore immunity may be waived. Colucci v. Town of Vail In an appeal
addressing issues relating to potential personal liability of a corporate
shareholder and another corporate insider who is not a shareholder,
officer, or director, the court first concluded that under C.R.S.
§ 13-25-127(1), the burden of proof in an action to pierce the
corporate veil is by a preponderance of the evidence, not by clear
and convincing evidence. The court also held that in appropriate circumstances,
the corporate veil may be pierced to impose personal liability on
a corporate insider who is not a shareholder, officer, or director.
McCallum
Family L.L.C. v. Winger Evidence supported
the courts dismissal of the county Department of Human Services
from adependency and neglect case because (1) the department stated
there were no child protective issues remaining in the case; (2) the
department was not providing any services for the family; and (3)
the guardian ad litem did not object to the childrens remaining
in their parents custody; did not argue the parents had not
complied with their treatment plans; and did not specify additional
services the department could or would provide, that were not already
being provided by therapists and school professionals. Moreover, there
was no indication in the record that school professionals would not
fulfill their duty to report to the appropriate authorities any child
protection concerns. The court of appeals therefore rejected the the
guardian ad litem's contention that the trial court committed reversible
error in dismissing the department from the case. People
In the Interest of E.D November 2, 2009 After getting snowed in a bit last week and having computer issues, I'm a bit behind on updates. This post contains today's supreme court announcements. It also has last week's court of appeals announcements and the list of the cases the court decided, but summaries will have to be posted later this week. Today's supreme court announcements are here. The court issued one decision, which is summarized below. The court granted cert. in 4 cases, which follow the case summary. On remand from the supreme court, the water court entered a conditional decree for the Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District and the San Juan Water Conservancy District based upon a planning period extending to 2055. On appeal, Trout Unlimited argued that the planning period should extend only to 2040. The supreme court upheld the water court's finding that the finding that the 2055 planning period is reasonable, but agreed with Trout Unlimited that current evidence in the record did not support the conditionally-decreed amounts of water. The court remanded for the water court to take additional evidence regarding specified decree provisions and a determination of water amounts reasonably necessary to serve the Districts reasonably anticipated needs in the 2055 period, above its current water supply. Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v. Trout Unlimited No. 09SC218,
Weinstein v. People Whether there was sufficient evidence of the Petitioners required knowledge to reach the jury on the charge of burglary. No. 09SC375,
Pellman v. People No. 09SC478,
Wend v. People No. 09SC719,
Catlin v. Tormey Bewley Corporation. Whether a litigant may recover expert witness fees as an actual cost or prevailing party cost where the expert witness is precluded from testifying, but where it was reasonable to believe, at the time it was incurred, that the expert would be permitted to testify. Whether litigants may recover as actual costs or prevailing party costs money paid to lay witnesses to reimburse the lay witnesses for wages lost due to appearing to testify. The court of appeals' announcements from last Thursday are here. The court issued the following decisions, including 10 published opinions. I will summarize those later this week: Published Opinions
October 26, 2009 The supreme court issued no case announcements today. The court has recently issued rules to show cause in the following C.A.R. 21 and 21.1 proceedings: No. 09SA282, In re: People v. Almeyda Synopsis: Petitioner Edwin Almeyda seeks an order to show cause why his sentences in two Fremont County cases should not be declared fully served. Almeyda was convicted in 1988 in three separate matters -- two in Fremont County and one in El Paso County. Pursuant to section 17-22.5-101, C.R.S., the DOC construed the sentences as one continuous 31 year sentence. In March 2001, he was granted parole, and in March 2003 parole was revoked. Almeyda argues, and the El Paso District Court found, that he could not be reincarcerated for more than 5 years, and that he has served his sentences in full. On September 30, 2009, the supreme court issued a rule to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondent Mary Carlson, Director of CDOC Time and Release Operations, is directed to provide a written answer on or before October 30, 2009 why the requested relief should not be granted. Almeyda has 30 days from receipt of the answer within which to reply. No. 09SA280, In re: People v. Ray Synopsis: Petitioner Robert Keith Ray seeks issuance of a stay in this death penalty case until the court rules in People v. Sir Mario Owens, 08SA402, and an order instructing the district court to allow the time permitted by Crim. P. 32.2 to file any post-trial motions. Specifically, he requests that imposition of a death sentence, which triggers the statutory non-extendable two year deadline for completing all postconviction and appellate litigation pursuant to section 16-12-208, C.R.S., should be stayed here until the court determines in the Owens matter whether the "no extension" provision of the two-year deadline is constitutional. He also requests the supreme court to determine whether Judge Rafferty's ruling in the Owens case that the "no extensions" provision of the Unitary Review System is unconstitutional comepls him to formally enter the same ruling in his matter. Finally, he asks the supreme court to determine whether the district court exceeded its jurisdiction when it made motions for new trial due two weeks prior to sentencing even though Crim P. 32.2 provides that the defendant may file such motions no later than 15 days after the imposition of a sentence. On September 30, 2009, the supreme court issued an order to show cause why the requested relief shold not be granted. Respondent The Honorable Gerald J. Rafferty and the People of the State of Colorado are directed to provide a written answer on or before October 30, 2009. Petitioner Ray has 30 days from receipt of the answer within which to reply. No. 09SA257, In re: Rocky Mountain Bank v. France Synopsis: On September 10, 2009, the supreme court accepted the following certified question of law from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado: Whether a financing statement, which identifies the individual debtor's correct first and last name, only, but does not include the debtor's middle initial or middle name and thereby does not indetify the debtor's full legal name, sufficiently provides the name of the debtor consistent with Colo. Rev. Stat. section 4-9-503(a)(4)(A) so as to establish a perfected and enforceable secured claim. The Trustee's opening brief is due on or before October 13, 2009. The Bank's answer brief shall be filed within 30 days from receipt of the opening brief. The Trustee's reply brief may be filed within 14 days from receipt of the answer brief. No. 09SA247, In re: People v. Shirley Synopsis: The People seek relief from the district court's order in this aggravated incest case that their endorsed and subpoenaed expert witness could not testify in the People's case in chief, but only as a rebuttal witness, and only after an offer of proof to determine whether the testimony is rebuttal. On August 31, 2009, the court issued an order to show cause why the requested relief should not be granted. Respondent Darin Shirley is directed to provide a written answer on or before September 30, 2009. The People have 30 days from receipt of the answer within which to reply. No. 09SA216, In re the Marriage of Weis Synopsis: Petitioner Melanie Bergeron seeks relief from the El Paso County Court's order holding her in county jail pursuant to a contempt order for her failure to pay certain debts that petitioner contends were subject to an automatic stay of the bankruptcy code. On August 10, 2009,
the supreme court ordered that petitioner should be released from
jail. It further issued a rule to show cause why the relief requested
should not be granted. respondents the Honorable Jann DuBois and Craig
Weis are directed to provide a written answer on or before August
31. Petitioner has 20 days from receipt of the answer within which
to reply. October 22, 2009 Here are the summaries of last week's court of appeals' decisions. After these summaries are today's announcements and the list of unpublished decisions the court released. The court of appeals held that United States Supreme Court precedent does not dictate that the absence of an authorizing law or condition of probation necessarily renders unconstitutional a warrantless search of a probationers residence based on reasonable suspicion. Instead, the totality of all other relevant circumstances may render such a search reasonable. The court assessed those circumstances and concluded that defendants reasonable expectation of privacy in his residence was greatly reduced and that the state insterests were substantial, especially since defendants status was as a probationer on ISP. The court concluded that the probation officers reasonable suspicion that defendant had violated conditions of his probation was sufficient to justify the search of defendants bedroom: neither a warrant nor probable cause was required. People v. Samuels The trial court committed reversible error when it denied defendant's challenge for cause to a prospective juror, because the juror refused to hold the prosecution to its burden of proof. During voir dire the prospective juror responded to the following statement from defense counsel: "And so correct me if Im putting words in your mouth. Ms. [N.], I think, thinks that its sort of a balancing of the evidence, and one side has to prove one thing and the other side has to prove one thing, that you sort of do a weighing test at the end, and we both have a[n] equal burden. Would you say that? PROSPECTIVE JUROR N.: Absolutely." People v. Hancock The make-my-day statute, C.R.S. § 18-1-704.5 does not authorize an appeal from a pretrial order denying immunity. The court of appeals concluded that in the absence of legislative authorization, such an order is unreviewable. People v. Wood Whether the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires that a pro se defendant
who voluntarily absents himself from his criminal trial -- as contrasted
with such a defendant who is held to have waived the right of self-representation
by engaging in disruptive behavior -- be appointed counsel during
his absence has not been decided by the United States Supreme Court
and is unresolved in Colorado. Addressing that question, the court
of appeals concluded that the trial courts failure to direct
advisory counsel to take control of the case when defendant, Michael
Alan Brante, voluntarily absented himself did not violate the Sixth
Amendment. People
v. Brante Defendant's convictions for vehicular eluding and second degree assault were not based on identical evidence, and, therefore, the trial court had the statutory authority to impose consecutive sentences. Defendant argued that, because the only injury that occurred was a non-serious knee injury one officer sustained during the vehicular eluding episode, and because that officer was named in both of the counts to which she pleaded guilty, the second degree assault conviction grounded on her admission to recklessly causing serious bodily injury by means of a deadly weapon was based on evidence identical to that which supporteds the vehicular eluding conviction. In response, the prosecution contendeds that, because defendants guilty plea to the second degree assault conviction was not based on any evidence at all, (1) this conviction is not based on the same evidence as the vehicular eluding conviction; and (2) she waived her right to demand concurrent sentencing pursuant to C.R.S. §18-1-408(3). The court agreed with the prosecution's argument. People v. Maestas Mother filed
a complaint against defendant nursing home on July 1, 2005, alleging
numerous acts of negligence in her care during her residency at the
nursing home. Because she was incapacitated, the suit was filed on
her behalf by her next friend and daughter. On July 22, 2005, mother
died. Defendant had not filed an answer at that point. That same day,
mother's counsel filed a suggestion of death on the record pursuant
to C.R.C.P. 25(a)(1). In the suggestion of death, counsel stated that
he was conferring with the surviving children and would notify the
court of any substitution of parties or claims within ninety days.
No substitution of claims or parties occurred, and on November 11,
2005, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the
failure to substitute parties pursuant to C.R.C.P. 25(a)(1). No response
was filed, and the trial court subsequently dismissed the first lawsuit
with prejudice. On July 17, 2007, the daughters, individually and
as representatives of mother's estate, filed their complaint against
defendant for wrongful death and violations of the CCPA arising from
the care in the nursing home. The trial court dismissed the second
lawsuit on March 1, 2008 on the basis of claim preclusion. The court
of appeals reversed the dismissal of both actions. First, the court
concluded that dismissal of the first suit under C.R.C.P. 25(a)(1)
was not proper, because Rule 25(a)(1) mandates personal service of
the suggestion of death on nonparty successors or personal representatives
in accordance with C.R.C.P. 4. Because the daughters were not personally
served with the suggestion of death, the ninety-day limit to substitute
parties was not triggered and the trial court improperly dismissed
the first lawsuit. Because the first suit was not properly dismissed,
the second suit could not be dismissed on claim preclusion grounds.
Sawyer
v. Kindred Nursing Centers West, LLC Defendant
challenged the summary denial of his postconviction motion challenging
the constitutionality of his conviction and sentence for second degree
kidnapping as a class two felony, and alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel for failing to raise that constitutional issue at trial.
The court of appeals rejected defendant's challenges. The court concluded
that although was defendant was acquitted of the sexual assault charge,
enhancement of his kidnapping conviction from a class four to a class
two felony based on the sexual assault did not violate double jeopardy.
The court noted that the plain language of the kidnapping statute
specifically requires only that the person kidnapped be a victim of
sexual assault, not that the kidnapper have perpetrated that crime.
See § 18-3-302(3)(a). Therefore, the court concluded that the
legislature sought to punish more severely any person who participated
in the kidnapping when the person kidnapped was also sexually assaulted
during the kidnapping. Thus, contrary to defendants argument,
he was not being punished for the crime of which he was acquitted,
but for the kidnapping, and such punishment is enhanced because the
victim of the kidnapping suffered some additional harm during the
kidnapping. People
v. Aguilar-Ramos In a cross-appeal in a criminal case, the the Attorney General contended the trial court erred by requiring the prosecution to prove defendants prior indecent exposure convictions to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The court of appeals disapproved of the trial courts ruling because the statute is a sentence enhancer and prior convictions are exempt from the jury requirement imposed by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). People v. Schreiber In a dispute between father and mother involving custody of their minor daughter, the court of appeals noted that conflicting state rulings have created an untenable impasse: a Nebraska court has awarded father custody and issued a warrant to arrest mother for keeping the child in Colorado, while a Colorado district court has awarded mother custody and refused to enforce the Nebraska orders. Father contended that Colorado courts must give full faith and credit to the Nebraska orders. The Colorado district court rejected this contention, reasoning that (1) only Colorado, not Nebraska, had child-custody jurisdiction because Colorado is the childs home state; and therefore (2) the Nebraska custody orders are unenforceable. The court of appeals agreed with the district courts first premise, but noted that the second did not follow inexorably from the first. The court of appeals held that the Nebraska courts jurisdictional and later rulings are binding on Colorado courts. The court therefore concluded that it was constrained to reverse the district courts judgment, but it "strongly urge[d] the Nebraska court and, if necessary, that states appellate courts to reconsider Nebraskas apparent lack of jurisdiction." In re the Parental Responsibilities Concerning L.S. The prosecution
appealed the trial courts order sentencing defendant, a sex
offender who pled guilty to a misdemeanor charge of failing to register
at an additional address, to two years of probation, because the court
did not include sex offense-specific treatment, which the prosecution
argued resulted in an illegal sentence. The court of appeals noted,
"Conditions of probation are not subject to appellate review
'unless probation is granted contrary to the provisions of this title.'§
18-1.3-104(1)(a), C.R.S. 2009. Although we accept appeals where a
condition of probation was based on 'considerations not statutorily
or constitutionally authorized,'see People v. Hernandez-Clavel, 186
P.3d 96, 98 (Colo. App. 2008) (cert. granted June 30, 2008) (collecting
cases), we discern no such ground here because, based on the information
before the court when it imposed sentence, treatment was not mandatory.
We further conclude that because in the plea disposition, the prosecutor
agreed that it would 'take no position'on the sentence, the prosecution
was barred from urging the court, months after [defendant ] had been
sentenced, to require a second sex offense specific evaluation. Therefore,
we do not consider whether that evaluation required the court to impose
treatment." Judge Bernard dissented, concluding, "As a basic
principle, I strongly agree with the proposition that people should
say what they mean and mean what they say. The criminal law breathes
life into this proposition by requiring that prosecutors, as representatives
of the government, must almost always be held to the promises they
make when entering into plea dispositions. But, 'almost always'is
not always. There are two exceptions to this paradigm, which are pointed
out in the majoritys opinion. I think that one of those, the
imposition of an illegal sentence, is present here. I would conclude
that the trial courts ultimate decision declining to require
defendant to participate in treatment resulted in an illegal sentence.
I believe that the trial court made two legal mistakes that led to
the illegal sentence. First, it relied on the wrong statute to conclude
that defendants guilty plea here disqualified him from the requirement
that sex offenders participate in treatment. Second, once the trial
court ordered and received the second evaluation, it is my view that
the court was compelled to require defendant to participate in modified
sex-offender treatment as a condition of probation." People
v. Sanders The court of appeals' announcements for today are here. The court issued these unpublished decisions: 07CA0657 People
v. Dustin Matthew Schiff October 19, 2009 Here are today's supreme court announcements. The court issued three decisions, summarized below. The court also granted cert. in one case. After a proceeding
in water court that upheld the state engineers proposed rules
governing Water Division Three in the San Luis Valley, the water court
imposed costs upon the parties that had objected to the rules. The
proceedings involved seven different parties, included twenty-six
days of hearings with testimony from over a dozen expert witnesses
and was preceded by extensive discovery, including expensive computer
modeling. On a direct appeal from the water court the supreme court
held that proceedings such as these, which occurred under C.R.S. §
37-92-501(3)(a), were sufficiently trial-like to provide a water court
with the discretion, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(d), to award costs to
prevailing parties when the court sees fit to do so. The court reversed
the amount awarded and remanded for further proceedings. Justice Eid,
joined by justice Hobbs, concurred in part and dissented in part,
concluding, "Because, in my view, the rulemaking nature of a
section 37-92-501(3)(a) proceeding is entirely inconsistent with Rule
54(d)s notion of awarding costs as a matter 'of course to the
prevailing party'in contested litigation, I respectfully dissent from
that portion of the majoritys opinion finding that costs may
be awarded against a member of the public who participated in such
a proceeding." Cotton
Creek Circles v. Rio Grande Water Conservation District The supreme
court held that the plaintiffs--parents from eight school districts
across the state acting in their individual capacities and on behalf
of their school age children and fourteen school districts in the
San Luis Valley--haved standing to the current state's public school
financing system as violating the Colorado constitutional mandate
of the education clause requiring a thorough and uniform
system of public education. The plaintiffs claim that the system is
severely underfunded and allocates funds on an arbitrary and irrational
basis. The court concluded , 4-3, holds that these challenges are
justiciable and that the plaintiffs must be given the opportunity
to prove their claim. Following Lujan v. Colorado State
Board of Education, a 1982 precedent, the court held that
it is the responsibility of the judiciary to determine whether the
plaintiffs prove that the public school finance system is not rationally
related to this constitutional mandate. Therefore, the court reversed
the court of appeals' holding to the contrary. Justice Rice, joined
by justices Eid and Coats, dissented. She would have adopted the political
question doctrine as framed by the United States Supreme Court, and
would have concluded that the plaintiffs' claims are nonjusticiable
political questions. Lobato
v. State In a case involving the remedial revival statute, C.R.S. § 13-80-111(1), a complaint was timely filed against a deceased, non-existent defendant and was later amended to name the estate of the deceased and the special administrator of that estate as defendants. The court concluded that the remedial revival statute cannot be used to revive a timely claim improperly filed against a non-existent defendant when the proper defendants were not added until after the statute of limitations ran. The court held that the trial court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the case despite the initially improper defendant. The remedial revival statute could not be invoked because the case was not terminated because of lack of jurisdiction or improper venue within the meaning of the statute, rather it was dismissed based on the statute of limitations. The court also held olds that the amended complaints do not relate back to the original complaint because the defendants did not receive notice of the suit prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Justice Eid, joined by Justices Martinez and Coats, concurred in part and concurred in the judgment in part, concluding that, unlike the majority, she "would interpret the term 'jurisdiction' in section 13-80-111(1) as referencing only subject matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction." Currier v. Sutherland The court granted cert in one case: City of Manassa
v. Ruff, No. 09SC612 October 15, 2009 Today's post contains this week's supreme court announcements and the summaries of the cases the supreme court decied, along with the new cases in which the court granted cert. It also contains the court of appeals announcements for today and the list of cases the court issued. I will post summaries of today's court of appeals published opinions early next week. Here are this week's supreme court announcements. The court issued 8 decisions, summarized below. The court also granted cert. in 7 cases. The issues in those appeals follow the summaries. Intervenors obtained a radioactive materials license and a hazardous waste permit from the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (the Department) without first obtaining a Certificate of Designation from Adams County that allowed disposal of the materials contemplated by the license and permit. Adams County brought two suits against the Department to challenge its issuance of the license and permit. The trial court found that Adams County did not have standing, and the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court held that that Adams County has standing to challenge the Departments issuance of the license and permit. Adams County suffered an injury in fact to a legally protected interest, as it had an express statutory right to grant or deny a Certificate of Designation covering the contemplated materials prior to the Departments issuance of a license or a permit. Furthermore, Adams County is not subordinate to the Department in this context, as it has a statutory separate power to issue or to refuse to issue Certificates of Designation. Justice Hobbs, joined by Chief Justice Mullarkey, concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that Adams County had standing, but only to challenge the the Department's issuance of the hazardous waste permit and radioactive materials license in the absence of the County first being able to exercise its legally protected right to review an application for a Certificate of Designation for disposal of the wastes contemplated by the facility and to decide whether to issue such a Certificate. He disagreed with the majority's conclusion that county issuance of a Certificate of Designation is a prerequisite to the Departments issuance of a permit or license because such an interpretation contravenes Colorados comprehensive statutory scheme for hazardous and low-level radioactive waste disposal and frustrates the Departments duty and authority to implement the Rocky Mountain Low-Level Radioactive Waste Compact , codified at C.R.S. § 24-60-2202, which obligates party states to open and operate waste disposal facilities sufficient to manage the low-level radioactive waste generated within the region. Board of County Commissioners v. Colo. Dept. of Public Health In this case arising out of an automobile accident, insurereas subrogee of its insured, brought suit against defendants, seeking to recover $100,000 it had advanced to its insured under an uninsured/under insured motorist policy. A jury trial was held and insurer was awarded $16,000 in damages. At the trial, an attorney who had previously represented insureretestified that she valued the case at $7,500. The supreme court that, while the act of subrogation has its roots in equity, the presence of a subrogee party does not transform otherwise legal claims into claims in equity. Therefore, the utilization of a jury as fact finder in this case was proper. As for the testimony of the former attorney, insurers objection to such testimony did not provide the trial court with an adequate opportunity to address the argument made on appeal that the evidence was inadmissible. American Family Insurance v. DeWitt Petitioner was convicted of multiple sexual-assault-on-a-child and incest-related crimes. On direct appeal, the court of appeals accepted the Peoples concession that the trial court erred in excluding testimony from a therapist of the defendants stepdaughter, on grounds of privilege. Rather than deciding whether the error was harmless, however, the court of appeals remanded for a hearing to obtain the therapists testimony and to determine whether that testimony was constitutionally material to the defendants case. See People v. Krutsinger, 121 P.3d 318 (Colo. App. 2005). Upon recertification, the court of appeals agreed with the trial courts assessment that the error was not material and therefore not of constitutional magnitude, and it found the error harmless according to the standard for evaluating nonconstitutional error. The supreme court affirmed, but concluded that the court of appeals applied the wrong legal standard by conditioning a designation of federal constitutional error on a determination that the error would impact the verdict sufficiently to be constitutionally material. The supreme court determined that the exclusion of the testimony did not deprive the defendant of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, and therefore the error did not rise to the level of federal constitutional error, even under the proper standard. The court also concluded that the error was harmless according to the standard for nonconstitutional error, and therefore affirmed. Krutsinger v. People In a case
of adverse possession under color of title case, the supreme court
affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial
courts grant of summary judgment for petitioner for an unrestricted
fee simple estate in a condominium parking space. Petitioner attempted
to convey the parking space to a third-party non-condominium owner.
The court held that the parking space is a condominium common element
subject to the alienability restrictions included in the condominiums
Declaration, which functions as a restrictive covenant running with
the land. Because the deed of conveyance to petitioner explicitly
incorporated the Declaration and its restrictions, the parking space
cannot be sold or leased to a third-party non-condominium owner. PUC'S
assessment of a civil penalty for petitioner's refusal to provide
records complied with the constitutional and statutory authorities.
First, federal law does not preempt the PUC from requiring motor vehicle
carriers to produce towing authorizations during the course of an
investigation. Second, because non-consensual towing is a closely-regulated
industry, and because the PUCs regulations meet the conditions
for a valid warrantless administrative search, the PUCs request
for records was constitutional. Finally, the PUC did not exceed its
authority or abuse its discretion in assessing the civil penalty.
Eddie's
Leaf Spring v. Colorado PUC In an interlocutory appeal, the prosecution challenged the trial courts order suppressing all evidence obtained as a result of a police seizure of the defendant. Defendant was in the drivers seat of a car that had come to a stop across a sidewalk against a fence. Based on the circumstances, the police had reason to believe that he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs. When the police removed him from the car and ordered him to the ground, he repeatedly took a combative stance toward them. The supreme court held , under the totality of the circumstances, that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and probable cause to arrest him for driving under the influence and resisting arrest. People v. Brown In an interlocutory appeal by the People, the supreme court affirmed the district court's suppression of statements defendant made in response to police interrogation. The supreme court held that the defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda when he was told by a police officer that if he would not come to the police station for questioning voluntarily, he would be forced to go against his will. Because the defendant did not receive Miranda warnings before his subsequent interrogation, the supreme court affirmeds the suppression of the defendants statements. People v. Sandoval Petitioner
challenged the actions of the Title Setting Board in setting titles,
ballot titles, and submission clauses for Initiatives 2009-2010 #22,
#23, and #24. The supreme court rejected petitioner's argument that
the titles violate the Colorado Constitutions prohibition on
multiple subjects, Colo. Const. art. V, § 1(5.5). After reading
the titles as a whole and considering their text in light of the context
provided by their heading, the court concluded that the titles presented
only one subject to voters. The court also rejects the argument that
certain words in the titles are misleading because they use legal
terms of art and thus are likely to be implemented in ways distinct
from what might be expected by voters without legal training. The
court held that such a challenge asks for its legal interpretation
of the ballot initiatives prior to their enactment, which is beyond
the scope of the courts review. The court affirmed the actions
of the Title Setting Board. The court granted cert in these cases: No. 09SC119,
French v. People No. 09SC184,
People v. Zhuk No. 09SC189,
Bly v. Story No. 09SC224,
Oram v. People No. 09SC451,
Rocky Mountain Festivals, Inc. v. Parsons Corporation No. 09SC598,
Crandall v. City and County of Denver No. 09SC680,
Brown v. People Today's court of appeals announcements are here. The court issued the following opinions, 11 published decisions: Published Opinions October 9, 2009 The supreme court will release the following decisions on Tuesday (Monday is a legal holiday): 07SC977 AND 07SC978
- Board of County Commissioners of the County of Adams v. Colo. Dept.
of Public Health Here are the summaries of last week's court of appeals decisions: Unpreserved double jeopardy errors in sentecing context may be reviewed for plain error. The court of appeals adopted the reasoning of federal circuit courts in allowing such review. Judge Bernard specially concurred, rejecting that rationale, and concluding that such plain error review should not be available to defendants. People v. Tillery The Colorado Rape Shield statute (C.R.S. § 18-3-407) does not violate equal protection. Defendants in sexual assault cases are not within a suspect classification and, therefore, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that there be a rational and reasonable basis for the classification and that it bear a fair relationship to the purpose of the statute. The court of appeals noted that section 18-3-407 is a rational attempt by the legislature to protect the complainant from harassment and humiliation and to encourage victims of sexual assaults to report crimes unhindered by the fear of having their past sexual activities made public. People v. Villa Defendant's conviction for attempted murder was reversed due to prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument. The court of appeals held that hold the prosecutions closing arguments were so flagrantly improper as to constitute plain error that should have prompted corrective action by the trial court even absent timely objection. An assault conviction was affirmed because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. The prosecutor's improper conduct included: accusing defendant of having lied over and over and claiming that thereby showed his guilt; making inflammatory appeals to jury emotions; making repeated personal attacks on a defense expert who relied on crime scene evidence to opine that the shooting had occurred differently than the victim had testified; exhorting jurors to do justice for other strangers; and misisstating the presumption of innocence. People v. McBride Defendant, who had been a legal intern for a district attorney in Colorado, sent a letter posing as the district attorney to his appointed counsel in a pending Montana criminal case. The letter appeared to attempt to influence the judge in the Montana case. Defendant was charged with criminal impersonation and attempting to influence a public servant, among other charges. He was convicted and on appeal argued that the letter should have been excluded under the attorney client privilege, as it was a letter between him and his lawyer. Not surprisingly, the court of appeals rejected that argument. People v. Tucker The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction for possession of a weapon by a previous offender. It was uncontested that the pistol found in defendant's car was inoperable. Defendant had told the police that, when he found the pistol in a street gutter, it looked as if it had been run over and did not work. The pistol not only lacked grips, but also had a crack in the base of the gun handle that prevented the gun from being loaded. The trigger bar was not how it should be, and the firing pin would not activate. One witness opined that, to make it functional, a person would have to take the pistol to a gunsmith to have it disassembled according to the manufacturers specifications and rebuilt by replacing the missing parts. C.R.S. § 18-1-901(3)(h) defines a firearm as any handgun, automatic, revolver, pistol, rifle, shotgun, or other instrument or device capable or intended to be capable of discharging bullets, cartridges, or other explosive charges. The court of appeals concluded that under section 18-1-901(3)(h), a pistol (no matter what its condition, no matter what a defendants intent may be with respect to it) is a per se firearm. People v. ONeal In an attempted reckless manslaughter case, the trial court erred in refusing defendants tendered instruction regarding multiple assailants. But the trial court's instructions told the jury to consider the totality of the evidence, including multiple assailants. So the error was harmless. People v. Riley In a constitutional challenge to the Englewood Sign Code, which is contained in the Englewood Municipal Code, the court of appeals concluded that the codes special review procedure constitutes a constitutionally impermissible prior restraint on free speech. Mahaney v. City of Englewood Plaintiff
appealed the district court's judgment affirming the revocation of
his driver's license by the Department of Revenue for driving with
an excessive breath alcohol content. The court of appeals concluded
that the Department improperly denied plaintiffs request for
a subpoena for the records concerning the functioning of the intoxilyzer
used for his breath test, and therefore reversed and remanded for
a new revocation hearing after the issuance of the subpoena. Gilbert
v. Julian October 8, 2009 This post has today's and last week's court of appeals case announcements. I have not been able to get to the summaries of last week's published decisions, but I hope to by the end of tomorrow. Here are today's court of appeals announcements. The court issued the following unpublished decisions: 07CA0228 People
v. Ricky Eugene Bailey Here are the court of appeals' case announcements from October 1. The court issued both published and unpublished decisions: Published decisions: People v.
Tillery Unpublished decisions: 06CA0792 People
v. Peter Karl Weinreich October 5, 2009 My firm is officially moved into its new space, and I hope I can catch up soon, after unpacking and getting settled. The supreme court's announcements for today are here. The court issued no decisions and did not grant cert. in any cases. I will try to get the summaries of last week's court of appeals' decisions posted in the next few days.
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